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Summary  
 
Several years ago, a financial and economic crisis struck the world. Although originated 
in the United States, it quickly increased in intensity and reached all countries. In a context of 
financial contagion, governments (at national and supranational level) needed to react through 
measures designed to revive their economies. The aim of this PhD thesis is to highlight the 
importance of regional and/or country specific characteristics for the public decision making in 
order to stimulate economic growth, by analyzing the relationship between GDP and 
unemployment and the effects of fiscal stimuli programs. 
The first part of the thesis is dedicated to analyzing the rule-of-thumb also known as 
Okun’s Law at regional level in three emerging countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We 
find high values (in absolute values) for the Okun coefficient, compared with the results 
emphasized by the recent literature that mostly focuses on developed countries. First, we 
consider two emerging countries, selected for presenting a strong connection in terms of history, 
culture and economic activity, namely the Czech Republic and Slovakia. One interesting result 
is that Okun’s Law appears not to be statistically significant in the regions in which average 
economic growth is low and average and long-term unemployment is high. Second, we analyze 
the same relationship in a newer member of the European Union, namely Romania. Here, Okun 
coefficients are not statistically significant in the most developed regions, namely with the 
highest average economic growth and with the lowest share of population at poverty risk. 
Consequently, our results suggest that Okun’s Law is far from being not “universal”; as such, 
policymakers need to take into account the regional specificities in the design of their policies 
regarding growth and unemployment. In regions where Okun’s coefficient is statistically 
significant, public authorities can make use of demand-side policies of Keynesian inspiration 
in order to reduce unemployment, while in regions where the coefficient is not significant 
policymakers need to turn their focus to supply-based policies. 
In the second part of this thesis we approach the fiscal multiplier concept and its rebirth 
since the Great Recession, from the perspective of lessons to learn from developed countries. 
We begin by presenting the methods used to estimate multipliers and we survey the recent 
studies that assess fiscal multipliers. We begin by grouping the literature taking into account 
nonlinearities in the multipliers evaluation, such as: (i) the position in the economic cycle, (ii) 
the debt level, (iii) the monetary policy and (iv) the exchange rate regime. Subsequently, we 
present multipliers values by the level economic of development. Contrary to the wide number 
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of studies focusing on developed countries, only few studies assess multipliers in developing 
and emerging countries. In particular, this latter strand of studies suggests that fiscal multipliers 
might be lower in developing and emerging countries compared to developed countries. 
Capitalizing on this evidence, we provide an analysis that consists of estimating multipliers in 
selected European Union (EU) countries, by specifically accounting for a potential role of the 
Eurozone (namely, being a member country or not). More precisely, we assess fiscal multipliers 
in four groups of countries: (i) the “historical” EU countries, (ii) EU countries that are not 
expected to adopt the Euro, (iii) countries that recently joined the EU and are expected to join 
the Eurozone in the future, and (iv) Eurozone countries heavily affected by the crisis. In 
particular, we find that being in the Eurozone or expecting to join the Eurozone in the future 
generates expenditure multipliers in accordance with the Keynesian theory. 
Finally, the third and last part of the thesis deals with evaluating fiscal multipliers in 
developing and emerging countries. On the one hand, we focus on the Mediterranean area, 
providing an appealing environment for the scope of our analysis due to the diversity of 
countries that compose it (in terms of cultures, traditions, religions) and to the heterogeneous 
response of these countries to the current crisis (countries that experienced negative growth 
rates coexist in the Mediterranean area with countries that managed to secure – at least for a 
period – positive growth rates). We reveal a positive and significant response of output on 
impact following a consumption (investment) shock in African (Asian) countries, a negative 
response after an investment shock in African countries or statistically not significant response 
for a consumption (investment) shock in Asian (small EU) countries. On the other hand, we 
analyze fiscal multipliers in eleven Central and Eastern European countries. We present results 
for pooled, country-specific and groups of countries (disentangled by the exchange rate regime, 
the level of economic development, the fiscal stance, and the openness degree). We reveal 
positive and significant multipliers for the whole group of countries, but output’s response 
becomes not significant or even negative when estimated at country level or in separate groups 
of countries. 
 
Keywords: fiscal policy, economic crisis, Okun’s Law, fiscal multipliers, developing and 
emerging countries, panel VAR, panel cointegration. 
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Résumé  
 
Il y a quelques années qu’une crise financière et économique a frappé le monde. Née 
aux Etats-Unis, elle a progressée rapidement et s’est propagée à tous les pays. Dans un contexte 
de contagion financière, les gouvernements (nationaux et supranationaux) ont dû réagir en 
adoptant des mesures visant à relancer l'économie. L'objectif de cette thèse est de mettre en 
évidence l'importance des caractéristiques spécifiques à la fois régionales et nationales dans la 
prise de décision publique visant à stimuler la croissance économique, notamment par l'analyse 
de la relation entre le PIB et le chômage et les effets des programmes de relance budgétaire. 
La première partie de cette thèse est dédiée à l’analyse de la règle d'or connue comme 
la loi d'Okun, au niveau régional, dans trois pays émergents d'Europe Centrale et de l’Est. Nous 
obtenons des valeurs élevées (en valeur absolue) pour les coefficients d'Okun, en comparaison 
avec les résultats mis en évidence par la littérature récente qui se concentre principalement sur 
les pays développés. Premièrement, on considère deux pays émergents, sélectionné pour leur 
fort lien en termes d'histoire, de la culture et de l'activité économique, à savoir la République 
Tchèque et la Slovaquie. Un résultat intéressant est que la loi d'Okun semble ne pas être 
statistiquement significative dans les régions où la croissance moyenne économique est faible 
et où le chômage moyen et de long terme est élevé. Deuxièmement, nous analysons la même 
relation dans un nouvel état de l'Union européenne, à savoir la Roumanie. Ici, les coefficients 
d'Okun ne sont pas statistiquement significatifs dans les régions plus développées, plus 
spécifiquement où la croissance économique moyenne est élevée et la part de la population au 
risque de pauvreté est faible. Par conséquent, nos résultats suggèrent que la loi d'Okun est loin 
d’être « universelle » ; de surcroît, les décideurs de politique économique doivent prendre en 
compte les spécificités régionales dans la définition de leurs politiques de croissance et 
d'emploi. Dans les régions où le coefficient d'Okun est statistiquement significatif, les autorités 
publiques peuvent faire usage des politiques de demande d’inspiration keynésienne afin de 
réduire le chômage, tandis que dans les régions où les coefficients sont non-significatifs les 
décideurs doivent tourner leur attention vers les politiques d’offre. 
Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse nous approchons le concept de multiplicateur 
budgétaire et sa renaissance depuis la Grande Récession, dans la perspective des leçons à 
apprendre des pays développés. Nous commençons par présenter les méthodes utilisées pour 
estimer les multiplicateurs et nous survolons les études récentes évaluant les multiplicateurs 
budgétaires. Nous débutons par regrouper la littérature qui prend en compte les nonlinéarités 
dans l’évaluation des multiplicateurs, tels que: (i) le cycle économique, (ii) le niveau de la dette, 
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(iii) la politique monétaire et (iv) le régime de taux de change. Par la suite, nous présentons les 
valeurs des multiplicateurs en fonction du niveau de développement économique. 
Contrairement au nombre très important d’études se focalisant sur les pays développés, seuls 
quelques travaux évaluent les multiplicateurs dans les pays en développement et émergents. En 
partant de cette évidence, nous développons une analyse qui consiste à estimer des 
multiplicateurs dans une sélection de pays de l’Union Européenne (UE), en prenant en compte 
spécifiquement un rôle pontentiel pour la zone euro (à savoir, être ou pas membre). Plus 
précisément, nous calculons des multiplicateurs budgétaires dans quatre groupes de pays: (i) le 
groupe « historique » des pays de l’UE, (ii) des pays de l'UE qui ne sont pas censés adopter 
l'euro, (iii) des pays qui ont récemment adhéré à l'UE et qui devraient rejoindre la zone euro à 
l'avenir, et (iv) des pays de la zone euro fortement touchés par la crise. Les résultats montrent, 
entre autres, que l’appartenance à la zone euro ou la possible intégration à la zone euro à l'avenir 
génèrent des multiplicateurs de dépenses conformes à la théorie keynésienne. 
Enfin, la troisième et dernière partie propose une évaluation des multiplicateurs 
budgétaires dans les pays en développement et émergents. D'une part, nous nous concentrons 
sur la région méditerranéenne, qui est très attrayante pour l’objectif de notre analyse en raison 
de la diversité des pays qui la composent (en termes de culture, tradition, religion) et compte 
tenu des réponses hétérogènes de ces pays à la crise actuelle (des pays qui connaissent des taux 
de croissance négatifs coexistent dans la région méditeranéenne avec des pays qui ont réussi à 
préserver – du moins pour une certaine période – des taux de croissance positifs). Nous trouvons 
une réponse positive et significative du PIB à l'impact suite à un choc de consommation 
(d’investissement) dans les pays africains (asiatique), une réponse négative après un choc 
d’investissement dans les pays africains ou une réponse statistiquement non significative suite 
à un choc de consommation (d’investissements) dans les pays asiatiques (dans les petits pays 
de l'UE). D'autre part, nous analysons les multiplicateurs budgétaires dans onze pays d'Europe 
Centrale et de l’Est. Nous présentons des résultats pour l’ensemble des pays, pour chaque pays 
et pour des groupes de pays (répartis selon le régime de change, le niveau de développement 
économique, la situation budgétaire et le taux d'ouverture). Nous mettons en évidence des 
multiplicateurs positifs et significatifs pour l'ensemble des pays, mais la réponse du PIB devient 
non significative, voire négative, lors de l'estimation pour chaque pays ou pour des groupes de 
pays. 
Mots-clés: politique budgétaire, crise économique, Loi d'Okun, multiplicateurs budgétaires, 
pays en développement et émergentes, panel VAR, cointegration en panel.  
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Rezumat  
 
Acum câțiva ani, o criză financiară şi economică a lovit economia mondială. Deşi 
originară din Statele Unite, criza a avut o creştere rapidă în intensitate şi s-a propagat în toate 
ţările. Într-un context de contagiune financiară, guvernele (la nivel naţional și supranaţional) au 
fost nevoite să reacţioneze, adoptând măsuri având ca scop revigorarea economiei. Scopul 
acestei teze de doctorat este de a evidenţia importanţa caracteristicilor specifice atât la nivel 
regional cât şi la nivel de ţară pentru luarea deciziilor publice care vizează stimularea creşterii 
economice, mai exact prin analizarea relaţiei dintre PIB şi şomaj şi a efectelor programelor de 
stimuli bugetari. 
Prima parte a tezei este dedicată analizei regulii de aur cunoscuta sub numele de Legea 
lui Okun, la nivel regional, în trei ţări emergente din Europa Centrală şi de Est. Obţinem valori 
ridicate (în valoare absolută) pentru coeficienţii Okun, în comparaţie cu rezultatele subliniate 
de literatura recentă, care se concentrează în special pe ţările dezvoltate. În primul rând, 
analizăm două țări emergente selectate pentru legătura puternică dintre ele în ceea ce priveşte 
istoria, cultura şi activitatea economică, şi anume, Republica Cehă și Slovacia. Un rezultat 
interesant este că Legea lui Okun pare a nu fi semnificativă statistic în regiunile în care creşterea 
economică medie este scăzută şi şomajul mediu sau pe termen lung este ridicat. În al doilea 
rând, analizăm aceeaşi relaţie într-un stat relativ nou al Uniunii Europene, şi anume România. 
Aici, coeficienţii Okun nu sunt semnificativi din punct de vedere statistic în regiunile cele mai 
dezvoltate, mai exact, cu cea mai mare creştere economică medie şi cu cea mai mică pondere a 
populaţiei cu risc de sărăcie. Prin urmare, rezultate noastre sugerează că Legea lui Okun este 
departe de a fi "universală”; în consecinţă, factorii de decizie publică trebuie să ia în considerare 
specificul regional în definirea politicilor privind creşterea economică şi şomajul. În regiunile 
în care coeficientul Okun este semnificativ statistic, autorităţile publice pot folosi politici de 
cerere de inspiraţie keynesistă în vederea reducerii şomajului, în timp ce în regiunile în care 
coeficientul nu este semnificativ factorii de decizie trebuie să-şi îndrepte atenţia spre politici 
bazate pe ofertă. 
În a doua parte a acestei teze abordăm conceptul de multiplicator bugetar și renaşterea 
acestuia odată cu începutul Marii Recesiuni, dintr-o perspectivă a lecţiilor ce pot fi învăţate din 
ţările dezvoltate. Începem prin a prezenta metodele utilizate pentru a estima multiplicatorii şi 
survolăm literatura recentă care calculează multiplicatori bugetari. Punctul de plecare constă in 
gruparea literaturii ținând cont de non-liniarităţi în evaluarea multiplicatorilor, cum ar fi: (i) 
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poziția în ciclul economic, (ii) nivelul datoriei, (iii) politica monetară și (iv) regimul cursului 
de schimb. Ulterior, vom prezenta valori ale multiplicatorilor în funcţie de nivelul de dezvoltare. 
Contrar numărului mare de studii care se focalizează pe ţările devoltate, doar un număr limitat 
de studii evaluează multiplicatorii în ţările în curs de dezvoltare şi emergente. În particular, 
această ultimă parte a literaturii sugerează că multiplicatorii bugetari sunt mai mici în ţările în 
curs de dezvoltare şi emergente comparativ cu valorile obținute pentru ţările dezvoltate. 
Bazându-ne pe aceste evidenţe, dezvoltăm o analiză ce constă în estimarea multiplicatorilor în 
anumite ţări ale Uniunii Europene (UE), în special ţinând cont de rolul zonei euro (a fi ţară 
membră sau nu). Mai precis, am estimat multiplicatori bugetari în patru grupuri de țări: (i) 
grupul „istoric” de ţări UE, (ii) țările UE care nu sunt de așteptat să adopte moneda euro, (iii), 
țări care au aderat recent la UE și se așteaptă să se alăture zonei euro în viitor, și (iv) țările din 
zona euro puternic afectate de criză. În special, rezultatele arată că apartența la zona euro sau 
posibila integrare in zona euro in viitor conduce la multiplicatori de cheltuieli în conformitate 
cu teoria keynesistă. 
În cele din urmă, a treia şi ultima parte a tezei se focalizează pe calcularea 
multiplicatorilor bugetari în țările în curs de dezvoltare şi emergente. Pe de o parte, ne 
concentrăm pe zona mediteraneană, care asigură un mediu atractiv pentru scopul analizei 
noastre datorită diversităţii țărilor care o compun (în ceea ce priveşte cultura, tradiţia, religia) 
şi a răspunsurilor eterogene la criza actuală (țări care au cunoscut rate de creştere negative 
coexistă cu ţări care şi-au menținut – macar pentru o perioadă – rate de creștere pozitive). 
Descoperim un răspuns pozitiv și semnificativ al PIB-ului la impact, după un șoc de consum 
(investiții) în ţările din Africa (Asia), un răspuns negativ în urma unui şoc de investiţii în ţările 
din Africa sau un răspuns nesemnificativ statistic pentru un şoc de consum (investiţii) în ţările 
din Asia (ţările mici din UE). Pe de altă parte, analizăm multiplicatori bugetari în unsprezece 
țări din Europa Centrală și de Est. Prezentăm estimări pentru toate ţările ca ansamblu, pentru 
fiecare țară în parte și pentru grupuri de țări (împărţite în funcţie de regimul de curs de schimb, 
nivelul de dezvoltare economică, situația bugetară, precum și gradul de deschidere). Evidențiem 
multiplicatori pozitivi și semnificativi pentru întregul grup de țări, dar răspunsul PIB-ului 
devine nesemnificativ sau chiar negativ, atunci când este estimat la nivel de țară sau în grupuri 
separate de țări. 
 
Cuvinte-cheie: politică fiscală, criza economică, Legea lui Okun, multiplicatori bugetari, țări 
în curs de dezvoltare și emergente, panel VAR, cointegrare în panel. 
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General introduction: The Great Recession, unemployment and fiscal 
stimulus 
 
  
The world economies still fight the perpetuation of the crisis that started in 2007, 
generating considerable economic growth losses and major unemployment imbalances. For 
example, for the Euro Area, the ECB announced in January 2015 the Asset Purchase Program 
(APP) that pursues combined monthly purchases of 60 billion Euros until September 2016. 
Additionally, the Bank of Japan announced in October 2014 that the Quantitative and 
Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) will be expanded in order to achieve the price stability 
target of 2 percent change of the CPI, a goal established at the introduction of QQE in April 
2013. Moreover, the recent decrease in oil prices will generate an increase in the global growth, 
but it is necessary to pay attention to the medium term growth prospects that can be affected by 
the uncertainty linked to the oil prices in the future, as reported in The G-20 Meeting (2015). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Global Financial Stability Report discusses the fact 
that while the United States (US) seems to have passed the crisis and that the growth for 2015-
2016 is projected to exceed 3 percent, in Japan and the Euro Area the economy is not there yet. 
The data from the third quarter of 2014 state that the Japanese economy fell into technical 
recession, while for the Euro Area the data indicate a lower growth than expected, and also 
deflation. As depicted in Figure 1, the IMF Global Projection Model predicts a decrease from 
the 2014 forecasts in the risk of recession in many major economies, and the fact that the 
deflation risk exists in principal for the Euro Area. 
 
Figure 1. The probability of recession and deflation forecasts 
  
Source: IMF (2015) World Economic Outlook April  
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If we turn to the unemployment problem, in Europe almost one quarter of young people 
under 25 years are unemployed, while the unemployed people number reaches nearly 20 million 
(Lagarde, 2014). Figure 2 reveals the proportion of unemployed people between advanced and 
developing and emerging economies, while Figure 3 presents the forecast established by ILO 
(2015), namely an increase in unemployment in Europe. 
 
Figure 2. The distribution of joblessness 
 
Source: Furceri, D. and P. Loungani (2014) “Growth: An essential Part of a Cure for Unemployment” http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2014/11/19/growth-an-essential-part-of-a-cure-for-unemployment/ 
 
Figure 3. Future trend in global unemployment 
 
 
Source: International Labor Office (2015) World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2015 
 
To this end, economists and academia still try to find answers to questions raised from 
the beginning of the recent crisis. Seven years have passed already and there is still place for 
lessons to be learned from the crisis effects. As stated by Blanchard (2015) “while the acute 
phase of “fiscal austerity’’ has passed, many issues will remain for decades to come”. Thus, in 
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order to find answers and the “good” path to deal with a crisis, the IMF started a series of 
conferences under the name “Rethinking Macro Policies”. They began in 2011 with the first 
edition called “In the Wake of the Crisis”, continued with the second edition in 2013 “What 
have we learned?” and the third in 2015 “Progress or Confusion?”.  
 
The Great Recession 
 
Before approaching the recent crisis subject, it is necessary to shortly present the pre-
crisis world situation. After the second oil price shock of the 1979, the global growth started to 
stagnate and so the 1980s and 1990s gain the name of the “Lost Decades” for developing 
countries where the median real growth per capita rate was almost zero. Turning to developed 
countries, the decades previous to the crises are known as the “Great Moderation”. An 
interesting observation is made by Verick and Islam (2010), which argue that starting from 
1979 until 2008 the world faced: “124 systemic banking crises, 208 currency crises, 63 
sovereign debt crises, 42 twin crises, 10 triple crises, a global economic downturn every ten 
years and several price shocks.” Another important period prior to the crisis is the global boom 
of 2002-2007, characterized by a period of high growth rates (especially in developing 
countries), high consumption (especially in developed countries) and high investments and 
exports (especially in developing countries). This increase in consumption and investment was 
not accompanied by a commensurate increase in wages (income), and we can easily affirm that 
the risks where underestimated in the “boom” period. For example, when the 2001 crisis started 
FED (The Federal Reserve) reduced the interest rate at 1 per cent and kept it at this point until 
the end of 2003. By so doing they stimulated the debt-financed consumption boom that 
influenced the global aggregate demand. In the boom years their policy was to maintain a loose 
monetary policy (not respecting the Taylor Rule).  
Although the majority of economists were ready to call this boom period the beginning 
of a new era, namely the “platinum age”, Bezemer (2009) in his paper reveals 11 economists 
that predicted a recession before 2008.  
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Table 1. Researchers that anticipated the crisis.  
Researcher Function Date 
Dean Baker, US Co-director, Center for Economic and Policy 
Research 
2006 
Wynne Godley, US Distinguished Scholar, Levy Economics Institute 
of Bard College 
2006- and 
2007 
Fred Harrison, UK Economic Commentator 2005 
Michael Hudson, US Professor, University of Missouri 2006 
Eric Janszen, US Investor and iTulip commentator 2006- and 
2007 
Stephen Keen, Australia Associate Professor, University of Western 
Sydney 
2006 
Jakob Brochner Madsen and Jens 
Kjaer Sorensen, Denmark 
Professor and Graduate Student, Copenhagen 
University  
2006 
Kurt Richenbacher, US Private consultant and investment newsletter 
writer  
2006 
Nouriel Roubini, US Professor, New York University 2005- and 
2006 
Peter Schiff, US Stock broker, investment adviser and 
commentator 
2006 and 
2007 
Robert Shiller, US Professor, Yale University 2005 
Source: adaptation of Bezemer (2009, p. 9) table. 
The Great Recession, also called the “Second Great Contraction” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009), took governments, economists and people by surprise. According to Verick and Islam 
(2010), the four core factors of the crisis were: interest rates, global imbalances, perceptions of 
risk and regulation of the financial system. To be more precise, the crisis started as a crisis in 
the sub-prime mortgage market in the US. More exactly, it is the part of the market that 
assembles the people that have a higher risk of not being able to pay their loans. After 2000 due 
to the fact that interest rates were low, more people were tented to borrow money in order to 
buy a house, so the house prices began to rise. The problem appeared when the house prices 
started to decrease and the money borrowed exceeded the “new” value of their house. If the 
borrowers think that they are not able to repay the loan, than they might decide to renounce and 
just to give the house to the bank. The other part of the problem consists in the fact that the US 
legislation allowed banks to have higher leverage ratios, so the higher the leverage run by the 
bank, the stronger was the hit in their capital when the loss in assets value appeared. Banks 
needed to start selling assets and loans, so the cost of borrowing increased and determined 
investments to decrease. Thus, what started like a small decrease in US house prices generated 
into a world recession. The overwhelming consequence can be observed at global level, but the 
most affected countries were those which had a poor initial condition when the crisis struck in 
relation to the state of the economy, the labour market, fiscal space and institutional framework.  
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For a visual presentation on the state of the economy before, during and after the crisis, 
Figure 4 illustrates the potential output growth and its components. We can observe that in the 
pre-crisis period the emerging countries showed a stronger output growth than developed 
countries. The second period, namely the crisis period, is associated with a decrease in both 
type of economies, while in the next period the projections show a further decrease for emerging 
economies and a slight increase for advanced economies. One important aspect to retain is that 
the employment growth is on a continuous descending path, thus the unemployment still is and 
will be a problem. The unemployment is on an increasing path although some firms around the 
world adopted the “reducing the working hours” policy instead of reducing the number of 
employees during the crisis in order to keep their skilled workers, but also due to the fact that 
in most countries a worker with a permanent contract is protected by the legislation and/or 
collective bargaining agreements. 
Figure 4. Potential output growth and its components 
  
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2015 
Furthermore, Figure 5 depicts the GDP Growth around the world for advanced 
economies and for developing and emerging countries. We can observe that the global growth 
is still moderate and while for developed economies looks to be improving, for developing and 
emerging economies the growth is still lower and the forecast shows weaker expectations for 
increase. The forecasts for the 2015-2020 period supports a faint increase for advanced 
economies to 1.6 percent than the average of 1.3 percent for the crisis period (2008-2014). For 
developing and emerging countries the forecasts predict a decrease in GDP growth for the 2014-
2020 period of 1.3 percent for the crisis average of 6.5 percent. The increase in the GDP growth 
should be the priority for each country. Thus, on the one hand, when referring to developed 
countries they should continue to support the demand in order to revive the investments, to 
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increase the spending on research and development, on education and policies to increase the 
labour supply incentives. On the other hand, the developing and emerging economies need to 
increase the infrastructure spending, must adopt policies to create better conditions for the 
business space and so to attract foreign direct investments and also to increase the spending on 
education and product market. 
Figure 5. GDP growth 2010-2016 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2015 
According to the literature, two policy action trends may be used to fight the crisis, 
namely supply-, and, respectively, demand-based economic policies. In the following, we 
discuss these two policies. On the one hand, to analyze the supply side, we focus on the 
literature related to Okun’s Law. Indeed, labour market-oriented policies can aid preventing the 
rise and persistence of unemployment (in addition to reducing inflationary pressures), but they 
need longer time until the results are perceptible (for example, improving the skills of human 
capital is a long process and results usually appear with a delay). There is a wide literature 
analyzing supply-based policies through studying the GDP-unemployment relationship, with 
the aim of establishing appropriate policy measures that may foster GDP through labour market 
reforms. For example, recent studies assessing the link between the labour market and the recent 
crisis include Cazes et al. (2009), ILO (2009a, b), IILS (2011) or Erhel and Levionnois (2013). 
On the other hand, to investigate the demand side, we focus on the large fiscal stimuli 
that were put in place in order to fight the crisis, in an attempt to stimulate aggregate demand 
and to boost the output growth. Appendix A draws a survey of the impressively wide recent 
literature that aims at assessing the effects of fiscal stimuli, which usually consist of an increase 
in government consumption or investment, or tax cuts. All in all, as summarized by Blanchard 
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(2014), “when demand improves, time to focus more on supply” suggests that, in order to 
support the economy, both types of policies need to be put to use, but each at the right time. 
 
Okun’s Law 
 
 After the burst of the crisis, when the unemployment level started to increase rapidly 
and the GDP growth stagnated, academia turned its attention to the relation between 
unemployment and output growth, the rule of thumb also known in economics literature as 
Okun’s Law. In his seminal paper of 1962, A. Okun stated that a 3 percent increase in output 
will reduce the unemployment by 1 percent (on US data). Moreover, he mentions that the 3 to 
1 proportion holds up for both the growth-rate version and for the gaps version. Arthur Okun, 
besides being an economist, also devoted his work to explaining the macroeconomics concept 
to policy makers, thus being also a policy advisor. To sustain this affirmation are his 57 
testimonials before the Congressional Committees (Lodewijks, 1989).  
 In time the Okun’s Law gain popularity and was revisited continuously in its initial 
form, or by introducing new variables in the formula, or by applying a different technique. On 
the one hand, the majority of studies added new variables, such as Gordon (1984) that takes 
into consideration the changes in the capital and technology, Prachowny (1993) added workers 
weekly hours or capacity utilization, and Mayes and Virén (2009) took into account the 
adhesion to the EMU. On the other hand, other studies made use of different methodologies to 
analyze the relationship, namely Attfield and Silverstone (1998) used a VECM, Perman et al. 
(2015) conducted a meta-analysis to obtain Okun coefficient, or Melguizo-Chafer (2015) who 
made use of VAR and PVAR techniques. 
 If we are to consider the type of countries that are analyzed, the literature is focusing 
almost exclusively on developed countries, US being the most studied economy (Prachowny, 
1993; Moosa, 1999; Ball et al. 2015). Among other developed countries that were analyzed we 
can mention UK (Attfield and Silverstone, 1998), G7 countries (Moosa, 1997) or OECD 
countries (Lee, 2000). At this point, we only found two papers that estimate Okun coefficients 
in developing and emerging countries, namely Hutengs and Stadtmann (2013) in five CEE 
countries in order to examine the youth unemployment problem, and Gabrisch and Buscher 
(2006) focusing on post-communist economies. When it comes to estimate Okun’s Law at 
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regional level, to the best of our knowledge, all studies are focusing on developed countries, 
i.e. on US (Freeman, 2000), on Greece (Christopoulos, 2004), on France (Binet and Facchini, 
2013) or Spain (Melguizo Chafer, 2015). 
 An interesting turning point was in 2010, when economists looked more in dept at the 
empirical relationship between GDP and unemployment claiming that due to the change in the 
economy the relationship should not be used in the future for forecasts (due to its historical 
stability in the US, the Okun Law forms the basis for most large-scale macroeconomic 
forecasting models, but it has evolved to a 2 to 1 proportion in forecast). Among the studies 
that discuss the end of Okun’s Law we can mention the April 2010 WEO, stating that the law 
broke down during the Great Recession, Daly and Hobijn (2010) consider that the relationship 
is disrupted by the surprise of 2009, Gordon (2010) is more drastic and affirms that the law is 
dead, while Meyer and Tasci (2012) consider that it’s unstable and Owyand and Vermann 
(2013) reveal that the relationship changes during recoveries.  
 Another stand of literature defenses the Okun Law and shows that after data revision 
the rule of thumb holds up. Daly et al. (2014) show that after the GDP data revision from the 
Great Recession the inconsistency in the relationship between unemployment and output 
dissipated, and in addition they present that the same discussions appeared after the 1973, 1991 
and 2001 recession until the data were revised. Okun’s Law is also backed by Ball et al. (2013a), 
Ball et al. (2013b), Ball et al. (2015)  
 
Fiscal stimulus 
 
In order to fight the crisis governments all over the world made use of fiscal policies 
measures to boost the demand, while central banks took the interest rate close to zero. Since the 
disposal income decreased, governments needed to take actions in order to replace private 
spending and investment with public spending and investment with the intention of sustaining 
the country economy. Thus, numerous countries implemented expansionary fiscal policies, 
namely fiscal stimulus packages. Figure 6 shows the stimulus around the world, while table 2 
presents a short list of countries that announced stimulus packages and the size of their 
announced stimulus in order to aid the economy to exit the recession.   
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Figure 6. Global overview of fiscal stimulus as % of 2008 GDP 
 
Source: IILS (2011) 
 
Table 2. Announced stimulus packages 
Country Announced Stimulus Packages in $ 
(billions) 
% of 2008 country GDP 
Australia 47.04 5.75% 
Austria 16.25 4.14 
Belgium 4.93 1.03% 
Canada 42.15 3.22% 
China 585.26 13.30% 
Czech Republic 3.91 2.04% 
Egypt 2.72 1.67% 
Finland 10.89 4.20% 
France 36.18 1.34% 
Georgia 2.28 19.92% 
Germany 80.50 2.32% 
India 38.39 3.53% 
Israel 2.80 1.47% 
Japan 297.52 5.32% 
Lithuania 0.92 2.02% 
Mexico 13.32 1.49% 
Netherlands 8.35 1.02% 
Norway 2.86 0.79% 
Poland 10.64 2.49% 
Portugal 3.03 1.31% 
Russia 53.64 3.78% 
Slovenia 1.20 2.32% 
South Africa 9.90 4.03% 
Spain 15.55 1.02% 
Sweden 13.44 3.33% 
Switzerland 1.97 0.39% 
Turkey 37.95 6.09% 
United Kingdom 29.16 1.39% 
United States 787.00 5.52% 
Source: adaptation of Zhang et al. (2010, p. 5) table and data from IILS (2011) 
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The structure of stimulus packages is different for each country, as shown for example 
by Saha and Weizsacker (2009) who analyze the composition of announced stimulus packages 
for 13 EU countries. They conclude that the spending categories of the package are so different 
due to the initial state of the economy. For instance, countries like France and Spain announced 
major spending on investment, while all Poland stimulus consists in investment. Austria and 
Sweden choose to direct a major part of the stimulus to permanent cut taxes and transfers, while 
United Kingdom (UK) and Netherlands to temporary cut taxes and transfers. The only country 
that has a more balanced structure of the stimulus package in terms of spending categories is 
Germany who tries to reach all categories: investment, permanent and temporary tax cuts and 
transfers, labour market measures and sector specific measures. The same variety in the 
composition of stimulus packages is found around the world, i.e. China spent a considerable 
part in rebuilding the region of Sichuan, while Brazil focused on the auto sector (ILLS, 2011). 
The distribution on years of the fiscal stimulus also differs among countries. For example, 
France announced a 0.7% of GDP stimulus for 2009, while Germany announced 1.5% of GDP 
and UK 1.4% of GDP. Other countries did not announced the allocation on years, just the period 
of stimulus, i.e. Japan for 2009-2010, while other countries propose the stimulus packages just 
for one year, i.e. Mexico, 1.49% of GDP in 2009. 
With the purpose of identifying the best way to allocate the stimulus package, to find 
out what type of fiscal instrument is more appropriate for each economy and also to assess the 
stimulus impact on the economy output, economists, policy-makers and academia made use of 
the fiscal multiplier concept. The fiscal multiplier is a cornerstone of the Keynesian paradigm, 
and Keynes’ (1936) analysis awarded the multiplier the central role that it still has today in 
macroeconomics. The simple way to define it is as the impact of an exogenous change in a 
fiscal variable (i.e. public spending G ) on output ( Y ), with respect to their respective 
baselines. Through the literature we can identify four major types of fiscal multipliers: impact 
multipliers, multipliers at a T horizon, peak multipliers and cumulative multipliers. The major 
part of the literature is assessing multipliers in developed countries (at country level or in panels 
like Euro area or OECD countries) and just a few studies are taking into account the developing 
and emerging economies. Table 3 presents studies that are estimating multiplier both in 
developing and developed countries (for a more complex review of the recent literature see 
Appendix A.). 
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Table 3. Recent studies assessing fiscal multipliers in developed and developing countries 
Author Country Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One year Long run 
lzetzki and 
Végh 2008 
High 
income 
 Government 
spending 
0.4 0.7 0.8 
Developing  Government 
spending 
0.6 0.4 -0.11 
Ilzetzki, 
Mendoza 
and Végh 
2013 
20 High 
income 
countries 
 Government 
spending  
0.39*  0.66* 
24 
Developing 
countries 
 Government 
spending  
-0.03  -0.63 
 20 High 
income 
countries 
 Government 
investment  
0.39*  1.5 
 24 
Developing 
countries 
 Government 
investment 
0.57*  1.6* 
Petrović, 
Arsić and 
Nojković 
2014 
10 
emerging 
CEEC 
 Expenditure 
multipliers 
0.20* 0.48* 0.20* 
Fixed 
exchange 
rates 
Expenditure 
multipliers 
1.31* 1.58* 0 
 Flexible 
exchange 
rates 
Expenditure 
multipliers 
0.03 0.11 0 
  Expansion Expenditure 
multipliers 
0.10* 0.32* -0.37* 
  Downturn Expenditure 
multipliers 
1.15* 1.51* -0.42* 
Note: “*” defines statistically significant and the shock is a 1% increase in government spending, investment and 
expenditure. 
 
A new stand of literature is focusing on the spillover effect. For example, Carmignani 
(2015) reveals the fact that a 1$ increase in US government expenditure generates an increase 
of output by approximately 7 cents in the full sample and about 24 cents in former transitions 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. We can conclude that the literature that aims at 
assessing the effects of fiscal stimulus effects is on an increasing path in recent years. 
 
Thesis presentation 
 
 As discussed above, two major effects of the recent crisis are the increase in world 
unemployment and the decrease in countries growth. The research conducted in this thesis tries 
to present potential solutions to these problems. When talking about this thesis originality, we 
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can mention the following: on the one hand, when referring to the unemployment we assess 
Okun coefficients in order to establish what type of policy is better suited to be applied. Two 
important features that significantly differentiate our analysis from that of the literature are 
related to the countries analyzed and to the use of regional data. As mentioned above, the 
majority of studies focus on developed countries and there is recent literature that use regional 
data, but only for developed countries, so to the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis 
of Okun Law at regional level in emerging countries. On the other hand, when referring to 
growth, we assess fiscal multipliers. We mentioned above that the literature is generally 
focusing on samples composed of developed countries, or assesses multipliers at country level 
(also developed countries), or assesses multipliers in big samples of developed and developing 
countries. The originality of this analysis consists of studying specific areas in order to observe 
differences or similarities in the output response of the area with the purpose of establishing 
possible fiscal policy measures. It is well known that a country economy is influenced, to a 
greater or a minor extent, by its neighbours and by the area to which it belongs. Thus, we assess 
multipliers (i) in the European Union (EU) in order to observe differences if you are a developed 
or developing country, or if you are or not in the Euro area or if you intend or not to join it; (ii) 
after that we focus on the Mediterranean Area, that we consider as the world economy at a 
smaller scale due to the country typologies composing it and (iii) the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries. 
This thesis regroups 6 articles which analyze the fiscal policy in emerging and 
developing countries and also presents lessons from developed countries. This thesis is 
organized in three parts. The first part presents evidence of the Okun Law in 3 countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania at regional 
level. In the second part, the fiscal multiplier topic is approached and presented as lesson from 
developed countries, while the third part presents estimates of fiscal multipliers in developing 
countries.  
The first part of this thesis aims at revising the GDP-unemployment relationship, also 
known as Okun’s Law at regional level in three emerging countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and contains two chapters.  
Chapter 1 analyzes the above mentioned relationship in two emerging countries which 
have a strong connection in terms of history, culture and economic activity, namely the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. In order to estimate the Okun equation we make use of detrending 
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techniques, which properly allow for estimating the long-run component of a time series, by 
taking into account the likely presence of a unit root and after that calculating the cyclical 
component of the variables. We present our results based on the most used filter in this 
literature, namely the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrending filter and after that, as robustness, we 
make use of the Quadratic Trend (QT) filter and the Baxter and King (1999) filter. We are using 
original output and unemployment regional annual data for the period 1995-2011 to provide the 
estimations of regional Okun’s Law. In our subsequent analysis we make use of a set of regional 
variables, including domestic and foreign investment, R&D, or infrastructure public spending. 
Considering the alternative methods for estimating Okun’s Law, three patterns arise: regions 
for which the Okun’s Law is (i) always validated, (ii) never or weakly validated, and (iii) mixed 
results. Thus, we also present a systematic analysis of the major factors explaining why the 
unemployment-output relation is significant only in some regions. Moreover, we search for 
possible non-linearities in the significant estimated regional Okun coefficients across the two 
countries. By doing this we aim to develop the existing literature and to find explanations to the 
regional heterogeneity and to the magnitude of regional Okun coefficients. One interesting 
result is that the Okun Law appears to be not statistically significant in the regions in which the 
average economic growth is low and the average and long-term unemployment is the highest. 
In chapter 2 we analyze the above mentioned relationship in a newer member state of 
the European Union, Romania. In order to estimate the Okun Law we apply the HP filter and 
the First Difference (FD) filter on regional annual data covering the period 1995-2010. Here we 
observe that although the negative relationship between the cyclical components of income and 
unemployment exist in all regions and at country level, the Okun coefficients are not 
statistically significant in the most developed regions. In the next step, we proceeded with an 
analysis of the driving factors of these heterogeneities. We looked at the average real income 
for the studied period, the real growth rate, the average unemployment rate, the average growth 
rate of foreign direct investment, the percentage of modernized roads, at demographic variables 
like stable population, workforce and variables like fertility, infant mortality and population at 
poverty risk. Our results suggest that the Okun coefficients are not statistically significant in 
the most developed regions, namely with highest average economic growth in the studied period 
and with the lowest share of the population at poverty risk. 
The second part of this thesis approaches the fiscal multiplier concept and it’s rebirth 
during the Great Recession, from the perspective of lessons to learn from developed countries.  
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Chapter 3 is a recent literature review of the fiscal multiplier topic. It starts with a short 
presentation of the fiscal multipliers and the types most used in the literature, then continues 
with the methods used to estimate multipliers in the literature (theoretical and empirical) and 
ends with a selection of recent studies that assess fiscal multipliers. First, the studies are group 
by taking into account the nonlinearities in the multipliers effects, to be more precise: the 
position in the economic cycle, the debt level, the monetary policy and the exchange rate 
regime. Second we present the recent literature on developed and developing countries. The 
main conclusion is that there is only a limited number of studies focusing on developing and 
emerging countries. Furthermore, the multipliers for developing countries are smaller than in 
developed countries and nonlinearities play an important role in the multiplier magnitude. 
To better understand the difference between multipliers values in developed and 
developing countries, in Chapter 4 we focus on the European Union (EU) area. More precisely 
we want to see if the Eurozone plays a role or not in the EU and investigate if being a member 
or not, or being a developed or developing country (in this group we have the Czech Republic 
that according to the IMF classification is considered a developed country only from 2009, 
which is close to our time span end) influences the multipliers values. In order to find answers 
to these questions we created four groups of countries: the historical group, EU countries that 
are not expected to adopt the Euro, countries that have recently joined the EU and are expected 
to join the Eurozone in the future, and Eurozone countries heavily affected by the crisis. We 
draw upon the panel Vector AutoRegressive (PVAR) methodology and we use the Cholesky 
decomposition to transform the error term such as innovations to be orthogonal on quarterly 
data for the 1999:Q1 – 2012:Q4. Our variables (GDP, expenditures and taxes) are computed as 
growth rates. We then proceed at estimating impact, peak and cumulative fiscal multipliers, i.e. 
changes in output following changes in the fiscal policy and use as shock first, an increase in 
government expenditure, and second an increase in taxes. Our results reveal that being in the 
Eurozone or expecting to join the Eurozone in the future generates positive and significant 
expenditure multipliers, while the tax multipliers are not sensitive to being in the Eurozone or 
experiencing a crisis. 
For extending the fiscal multiplier subject, the third part of the thesis focuses more on 
assessing fiscal multipliers in developing countries in two specific areas. 
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In chapter 5 we study the Mediterranean area, which we consider attractive due to the 
countries that compose it (three continents and islands). In order to compute fiscal multipliers 
we make use of the panel VAR methodology and use annual data from 1980 until 2010 for 
GDP, government consumption and government investment. As mentioned before, we take 
advantage of the diversity of each area and disentangle the countries in several groups, based 
on economic and geographic criteria. By doing so we obtained five groups of countries: group 
1 “large-EMU” countries who adopted the euro in 1999 or 2001, group 2 “small-EMU” 
countries who joined the Eurozone only recently, group 3 which includes developing African 
countries, group 4 which considers developing Asian countries and finally group 5 composed 
of Former Republic of Yugoslavia countries for which we could find data. After obtaining the 
groups we compute impact, second year, third year, peak and cumulative multipliers for 
consumption and investment shocks. Our results for the entire Mediterranean area reveal a 
significant and positive output response both for government consumption and investment 
shock. Furthermore, we obtain positive and significant consumption (investment) multipliers in 
Africa (Asia) and negative and significant investment multiplier in Africa or not statistically 
significant consumption (investment) multipliers in Asia (small EU). In addition, we developed 
our analysis by computing fiscal multipliers first, by changing the ordering of the fiscal 
variables, second, by adding control variables like the current account, public debt and inflation 
and third, by changing the computation of the main variables, namely using the HP filter and 
not the growth rates. 
Chapter 6 studies the response of output to a government spending shock in eleven 
Central and Eastern European countries by using quarterly data for the period 1999:Q1-
2013:Q3. Due to the characteristics of this area (the countries are expected to follow a common 
dynamic path in the long-term but they may present different short-run dynamics) we draw 
upon a Panel Vector Error Correction model (PVECM) for computing the fiscal multipliers. By 
using this methodology we are able to compute pooled and country specific multipliers while 
controlling for the common long-run relationship between the eleven CEE countries. To define 
the spending shock we decompose the public spending into a structural (anticipated) and a 
residual (non-anticipated) component, and define discretionary spending shocks as the 
cyclically-adjusted component of government spending, which reflects unexpected fiscal policy 
changes. Our results show that impact and four-quarter cumulative spending multipliers are 
positive and significant for the whole group of countries, but the output response becomes not 
significant or even negative when estimating at country level. In addition, we disentangle the 
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CEE countries across several of their major characteristics, namely the exchange rate regime 
(ERR), the level of economic development, the fiscal stance and the openness degree. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Fiscal multipliers in recent literature  
 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
Dalsgaard, André, 
Richardson 2001 e 
OECD interlink 
model 
 
No monetary 
policy response 
 
Nominal interest 
rate held 
constant 
 US  Government 
spending, 
country 
specific 
 1.1 1 0.5 0.2 
    Government 
spending, 
global shock 
 1.5 1.3 0.7 0.3 
  Japan  Government 
spending, 
country 
specific 
 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.2 
    Government 
spending, 
global shock 
 2.6 1.9 0.6 0.3 
  Euro Area  Government 
spending, 
country 
specific 
 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.2 
    Government 
spending, 
global shock 
 1.9 1.5 0.7 0.4 
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
Blanchard and 
Perotti 2002 
Structural VAR 
 
Quarterly 
1960 :1 – 
1997 :4 
US  Government 
spending, 
deterministic 
trend 
0.84 0.45 0.54 1.13  
     Government 
spending, 
stochastic 
trend 
0.90 0.55 0.65 0.66  
     Taxes, 
deterministic 
trend 
-069 -0.74 -0.72 -0.42  
     Taxes, 
stochastic 
trend 
-0.70 -1.07 -1.32 -1.30  
HM Treasury 2003 European 
Commission’s 
QUEST model 
 Germany  Taxes  0.2    
    Government 
spending 
 0.4    
  Spain  Taxes  -0.1    
    Government 
spending 
 0.5    
   France  Taxes  -0.1    
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
     Government 
spending 
 0.5    
   Ireland  Taxes  -0.1    
     Government 
spending 
 0.4    
   Italy  Taxes  -0.1    
     Government 
spending 
 0.5    
   Netherlands  Taxes  -0.1    
     Government 
spending 
 0.4    
   Portugal  Taxes  -0.0 to 
-0.1 
   
     Government 
spending 
 0.7    
   Sweden  Taxes  -0.3    
     Government 
spending 
 0.4    
   UK  Taxes  -0.2    
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
     Government 
spending 
 0.3    
Perotti 2005 VAR 
 
The two 
multipliers : the 
early and the 
late part of the 
sample:  
1960-1979 
1980-end 
 
Cumulative 
multipliers 
Quarterly : 
1960 :1 – 
2001 :2 
Australia  Government 
spending 
 -0.14 / 
0.38 
 1.42 / 
0.69 
 
    Taxes  1.50 / 
0.55 
 1.69 /  
0.85 
 
 Quarterly : 
1961 :1 – 
2001 :4 
Canada  Government 
spending 
 0.98 /  
-0.32 
 0.58 / 
 -1.10 
 
    Taxes  0.4 /  
-0.42 
 0.22 /  
-1.59 
 
 Quarterly : 
1960 :1 – 
1989 :4 
Germany  Government 
spending 
 0.61 / 
0.47 
 -0.08 / 
 -1.10 
 
    Taxes  0.29 / 
-0.04 
 -0.05/ 
0.59 
 
  1963 :1 – 
2001 :2 
UK  Government 
spending 
 0.48 /  
-0.28 
 -0.003 /  
-0.94 
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
     Taxes  -0.23 / 
0.43 
 -0.21/ 
0.70 
 
  1960 :1 – 
2001 :4 
US  Government 
spending 
 1.29 / 
0.44 
 1.67 / 
0.08 
 
 
     Taxes  -1.41 /  
0.70 
 -23.87 /  
1.55 
 
AL-Eyd and ray 
Barrell 2005  
NiGEM model 
with one-year 
shock 
 
 
 France  Indirect tax  -0.26 -0.19   
   Corporate tax 
lump sum 
 -0.033 -0.158   
   Corporate tax 
rate 
 -0.153 -0.386   
 1% , 1year 
shock 
   Direct tax  -0.280 -0.158   
     Transfers  -0.19 -0.105   
   Germany  Indirect tax  -0.502 -0.161   
     Corporate tax 
lump sum 
 -0.129 -0.594   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
     Corporate tax 
rate 
 -0.160 -0.660   
     Direct tax  -0.707 -0.195   
     Transfers  -0.491 -0.116   
   Italy  Indirect tax  -0.163 -0.210   
     Corporate tax 
lump sum 
 -0.033 -0.229   
     Corporate tax 
rate 
 -0.186 -0.404   
     Direct tax  -0.145 -0.180   
     Transfers  -0.110 -0.138   
   Spain  Indirect tax  -0.190 -0.087   
     Corporate tax 
lump sum 
 -0.028 -0.116   
     Corporate tax 
rate 
 -0.219 -0.232   
     Direct tax  -0.159 -0.074   
     Transfers  -0.20 -0.054   
   UK  Indirect tax  -0.303 -0.231   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
     Corporate tax 
lump sum 
 -0.027 -0.205   
     Corporate tax 
rate 
 -0.085 -0.350   
     Direct tax  -0.150 -0.197   
     Transfers  -0.115 -0.152   
Mountford and 
Uhlig 2005 
SVAR 
Impact 
multiplier 
They apply sign 
restriction 
Quarterly : 
1955 - 2000 
SUA  Government 
spending 
0.44 0.42 0.67 0.23  
Tax cut -0.19 -1.21 -2.79 -3.22  
Perotti 2006 VAR 
Cumulative 
multipliers 
 
Quarterly : 
1960 :1 – 
2001 :2 
Australia  Government 
spending 
 0.56* 0.86* 0.88*  
    Government 
investment 
 -0.29 0.02 0.5*  
  Quarterly : 
1961 :1 – 
2001 :4 
Canada  Government 
spending 
 0.55* 0.74* 0.93*  
     Government 
investment 
 0.38 -0.24 -0.73*  
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
  Quarterly : 
1960 :1 – 
1989 :4 
Germany  Government 
spending 
 0.77* 0.83* 0.91*  
     Government 
investment 
 5.07* 4.38* 3.84*  
  Quarterly : 
1963 :1 – 
2001 :2 
UK  Government 
spending 
 0.64* 0.94* 0.99*  
     Government 
investment 
 0.01 -0.08 -0.06  
  Quarterly : 
1960 :1 – 
2001 :4 
US  Government 
spending 
 1.37* 1.91* 2.16*  
     Government 
investment 
 1.17* 0.52 0.21  
Ilzetzki and Végh 
2008  
Panel VAR Quarterly panel 
data on 27 
developing and 
22 high income 
countries 
High 
income 
 Government 
spending 
0.4 0.7 0.9 0.8  
   Developing  Government 
spending 
0.6 0.4 0.1 -0.11  
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
 
IMF 2008 Regression 
analysis 
2 alternative 
measures of 
fiscal impulse : 
elasticity 
/regression 
based 
Annual panel 
data 
1970-2007 
Advanced  Taxes – 
elasticity 
 0.35  0.59  
    Taxes – 
regression 
based 
 0.01  0.40  
    Government 
spending – 
elasticity 
 -0.09  -0.26  
    Government 
spending – 
regression 
based 
 0.15  0.52  
  Emerging  Taxes – 
elasticity 
 0.23  0.23  
     Taxes – 
regression 
based 
 0.13  0.17  
     Government 
spending – 
elasticity 
 0.20  -0.18  
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
     Government 
spending – 
regression 
based 
 0.08  -0.23  
Romer and 
Bernstein 2009 
Two quantitative 
macroeconomic 
models 
ARRA 
estimations 
USS  government 
spending 
 
1.05 1.44 1.57 1.57 1.55 
     Tax  0.00 -0.66 -0.99 -0.99 -0.98 
Mountford and 
Uhlig 2009 
SVAR 
Impact 
multiplier 
They do not 
apply sign 
restriction 
Quarterly : 
1955 - 2000 
SUA  Government 
spending 
0.65 0.27 -0.74 -1.19  
Tax  -0.28 -0.93 -2.05 -3.41  
Cogan and others 
2010 d 
New Keynesian 
simulation 
exercise, based 
on the model in 
Smets and 
Wouter 2007 
Quarterly : 
2009 :1 to 
2012 :4 
Impact of the 
ARRA 17 fev 
2009 on USs 
US  government 
spending 
federal rate 
set to zero 
throughout 
2009 and 
2010 
1.03 0.89 0.61 0.44 0.40 
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
 Assumptions 
about the 
interest rate 
response 
  government 
spending 
federal rate 
set to zero 
throughout 
2009  
0.96 0.67 0.48 0.41 0.40 
Auerbach-
Gorodnichenko 
2012a 
Structural VAR Quarterly data 
1947 :1 – 2008-
4 
USA Expansion spending  0.0 -0.1   
    Recession spending  1.4 1.8   
Auerbach-
Gorodnichenko 
2012b 
Structural VAR Semiannual 
data : 
Old 
members :1985 
– 20110 ; ewer 
members: mid-
1990s – 2010 
OECD Expansion spending  -0.3 -0.3   
    Recession spending  0.5 0.4   
Batini, Callegari 
and Melina 2012 
Threshold VAR 
 
Cumulative 
fiscal multipliers 
Quarterly Data : 
1975 :1 – 
2010 :2 
US Expansion spending 0.95 0.3. -0.49   
Recession spending 1.96 2.18 2.17   
Expansion Revenue 0.04 -0.15 -0.72   
Recession Revenue 0.03 -0.16 -0.65   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
 
1SD 
Quarterly data : 
1981 :1 – 
2009 :4 
Japan Expansion spending 0.71 1.40 1.09   
Recession spending 1.34 2.01 2.01   
Expansion Revenue 0.27 0.30 0.09   
Recession Revenue 0.31 0.21 -0.17   
Quarterly 
data :1981 :1 – 
2007 :4 
Italy Expansion spending 0.25 0.41 0.46   
Recession spending 1.42 1.57 1.78   
Expansion Revenue -0.07 -0.07 -0.10   
Recession Revenue -0.12 -0.17 -0.17   
Quarterly data : 
1970 :1 – 
2010 :4 
 
 
France Expansion spending 1.39 1.55 1.88   
Recession spending 2.62 2.08 1.79   
Expansion Revenue 0.05 0.12 0.20   
Recession Revenue -0.02 0.03 0.28   
Quarterly data : 
1985 :1 – 
2009 :’ 
Euro Area Expansion spending 0.41 0.43 0.07   
  Recession spending 2.06 2.56 2.49   
Expansion Revenue 0.10 0.20 0.06   
Recession Revenue -0.18 -0.35 -0.35   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
Anja Baum, 
Marcos 
Poplawsky-
Ribeiro, Anke 
Weber 
Dec 2012 
Threshold VAR 
 
The threshold 
variable= output 
gap 
 
 
 
Cumulative 
fiscal multipliers 
 
Obs : *no 
significant 
multiplier is 
found at the time 
the fiscal shock 
is implemented 
Quarterly data : 
1966 :1 – 
2011 :2 
Canada Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 -0.9* -0.7*   
  Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 -1.1* -0.9*   
   Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.3 -0.2   
   Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 0.1 0.1   
   Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 0.9* 0.7*   
   Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 1.1* 0.9*   
   Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 0.3 0.2   
   Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.1 -0.1   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
 Quarterly data : 
1970 :4 – 
2010 :4 
France Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 -0.1* -0.1*   
   Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 0.2* 0.1*   
   Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.5 -0.4   
   Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.7 -0.5   
   Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 0.1* 0.1*   
   Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 -0.2* -0.1*   
   Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 0.5 0.4   
   Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 0.7 0.5   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
 Quarterly data : 
1975 :3 – 
2009 :4 
Germany Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 0.2 0.1   
   Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 1.0 0.8   
   Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 0.7 0.5   
   Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 0.5 0.4   
   Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 -0.4 -0.2   
   Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 -1.3 -1.2   
   Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.6 -0.4   
    Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.4 -0.3   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
  Quarterly data : 
1970 :1 – 
2011 :2 
Japan Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 1.4 1.9   
    Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 2.0 2.4   
    Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.5 -0.5   
    Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 0.5 0.3   
    Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 -1.5 -1.7   
    Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 -2.0 -2.0   
    Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 0.4 0.5   
    Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.7 -0.6   
General introduction: The Great Recession, unemployment and fiscal stimulusE 
34 
 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
  Quarterly data : 
1970 :1 – 
2011 :2 
UK Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 -0.00 -0.00   
    Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 0.2 0.1   
    Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 0.4* 0.4*   
    Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.2* -0.2*   
    Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 0.00 0.00   
    Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 -0.2 -0.1   
    Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.4* -0.3*   
    Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 0.2* 0.2*   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
  Qurterly data : 
1965 :2 – 
2011 :2 
US Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 1.3 1.0   
    Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
spending 
shock 
 1.7 1.2   
    Expansion –
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.1* -0.1*   
    Expansion – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
revenue 
shock 
 0.1* 0.1*   
    Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 -1.3 -1.0   
    Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Negative 
spending 
shock 
 -1.8 -1.3   
    Recession – 
positive output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 0.1* 0.1*   
    Recession – 
negative output 
gap 
Positive 
revenue 
shock 
 -0.1* -0.1*   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
WEO 2012 Forecast model 2010-2011 28 advanced and emerging 
economies 
Government 
spending  
0.9 to 
1.7 
    
Ilzetzki, Mendoza 
and Végh 2013 
SVAR 1960:1-2007:4 
quarterly 
20 high 
income 
24 
developing 
High income 
countries 
Government 
spending  
0.39*     
    Developing 
countries 
Government 
spending  
-0.03     
    High income 
countries 
Government 
investment  
0.39*     
    Developing 
countries 
Government 
investment 
0.57*     
    Fixed exchange 
rates 
Government 
spending  
0.15*     
    Flexible 
exchange rates 
Government 
spending  
-0.14*     
    closed 
economies 
Government 
spending  
0.6*     
    Open 
economies 
Government 
spending  
-0.08     
    Low debt Government 
spending 
-0.37     
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
    High debt Government 
spending 
-0.03     
M Owyang, V 
Ramery and S 
Zubairy 2013 
extension of 
Ramey (2011) 
military news 
and Jorda's 
(2005) method 
quarterly 
interpolated 
data: 
US:1980-2010 
Canada:1921-
2011 
US  Military news 
shock 
  0.72  0.81 
  High 
Unemployment 
Military news 
shock 
  0.76  0.78 
  Low 
Unemployment 
Military news 
shock 
  0.72  0.88 
  Canada  Military news 
shock 
  0.67  0.79 
    High 
Unemployment 
Military news 
shock 
  1.60  1.16 
    Low 
Unemployment 
Military news 
shock 
  0.44  0.46 
Petrović, Arsić and 
Nojković (2014) 
SVAR 
cumulative 
multipliers 
1999-2012 
quarterly 
10 emerging 
CEEC 
 Expenditure 
multipliers 
0.20* 0.48*    
 Fixed exchange 
rates 
Expenditure 
multipliers 
1.31* 1.58*    
  Flexible 
exchange rates 
Expenditure 
multipliers 
0.03 0.11    
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
    Expansion Expenditure 
multipliers 
0.10* 0.32*    
    Downturn Expenditure 
multipliers 
1.15* 1.51*    
C-Y Hong and J-F 
Li, 2015 
Spillover imput-
output model 
 
cumulative 
multipliers 
2009-2013 
Fiscal stimulus 
packages 
adopted by the 
government 
Taiwan  Increase in 
government 
consumption 
1.47*     
   Increase in 
government 
investment 
1.94*     
D Riera-Crichton, 
CA Vegh and G 
Vuletin, 2015 
Single-equation 
approach of 
Jorda 2005 
 
Cumulative 
fiscal multipliers 
1986-2008 
semiannual  
29 OECD 
countries 
Recession Spending 
shock 
0.73*  1.25*   
  Expansion  Spending 
shock 
0.09* Not significant  
  Increase in 
government 
spending 
Spending 
shock 
0.49*  2.28*   
   Decrease in 
government 
spending 
Spending 
shock 
Not significant  
    Recession - 
Increase in 
Spending 
shock 
0.68*  2.28*   
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
 
39 
 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
government 
spending 
    Recession - 
Decrease in 
government 
spending 
Spending 
shock 
0.76* Not significant  
    Expansion - 
Increase in 
government 
spending 
Spending 
shock 
1.13*     
    Expansion - 
Decrease in 
government 
spending 
Spending 
shock 
Not sidnificant  
    Extreme 
recession 
Spending 
shock 
1.21*  2.08*   
    Extreme 
expansion 
Spending 
shock 
Not significant   
    Extreme 
recession - 
Increase in 
government 
spending 
Spending 
shock 
0.92*  3.14*   
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 Fiscal multipliers values 
Authors, year Methodology Data Countries Economy Fiscal Shock Impact One 
year 
Two 
years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
    Extreme 
recession - 
Decrease in 
government 
spending 
Spending 
shock 
1.23*  1.60   
KP Arin, FA 
Koray and N 
Spagnolo 2015 
a regime 
switching 
framework 
Quarterly data: 
1949 - 2006 
US Low growth Defense 
spending 
shock 
2.91     
   High growth Defense 
spending 
shock 
0.13     
    Low growth Tax shock -0.19     
    High growth Tax shock -0.66     
R Ambrisko, J 
Babecky, J 
Rysanek, V 
Valenta 2015 
DSGE model Quarterly data: 
1996-2011  
Czech 
Republic 
 Spending 
shock 
 0.6    
    Investment 
shock 
 0.5    
Note: The multipliers are the response of GDP to a positive government spending shock or/and positive tax shock; “*” (for the articles that mention the significance) shows 
that the multiplier is statistically significant, unless otherwise stated. 
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Regional Evidence on Okun’s Law in Czech Republic and Slovakia1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We present regional evidence on Okun’s Law using original data for two emerging 
countries, namely the Czech Republic and Slovakia. We unveil the presence of 
important regional heterogeneities, as in many Czech and Slovak regions Okun’s 
Law is not significant. Among the drivers of these regional differences, we outline 
the level of unemployment and output, domestic and foreign investment, and R&D 
and infrastructure spending. Subsequently, we show that unemployment, output, 
and domestic investment are equally related to regional magnitude non-linearities, 
when it comes to Czech and Slovak regions in which Okun’s Law is at work. We 
draw upon these rich results to discuss policies that could be implemented to avoid 
underemployment traps in Czech and Slovak regions. 
 
 
Keywords: regional Okun’s Law, emerging countries, Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC) 
 
JEL Codes: E24, E32, R11 
 
                                                          
1 A version of this chapter was published as “Regional Evidence on Okun’s Law in Czech Republic and Slovakia”, 
Economic Modelling, vol. 42, pp. 57-65, 2014, and was written with R. Durech, A. Minea and L. Slusna. 
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1.1. Introduction 
The dawn of the 1990’s brought massive changes in Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC). Politically, these changes marked the end of almost half a century of Cold War. 
Economically, CEEC entered a new era, characterized by progressive monetary and financial 
liberalization, free markets, free prices, and free trade. Many countries found themselves 
trapped in the tumult of increasing external competition, particularly since their industrial 
systems were characterized by obsolete techniques, over-designed production plants, and low 
labor productivity in a full employment context. Consequently, many such large loss-generating 
public plants were closed, causing massive unemployment in the second half of the 90s.2 
 These high unemployment levels draw the attention of policymakers. Indeed, according 
to the popular Okun’s Law (Okun, 1962), there exists a strong relation between an increase in 
GDP above its potential, i.e. a positive output gap, and a decrease of unemployment below its 
trend. Thus, over the last two decades, an increasing strand of literature focused on exploring 
the robustness of Okun’s Law on several grounds.3 
 First, regarding its significance and magnitude. In a very influential paper, Prachowny 
(1993) appends Okun’s Law to include the effect of weekly hours and capacity utilization,4 and 
shows that, although significant, the magnitude of the link between cyclical unemployment and 
the output gap is around -0.67, notably lower (in absolute value) than Okun’s initial estimation 
of -3. Subsequent work continues this debate: using US quarterly data, Weber (1995) and 
Moosa (1999) emphasize Okun coefficients above 3 (in absolute value), while Attfield & 
Silverstone (1997) or Coen & Hickman (2006) outline Okun coefficients of lower magnitudes, 
namely of -2.25 and -1.90, respectively. 
 Second, Okun’s coefficient was found to significantly differ across countries. Compared 
to their previous findings for the US, Attfield & Silverstone (1998) illustrate a lower (in absolute 
value) Okun coefficient of -1.45 for the UK, using a VECM augmented to account for 
cointegration in the presence of non-stationary output and unemployment series. Several 
authors, like Kaufman (1988) or Moosa (1997), present evidence on a small number of 
countries. For example, using data for G7 countries, Moosa (1997) concludes that all seven 
Okun coefficients are significant and have the expected negative sign, but their magnitude 
                                                          
2 For example, unemployment in Slovakia in 1995 was 13.0%, while in Czech Republic in 1999 it equaled 9.4%. 
3 In particular, the current Great Recession revived the question of the pertinence of Okun’s Law (for recent 
discussions, see Daly & Hobijn, 2010, Owyang & Sekhposyan, 2012, Ball, Leigh & Loungani, 2013, or Daly, 
Fernald, Jordà & Nechio, 2014). 
4 Alternatively, Evans (1989) and Mussard & Philippe (2009) emphasize the importance of time lags and money 
creation, respectively, in estimating Okun’s Law. 
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differs across countries. Comparable conclusions arise from the analysis of Harris & Silverstone 
(2001) for Australia, Canada, Western Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US, as they find that 
Okun coefficients are negative and significant, while rather different in UK and Japan compared 
to the other countries (for an identical finding for Japan, see also Freeman, 2001). Moreover, 
many studies focus on a large set of countries, especially from the OECD area. Using annual 
data for 16 OECD countries, Lee (2000) not only confirms the significance of Okun’s 
coefficient, but shows that its magnitude is subject to important country heterogeneities, ranging 
from -6.55 for Japan to -0.57 for Italy, based, for example, on the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.5 
 Third, in addition to country heterogeneities, Okun’s Law has been found to exhibit 
multiple non-linearities. Using US data, Moosa (1999) shows that Okun’s coefficient is 
different in the short- compared to the long-run. Moreover, Harris & Silverstone (2001) and 
Cuaresma (2003) conclude that Okun’s Law changes in business cycle upturns compared to 
downturns (or above compared to below the trend, see Holmes & Silverstone, 2006). In addition 
to the level of output, Virén (2001) and Fouquau (2008) find that Okun’s Law is equally 
sensitive to the level of unemployment. Subsequent papers emphasize alternative mechanisms 
for threshold effects in Okun’s Law, including the considered time period (Knotek, 2007, or 
Beaton, 2010), the level of effort in the labor market (Malley & Molana, 2008), changes in labor 
productivity (Huang & Lin, 2008), adhesion to the EMU (Mayes & Virén, 2009), or market 
regulations (Neely, 2010). 
 Finally, a more recent strand of literature focuses on the pertinence of Okun’s Law at a 
sub-country, regional level.6 Among the first studies, Freeman (2000) emphasizes differences 
between Okun’s coefficients for pooled data (around -2) compared to US regions (between -
3.57 and -1.84). Even more important disparities are outlined by Adanu (2005) for Canadian 
regions. On the one hand, in some regions the Okun coefficient is not significant. On the other 
hand, the magnitude of significant Okun coefficients ranges between -2.14 and -0.93, if we 
consider, for example, the HP filter. 
 In addition to the US and Canada, much of the regional analysis of Okun’s Law has 
focused so far on European Countries. Early studies by Kangasharju & Pehkonen (2001) outline 
both significance and magnitude differences in the Okun coefficient for regions in Finland (see 
also Kangasharju, Tavera & Nijkamp, 2012). Two other studies analyze regions in Greece. 
                                                          
5 See also the analysis of Moazzami & Dadgostar (2009) performed on 13 OECD countries, or the work of Gabrisch 
& Buscher (2006) focusing on post-communist economies. 
6 To some extent, cross-country OECD or E(M)U studies can be also seen as regional, provided countries are 
considered as regions of the OECD or E(M)U areas. 
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Apergis & Rezitis (2003) find little differences between Greek regions, except for two regions 
for which the estimated coefficients are quite large in absolute value (around -3). On the 
contrary, Christopoulos (2004) concludes that not only is the size of the Okun coefficient 
weaker, ranging between -1.70 and -0.32, but that Okun’s Law is valid (at the 5% level) in only 
5 out of the 13 Greek regions. In their analysis on Spanish regions, Villaverde & Maza (2007, 
2009) emphasize results in favor of Okun’s Law in most regions (between 11 and 15 out of 17 
regions), of relatively low (absolute value) magnitude (between -1.55 and -0.32 for the regions, 
and equal to -0.91 for Spain as a whole). Finally, comparable results are illustrated by Binet & 
Facchini (2013) for France: Okun’s coefficient is significant in only 14 out of 22 regions, and 
ranges between -1.81 and -0.91. 
In this paper we take stock of this latter strand of literature and explore the potential 
existence of Okun’s Law in regions within the Czech Republic and Slovakia. By so doing, we 
aim to develop the existing literature in several directions. First, compared to previous research, 
this is the first paper that presents evidence on the regional Okun’s Law in more than one 
country. Indeed, there are several reasons for jointly considering the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Historically, the two countries were part of the former Czechoslovakia for the period 
1918-1992, during which time they shared common traditions, culture, history, and so forth, in 
addition to a common government and economic policy. Nowadays, there is a strong tradition 
for the elected prime minister of one country to make the first official foreign visit to the other 
one. Also, the two countries often disregard their common border when it comes to important 
development projects (i.e. highways), and students from one country can study in the other one 
in their own language (the two languages are fairly close). Finally, each country is the other’s 
first (after Germany) foreign partner in terms of trade. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper analyzing Okun’s Law in 
emerging countries at a regional level, while previous contributions focused exclusively on 
developed countries. As such, we are using an original output and unemployment regional 
dataset to provide estimations of a regional Okun’s Law, as well as a set of regional variables, 
including domestic and foreign investment, R&D, or infrastructure public spending, in our 
subsequent analysis. Thus, we illustrate output and unemployment dynamics over two decades 
for two emerging countries that were confronted with major political, institutional and 
economic transformations in the 1990’s. 
Third, after emphasizing regional estimates for Okun’s Law in both the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, we augment our study in two ways. On the one hand, we present a systematic 
analysis of economic drivers of Okun’s Law, in other words, the major factors explaining that 
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the unemployment-output relation is significant only in some regions. On the other hand, we 
search for possible non-linearities in the significant estimated regional Okun coefficients across 
the two countries. Compared to previous studies in which relatively minor importance is given 
to explaining the underlying sources of regional heterogeneity, our analysis considers a wide 
range of variables that can affect not only the significance, but also the magnitude of regional 
Okun coefficients. 
Our results are the following. First, we produce evidence on the presence of a negative 
relation between output and unemployment in the two emerging countries considered. Second, 
we highlight important regional disparities in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, when it 
comes to the significance of Okun’s Law. Third, we provide an extensive analysis regarding 
potential drivers of such regional heterogeneities. In particular, we find that cyclical 
unemployment is significantly related to changes in the output gap in Czech and Slovak regions 
with relatively high output, high domestic and foreign investment, high R&D, and a developed 
network of highways. On the contrary, regions with high and persistent long-term 
unemployment or large populations cannot benefit from positive output gaps to reduce 
unemployment. Fourth, we look for subsequent discrepancies across Czech and Slovak regions, 
by focusing exclusively on regions in which Okun’s Law is at work. We unveil important non-
linearities, mainly related to the level of unemployment, economic growth, and the growth rate 
of domestic investment. Finally, capitalizing on our results, we discuss policy measures 
designed to reduce unemployment regional disparities in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy 
and the data, section 3 illustrates evidence on the regional Okun’s Law in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, section 4 analyses the determinants of both the significance and the magnitude 
of Okun’s coefficient, and section 5 discusses policy implications and concludes. 
 
1.2. Empirical strategy and data 
We first present the econometric specification and then discuss the data used in our study. 
 
1.2.1. Econometric Strategy 
Let us consider a general specification of Okun’s Law linking the cyclical components of output 
and unemployment 
  ttttt uuyy   10 ,       (1) 
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where ty  and tu  are, respectively, the (log of) real GDP and the unemployment rate, 0  is a 
constant, and t  is the error term. Denoting by ty  the trend of GDP and by tu  the trend of 
unemployment, the terms  tt yy   and  tt uu   measure the cyclical components of output 
(the output gap) and unemployment (the unemployment gap), respectively. 
One major difficulty for estimating the interest coefficient, 
1 , is that the long-term 
components of output and unemployment, namely potential output ty  and the natural 
unemployment rate tu , are unobserved. However, the literature has by now emphasized 
numerous detrending techniques, which properly allow for estimating the long-run component 
of a time series, by taking into account the likely presence of a unit root.7 To easily compare 
our results with the literature, we focus on the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrending filter for 
estimating ty  and tu .
8 Despite its popularity, the HP technique is the object of various criticism, 
particularly regarding the value of the key smoothing parameter,  . In particular, although 
some consensus emerges for quarterly data, the literature is much divided when observed series 
present an annual frequency. Consequently, we append the value recommended by HP, namely 
100, to account for the popular correction emphasized by Ravn & Uhlig (2002) and use the 
value 25.6 . 
 
1.2.2. Data 
At the most disaggregated level, our study is conducted on a balanced panel of 22 
regions (14 from the Czech Republic and 8 from Slovakia), using original yearly data over the 
period 1995-2011.9 We measure output ty  by real GDP, while unemployment tu  is captured 
through the registered unemployment rate, based on the methodology developed by the 
Ministries of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
We begin by estimating the output and unemployment gaps using the HP filter on 
observed series ty  and tu . For a proper estimation of Okun’s Law by equation (1), both cyclical 
components tt yy   and tt uu   must be stationary. The literature emphasizes, mainly, two 
alternatives for investigating the presence of a unit root, namely unit root (for example, 
                                                          
7 For an early excellent survey on detrending methods, see Canova (1998). 
8 The robustness section will provide results based on other detrending methods. 
9 The time length was selected based on data availability. In addition, assuming that data were available since 1990 
(i.e. after the end of the Cold War), we would still use 1995 as the starting date of our sample, to allow several 
years for economies to stabilize after the massive shocks they experienced. 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and stationarity (for example, Kwiatkovski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin, 
KPSS, 1992) tests.10 If we consider stationarity tests, according to Carrion-i-Silvestre & Sanso 
(2006) a major shortcoming relates to the estimation of the long-run variance; thus, we estimate 
it using the correction of Sul, Phillips & Choi (SPC, 2005). 
Table 1. Stationarity tests for output and unemployment gap 
Region Output gap Unemployment gap 
Czech Republic   
Central Bohemia (CB) 0.056 0.054 
Hradec Kralove (HK) 0.061 0.049 
Karlovy Vary (KV) 0.062 0.047 
Liberec (LI) 0.051 0.047 
Moravia Silesia (MS) 0.066 0.058 
Olomouc (OL) 0.063 0.054 
Pardubice (PD) 0.057 0.049 
Plzen (PZ) 0.065 0.050 
Prague (PG) 0.060 0.059 
South Bohemia (SB) 0.064 0.050 
South Moravia (SM) 0.061 0.055 
Usti (UT) 0.069 0.059 
Vysocina (VY) 0.054 0.046 
Zlin (ZL) 0.055 0.051 
Slovakia   
Banska Bystrica (BB) 0.047 0.086 
Bratislava (BA) 0.072 0.084 
Kosice (KE) 0.060 0.099 
Nitra (NR) 0.065 0.091 
Presov (PO) 0.055 0.088 
Trencin (TR) 0.058 0.081 
Trnava (TV) 0.062 0.088 
Zilina (ZI) 0.059 0.083 
Note: KPSS stationarity tests are computed with a time trend. The maximum lag length was chosen based on the 
Schwert (1989) criterion. The critical values for the KPSS test are 0.119 (10%), 0.146 (5%), and 0.216 (1%). 
Table 1 presents the KPSS stationarity test for output and unemployment gaps. Results show 
that the HP filter was successful in extracting a potential unit root, as all considered cyclical 
components of output and employment are stationary. In addition to regional unit root tests,11 
these results are backed up by (i) panel unit root tests—for example, the Im, Pesaran & Shin 
(IPS, 2003)12 statistic (and its p-value) for cyclical output is -5.69 (0.00), while for cyclical 
unemployment is -5.19 (0.00), therefore rejecting the presence of a unit root in the panel—and 
                                                          
10 The null hypothesis for unit root (stationarity) tests is that the series is non-stationary (stationary) against the 
alternative hypothesis of stationarity (non-stationarity); thus, the two tests can be seen as the reversal complement 
of each other. 
11 The results of the Elliott-Rothemberg-Stock (ERS, 1996) test are available upon request. 
12 As acknowledged by the literature, the IPS test is more appropriate for heterogeneous panels compared, for 
example, with the Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) statistic, which is more appropriate for homogeneous panels. 
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by (ii) panel stationarity tests—for example, the Hadri (2000) statistic (and its p-value) equals 
-2.68 (0.996) for cyclical output and -2.43 (0.993) for cyclical unemployment, therefore 
accepting the null hypothesis of stationary panels. Consequently, we employ the cyclical 
components of output and unemployment in the next section to search for eventual regional 
evidence on Okun’s Law. 
 
1.3. Results: Regional evidence on Okun’s Law in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
 
We proceed in two steps: first, we present a graphical illustration of the relationship between 
unemployment and output at the regional level and, second, we emphasize regional estimations 
of Okun’s Law. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the cyclical components of unemployment and output based on HP 
computations. For parsimony, we present four examples for the Czech Republic (the first two 
lines) and two examples for Slovakia (the last line). 
Figure 1. Regional output and unemployment cycles in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
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As emphasized by Figure 1, the output gap has a much higher magnitude compared to the 
unemployment gap. This is consistent with the fact that both the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
are emerging economies experiencing a catching-up process (possibly relative to advanced EU 
countries) characterized by relatively higher economic growth rates. Figure 1 shows mixed 
evidence. On the one hand, there seems to be a strong inverse relation between the output gap 
and the unemployment gap in the regions on the left-hand side column, namely Moravia Silesia, 
South Moravia, and Trencin. On the other hand, in South Bohemia, Karlovy Vary, and Kosice, 
the negative correlation between the two series is not that clear-cut. Indeed, for the latter 
regions, the behavior of unemployment and output seems less consistent with Okun’s Law, as 
the two series often cross at values fairly different from zero, namely a positive output gap is 
not always correlated with a negative unemployment gap (or vice versa). Capitalizing on these 
observations, we present in the following regional estimations. 
 
Table 2. Okun’s Law in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: regional evidence 
Region HP QT BK 
Czech Republic    
Central Bohemia (CB) 
-2.30** 
(.729) 
-1.72** 
(.545) 
-1.94 
(1.00) 
Hradec Kralove (HK) 
-1.04** 
(.461) 
-.904 
(.479) 
-1.20** 
(.407) 
Karlovy Vary (KV) 
-.535 
(.408) 
-1.10** 
(.329) 
-.539 
(.564) 
Liberec (LI) 
-1.51** 
(.476) 
-1.14** 
(.470) 
-1.21** 
(.515) 
Moravia Silesia (MS) 
-1.90** 
(.478) 
-2.17** 
(.306) 
-2.05** 
(.602) 
Olomouc (OL) 
-.919** 
(.408) 
-.856** 
(.263) 
-.980 
(.505) 
Pardubice (PD) 
-1.45** 
(.451) 
-1.64** 
(.394) 
-1.29** 
(.523) 
Plzen (PZ) 
-1.53** 
(.609) 
-2.17** 
(.446) 
-1.25 
(.877) 
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Prague (PG) 
-3.00** 
(1.17) 
-2.56** 
(.806) 
-2.78 
(1.41) 
South Bohemia (SB) 
-.724 
(.623) 
-1.37** 
(.551) 
-.553 
(.594) 
South Moravia (SM) 
-1.51** 
(.407) 
-1.13** 
(.356) 
-1.25** 
(.493) 
Usti (UT) 
-.619 
(.478) 
-1.57** 
(.312) 
-.403 
(.490) 
Vysocina (VY) 
-1.40** 
(.357) 
-1.55** 
(.261) 
-.947 
(.597) 
Zlin (ZL) 
-1.22** 
(.510) 
-1.41** 
(.467) 
-1.15** 
(.396) 
Slovakia    
Banska Bystrica (BB) 
-1.32 
(.722) 
-.501 
(.399) 
-2.33** 
(.771) 
Bratislava (BA) 
-2.58** 
(.884) 
-2.64** 
(.607) 
-2.90** 
(1.07) 
Kosice (KE) 
-.471 
(.397) 
-.676** 
(.290) 
-.226 
(.384) 
Nitra (NR) 
-1.11** 
(.433) 
-.872** 
(.217) 
-1.34 
(.661) 
Presov (PO) 
-.986 
(.493) 
-.750** 
(.291) 
-1.29** 
(.542) 
Trencin (TR) 
-1.89** 
(.610) 
-1.45** 
(.407) 
-2.29** 
(.656) 
Trnava (TV) 
-2.16** 
(.929) 
-2.20** 
(.580) 
-1.44 
(.945) 
Zilina (ZI) 
-1.72** 
(.500) 
-1.06** 
(.297) 
-2.70** 
(.570) 
Note: HP stands for the Hodrick-Prescott filter. QT signals the use of a quadratic trend. BK stands for the Baxter-
King filter. Standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. ** shows 
significance at the 5% level. 
Table 2 presents OLS estimations of regional Okun coefficients for each of the 22 Czech and 
Slovak regions. HP-based results depicted in the first column are consistent with Okun’s Law, 
as all coefficients are negative, emphasizing an inverse relation between the unemployment gap 
and the output gap. Similar results occur if we perform panel pooled or fixed effects estimations 
on Czech and Slovak regions; for example, the Okun coefficient based on a panel regression 
with regional fixed effects equals -1.23 (with a standard error of 0.108). The (absolute 
magnitude) value of the Okun coefficient is even higher if we consider country data, namely -
1.50 (0.265) for a panel regression with country fixed effects, -1.58 (0.464) for the Czech 
Republic, and -1.47 (0.343) for Slovakia. Altogether, these results confirm the presence of a 
negative link between cyclical unemployment and the output gap.13 
                                                          
13 Note also the existence of some differences in the magnitude of the Okun coefficient between the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia. Indeed, although the difference between the two countries is rather weak if we compare regional-
average coefficients, namely -1.3 for the Czech Republic versus -1.2 for Slovakia, it becomes more important if 
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However, results equally outline significant regional disparities. Regarding the Czech 
Republic, Okun’s Law is statistically significant in 11 out of 14 regions, while in only 5 out of 
8 regions for Slovakia. Moreover, when it comes to its magnitude, significant Okun coefficients 
lie between -3.00 for Prague and -2.58 for Bratislava, or between -0.92 for Olomouc and -1.11 
for Nitra. Notice that these numbers are of higher (absolute value) magnitude than regional 
coefficients derived for developed countries (see Villaverde & Maza, 2009, for Spain, or Binet 
& Facchini, 2013, for France), confirming the strong link between unemployment and output 
in emerging countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
 Using the HP filter as a benchmark, in columns 2 and 3 we present robustness tests, 
which consider alternative detrending methods allowing for comparison with the related 
literature, namely a Quadratic Trend (QT, in column 2; see Adanu, 2005) and the Baxter & 
King (1999) filter (BK, in column 3; see Villaverde & Maza, 2009). The negative coefficients 
are yet again compatible with Okun’s Law and of comparable amplitude with those based on 
the HP filter, namely between -2.56 (-2.64) for Prague (Bratislava) and -0.856 (-0.676) for 
Olomouc (Kosice) for QT, and between -2.05 (-2.90) for Moravia Silesia (Bratislava) and -1.15 
(-1.29) for Zlin (Presov). However, compared to the HP filter, the use of a QT increases the 
number of significant coefficients to 13 in the Czech Republic and to 7 in Slovakia, while 
drawing upon the BK filter drops the number of significant regions to 6 for the Czech Republic 
and to 5 in Slovakia.14 
 Based on the three alternative detrending methods, we can identify three patterns when 
it comes to assessing the significance of the regional Okun’s Law. In the first group there are 
several regions in which the coefficient is strongly significant (at the 5% level), irrespective of 
the method used. Regarding the Czech Republic, such regions are South Moravia or Moravia 
Silesia, while for Slovakia we can identify Bratislava and Trencin. Regarding the second group, 
in several regions the unemployment and output cycles do not seem to be significantly 
correlated, as the estimated coefficient is not significant in at least 2 out of 3 cases. This is the 
case for Karlovy Vary, Usti, and South Bohemia for the Czech Republic, and for Banska 
Bystrica and Kosice for Slovakia. Finally, in the last group we identified regions with mixed 
results, namely, in which significant and non-significant Okun coefficients coexist, depending 
                                                          
we focus only on significant regional coefficients, as their averages are -1.6 for the Czech Republic and -1.9 for 
Slovakia. The more vigorous (in absolute value) Okun coefficient in Slovakia might be attributable, for example, 
to a better integration with trade partners (mostly EU countries), fostered by the convergence process prior to the 
adoption of the Euro in 2009. 
14 Moreover, to control for the fact that, as with most of the CEECs, the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced 
changes in the dynamics of their population after the end of the Cold War, we used real per capita GDP as a 
measure of output. We report that HP-based results are unchanged when it comes to the sign and significance of 
Okun’s coefficient in all Czech and Slovak regions (results are available upon request). 
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on the econometric method used. For example, for the Czech Republic, Central Bohemia and 
Vysocina would be associated with the first and second group, while for Slovakia, Trnava and 
Presov would be closer to the first and second groups, respectively. Building on these findings, 
in the next section we aim to emphasize potential factors that could drive such important 
regional differences. 
 
1.4. Discussion: a closer look at driving factors of regional disparities 
The goal of this section is to explore two issues. In the first subsection we investigate what 
might differentiate regions in which Okun’s Law holds from regions in which it does not. In 
the second subsection we focus exclusively on the regions in which the relation between the 
cyclical components of unemployment and output is significant and search for potential 
variables that might significantly influence its magnitude. 
 
1.4.1 What explanations exist for a significant regional Okun’s Law? 
 Let us first focus on our main variables, namely unemployment and GDP. Regarding 
unemployment in Slovakia, the regions where Okun’s Law is not significant are associated with 
high unemployment, as well as high long-term unemployment. Average unemployment for 
Banska Bystrica, Kosice, and Presov equals 19.2%, compared to 8.83% in Bratislava, Zilina, 
and Trnava, while for long-term unemployment the numbers are 11.2% and 3.52%, 
respectively. Turning to the Czech Republic, average unemployment and average long-term 
unemployment together for Karlovy Vary and Usti is 10.8% and 4.04%, well above the values 
for Central Bohemia and Prague, namely 4.40% and 0.87%. Consequently, an identical initial 
explanation arises for both countries: demand-based policies are found to be inefficient in 
reducing unemployment in Czech and Slovak regions characterized by high and persistent 
unemployment.15 Given the beginning date of our sample, namely 1995, we can suspect that 
this long-term unemployment is mainly related to the end of the Cold War and the transition to 
a market economy in the 1990’s, which was typically associated with deindustrialization and 
massive job destruction. In particular, the skills of the unemployed rapidly became obsolete 
with respect to the requests of the new types of industries. Therefore, these regions should draw 
upon supply-based policies designed to reduce labor market rigidities, allowing, for example, 
for the long-term unemployed to acquire new skills through requalification. 
                                                          
15 Our results confirm previous findings for Greece (Christopoulos, 2004) and for the OECD (Sogner & Stiassny, 
2002). 
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 We now turn to GDP. Regarding the Czech Republic, the regions Karlovy Vary, Usti, 
and Vysocina are below the average GDP per capita, in contrast with Prague, South Moravia, 
and Central Bohemia, which are (decreasingly) ranked 1, 2, and 4, respectively. The same holds 
in Slovakia, as, according to their average GDP per capita, Bratislava and Trnava are the two 
richest regions, while Banska Bystrica and Presov are the two poorest. Thus, it seems that 
demand-based policies may create important unemployment regional disparities in both the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, with the formation of “clubs,” namely, rich regions with low and 
decreasing unemployment, which coexist with poor regions with high and persistent (long-
term) unemployment. To better emphasize the potential existence of such underdevelopment 
traps, we can augment our analysis using GDP growth rates. For Slovakia, the regions of 
Bratislava and Zilina present the two highest growth rates, in contrast with Banska Bystrica and 
Presov which exert the two lowest growth rates. For the Czech Republic, Karlovy Vary and 
Usti are associated with the lowest average growth rates (3.8% and 4.7%, respectively), below 
the average of 5.5% for the Czech Republic and well below the most rapidly growing regions, 
namely Prague (7.7%), Central Bohemia (6.8%), and South Moravia (6.3%). Since average 
growth rates are computed over the period 1995-2011, these important differences in magnitude 
over such a long period support the idea of the formation of significant regional disparities 
involving regional development paths at different speeds (absence of regional convergence). 
 Capitalizing on the evidence for unemployment and GDP, we consider, in the following, 
additional explanatory variables for the regional Okun’s Law. Let us first focus on domestic 
and external investment. An interesting feature for both countries is that domestic and foreign 
investment seem to be highly complementary. Indeed, for the Czech Republic, the lowest and 
highest volumes of per capita gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) are registered in Karlovy Vary and in (except Prague) South Moravia and 
Central Bohemia, respectively. Similarly, Banska Bystrica and Presov, and Bratislava and 
Trnava, present, respectively, the lowest and highest per capita GFCF and FDI volumes for 
Slovakia. The fact that domestic and foreign investment often go hand in hand, signifying that 
one type of investment can hardly substitute the other, yet again supports the potential danger 
of regional underdevelopment traps in Czech and Slovak regions. 
 Second, we discuss innovation, measured alternatively by two variables. On the one 
hand, the largest volume of R&D investment in the Czech Republic occurs in (except Prague) 
Central Bohemia, South Moravia, and Moravia Silesia, and the smallest in Karlovy Vary, 
Vysocina, and Usti. The same pattern appears for R&D growth rates, as the former (latter) three 
regions are all above (below) the average. For Slovakia, R&D investment volumes are roughly 
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10-20 times (2-4 times) higher in Bratislava (Trnava) compared to the lowest amounts of R&D 
investment, which is registered in Presov and Banska Bystrica. These high magnitudes still hold 
when we compare the average growth rate of R&D for Bratislava (11.1%) and Trnava (9.95%) 
with that of Presov (4.39%). On the other hand, we consider the number of students, as a proxy 
for human capital, which itself can foster innovation. If the highest number of students over the 
period 2007-2011 occurs as expected in Bratislava, note that the region of Presov has among 
the lowest number of students. The figures for the Czech Republic for the same period are even 
more conclusive: the top four regions regarding the number of students are Prague, Moravia 
Silesia, South Moravia, and Central Bohemia, while Karlovy Vary, Vysocina, Usti, and South 
Bohemia are all below the average. Thus, evidence for innovation, proxied alternatively by 
R&D investment or the number of students as a measure of human capital, confirms the patterns 
established for previous variables. 
 
 Finally, we explore to what extent demographic and geographic variables may explain 
differences in the significance of Okun’s Law. In the former group of variables, for Slovakia, 
the most populated regions are Presov and Kosice, while Bratislava and Trnava are among the 
least populated regions; in addition, Banska Bystrica and Presov are the lowest two regions 
when it comes to population density.16 For the Czech Republic, the regions with the highest 
average net migration are Central Bohemia, Prague, and South Moravia, while Karlovy Vary 
and Vysocina have virtually no net migration. 
To capture geographic variables, we searched for data on highways, since, particularly 
for developing and emerging countries, they can be a strong vector of economic development. 
Figure 2 displays the network of highways in Czech Republic and Slovakia.17 
                                                          
16 Note also that the largest Slovak regions are Banska Bystrica and Presov (together they represent 38% of the 
total land area of Slovakia). 
17 We looked for maps for the beginning and the end of our sample. However, the lack of available data forced us 
to use the map for 2005—as close as we could get to the middle year of our sample, 2003. 
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Figure 2. The network of highways in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2005 
 
Visually, the map confirms the three areas along which the Okun’s Law was found to be 
significant. First, around the capital Prague, namely for the regions Prague and Central 
Bohemia, there is an important concentration of highways. Second, along the highway linking 
the two capital cities Prague and Bratislava, namely for the regions South Moravia and 
Bratislava. Third, along the highway connecting Bratislava to Trencin, namely for the regions 
Bratislava, Trnava, and Trencin. For example, regarding the Czech Republic, out of the 546 km 
of highways in 2005, 298 km are located in Central Bohemia (174) and South Moravia (124), 
while for Slovakia the three regions with the longest highways are Bratislava (101), Trnava 
(67), and Trencin (67), for a national highway network of 317 km in 2005.18 Strongly related 
to the presence of high-quality transport infrastructure, the automobile industry is equally 
developed in these regions. For example, regarding Slovakia, Volkswagen is implanted in the 
region of Bratislava, Peugeot-Citroen in Trnava, and Kia Motors in Zilina. Similarly, regarding 
the Czech Republic, Skoda is implanted in Central Bohemia, while Moravia Silesia and South 
Moravia are traditionally highly industrialized regions.19 Conversely, Okun’s Law is not 
                                                          
18 Note that our conclusions still hold if we consider other national rapid roads, i.e. 1st roads, in addition to 
highways. For example, among the regions with the lowest density of highways and 1st roads in 2005 in the Czech 
Republic we find South Bohemia and Karlovy Vary, while Prague (corrected for the surface covered by historical 
buildings) and the Moravian Silesian region contain the highest density of highways and 1st roads. Regarding 
Slovakia, there is a major gap between the density of the last three ranked regions, namely Kosice, Banska Bystrica, 
and Presov (the average value is around 6.4 km of such roads per 100 km2 of surface), and the first three regions, 
namely Bratislava, Trnava, and Trencin (the average is around 9.5 per 100 km2 of surface). 
19 For example, the industrial tradition of the Moravian Silesian region goes back (at least) to 1763 (discovery of 
coal in the region) and currently Moravia Silesia is among the most industrialized regions in all of Central Europe. 
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significant in northern regions of the Czech Republic (especially Karlovy Vary and Usti) and 
in eastern regions of Slovakia (Banska Bystrica, Kosice and Presov). 
This preceding analysis suggests that, in addition to common historical and cultural 
traditions between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there exists a regional pattern of where 
Okun’s Law holds, namely in border regions between the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Czech 
Republic: South Moravia, Zlin, and Moravia Silesia; Slovakia: Trnava, Trencin, and Zilina). 
Consequently, the following analysis considers all regions pooled, i.e. irrespective of the 
country to which they belong. 
 
1.4.2. Are there regional non-linearities in the regional Okun’s Law? 
In complement to the previous analysis, we focus in this subsection exclusively on the regions 
in which the Okun coefficient is significant. Precisely, we aim to look at whether, when 
significant, the relation between unemployment and output is related to non-linearities among 
Czech and Slovak regions. To this end, we consider several variables that may generate such 
nonlinear effects. Let us first focus on the influence of average unemployment on Okun 
coefficients. 
 
Figure 3.a. The magnitude of regional Okun coefficients: the role of unemployment 
 
                                                          
Previously focused on mining and heavy industry, the region has undergone a significant restructuring process, 
leading to the development of new industries, including automotive and related supply chains. Important firms 
include Moravia Steel (ranked 7th in the Czech Republic according to net sales in 2011), OKD (coal and coke 
production, ranked 6th in the Czech Republic according to the number of employees in 2011), or the famous 
automotive company Tatra. In particular, note that the high magnitude (in absolute value) of the Okun coefficient 
for Moravia Silesia is in line with the work of Blackley (1991), emphasizing high Okun coefficients in large 
manufacturing sectors. 
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As emphasized by Figure 3.a, there exists an increasing relation between average (1995-2011) 
unemployment and Okun coefficients. In addition, since the slope is significant (the p-value 
associated with the slope equals 2.7%), our analysis reveals that the relation between 
unemployment and output is significantly different depending on the level of average 
unemployment. For example, the Okun coefficient is 2-3 times stronger in Central Bohemia or 
Bratislava compared to its value in Olomouc or Hradec Kralove. Thus, in addition to the result 
from the previous subsection, according to which the level of unemployment matters when it 
comes to the significance of the Okun coefficient, we find that the level of unemployment is 
equally related to significant magnitude non-linearities across Czech and Slovak regions for 
which Okun’s Law is at work. 
 
Figure 3.b. The magnitude of regional Okun coefficients: the role of economic growth 
 
 Second, we look for a potential role of economic growth. According to Figure 3.b., there 
exists a decreasing and significant (the p-value associated with the slope equals 2.5%) link 
between the size of the Okun coefficient and the 1995-2011 average economic growth (RGDP). 
Specifically, in regions such as Bratislava, Central Bohemia, Prague, or Trnava, Okun 
coefficients are above 2 (in absolute value), but only around 1 in Hradec Kralove, Olomouc, or 
Zlin. Consequently, there exist significant regional disparities in the reaction of unemployment 
to output-based policies among Czech and Slovak regions with rapid, versus moderate, 
economic growth paths.20 
 
                                                          
20 A positive link between output and the absolute size of the Okun coefficient is similarly reported by Adanu 
(2005) for Canada. 
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Third, let us look more in detail at important economic growth drivers, namely research 
and development (R&D), foreign direct investment (FDI), and the gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF). Despite presenting the expected negative sign, the correlations between Okun 
coefficients and the growth rates of both R&D and FDI are not significant.21 On the contrary, 
as illustrated by Figure 3.c., the higher the growth rate of the gross fixed capital formation 
(RGFCF), the higher the Okun coefficient (in absolute value). Even though the significance of 
the relation is relatively weaker (the p-value associated to the slope equals 9.4%), GFCF 
appears, in addition to unemployment and the growth rate of GDP, as a potential key 
determinant of the magnitude of the relation between unemployment and output. 
 
Figure 3.c. The magnitude of regional Okun coefficients: the role of the GFCF 
 
 Finally, we explored other potential sources of heterogeneities among Okun’s 
coefficients in Czech and Slovak regions. We report that population dynamics (measured by 
the growth rate of migrants), the evolution of human capital (measured by the growth rate of 
students), or the change in wages were not found to be significant drivers of regional 
heterogeneities in the relation between unemployment and output in Czech and Slovak regions. 
 
                                                          
21 An unpublished appendix provides a graphical illustration. The lack of a significant relation between R&D 
growth and Okun coefficients can be related to the time needed for R&D investment to generate sizable effects at 
the macroeconomic level (and all the more in emerging or developing countries, as is the case for our analysis). 
Besides, there is currently a debate over the sign of the effect of R&D growth on the Okun coefficient; for example, 
Villaverde & Maza (2009) find a positive relation, contrary to the not significant slope we find. However, R&D 
and FDI growth rates explain regional differences when it comes to the significance of Okun’s Law (see also the 
previous subsection). For example, in regions with high FDI growth rates, such as Moravia Silesia or South 
Moravia, Okun’s coefficient is significant, while not significant in regions with low FDI growth rates (Karlovy 
Vary or Usti). 
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1.5. Conclusion 
 
We presented in this paper evidence on the regional Okun’s Law in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Compared to the few previous contributions that focused exclusively on developed 
countries, our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to present such regional 
evidence in two emerging countries, selected for their historical, cultural, and economic 
closeness. 
 Using annual data for the period 1995-2011, we emphasized important heterogeneities 
among Czech and Slovak regions regarding the significance of the Okun coefficient. 
Considering alternative methods for estimating Okun’s Law, three patterns arise: regions for 
which the Okun’s Law is (i) always validated, (ii) never or weakly validated, and (iii) mixed 
results. The existence of these disparities calls for more detailed analysis of the underlying 
mechanisms explaining such regional differences. On the one hand, we searched for 
determinants that might explain what drives regional disparities in the relation between 
unemployment and output. According to our findings, the Okun’s Law appears not to be 
statistically significant in Czech and Slovak regions in which average and long-term 
unemployment is high and average economic growth is relatively lower. These results are to be 
related to the deindustrialization process that followed the end of the Cold War, generating high 
and persistent unemployment due to obsolete skills. Furthermore, these findings raise serious 
regional development concerns, as regions with high unemployment may be caught in an 
underemployment trap, in addition to the underdevelopment trap due to the presence of 
relatively lower economic growth rates over such a long period. In addition, the regions where 
the Okun coefficient is not significant are jointly characterized by low domestic (GFCF) and 
foreign (FDI) investment, which equally raise the danger of regional underdevelopment traps 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Unfortunately, the same holds when considering other 
potential sources of economic development, like R&D spending, population, the number of 
students, or the network of highways. On the other hand, we found that the level of 
unemployment, economic growth, or the growth rate of the GFCF are related to significant non-
linearities among Czech and Slovak regions for which the Okun’s Law is statistically 
significant. 
 Altogether, these results have important policy implications. First, it appears that 
demand-side policies are inappropriate in many Czech and Slovak regions for dealing with 
unemployment. In such regions, policymakers should draw upon supply-based policies, 
including supporting the unemployed in acquiring new skills through requalification, 
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subsidizing the formation of human capital (for example, through increasing the number of 
students), or subsidizing the development of R&D activities is poor regions with high 
unemployment.22 In addition, from a more demand-side perspective, since domestic and foreign 
investment seem to go hand in hand in Czech and Slovak regions, policymakers concerned with 
reducing unemployment should provide facilities for attracting FDI in such affected regions.23 
One way to do so is to focus on large public investment plans in regional infrastructure (such 
as highways or other rapid roads).24 Failing to do so might result in persistent unemployment 
rates, and even regional underemployment traps, in Czech and Slovak regions associated with 
different convergence speeds compared to other EU/CEEC regions. From this perspective, EU 
funds designed for fostering convergence across the area can play the role of a key vector in 
accompanying the Czech and Slovak transition (and convergence to the advanced EU countries) 
process, by driving regional development and reducing regional unemployment. 
  
                                                          
22 Supply-based policies are likewise defended by Apergis & Rezitis (2003) and Apergis (2005) for Greece, or 
Villaverde & Maza (2009) for Spain. 
23 One successful example is the Moravian Silesian region in the Czech Republic: despite high unemployment 
rates following the restructuring process in industry, the region attracted domestic and foreign investment (in 
particular by building industrial parks) that generated sizable macroeconomic effects in reducing unemployment. 
24 The role of local infrastructure for reducing regional unemployment is similarly outlined by Christopoulos 
(2004) for Greece or Binet & Facchini (2013) for France. 
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Economic growth and unemployment in Romania: 
A regional analysis of Okun's Law1 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We analyze the regional Okun's Law in Romania, the second largest emerging 
country in the European Union. We are unveiling significant regional 
heterogeneities of the Okun coefficient. The regions in which Okun's Law is not 
significant have high growth rates, but the unemployment rates are around the 
median. These results illustrate the importance of the regional dimension in setting 
growth and employment policies. In most Romanian regions, demand policies 
would still be effective in reducing unemployment. However, in some areas, 
government should focus on supply policies. Finally, an employment policy might 
prove virtuous to regain economic growth. 
  
 
 
Keywords: Regional Okun Law, emerging countries, Romania 
 
JEL Codes: E24, E32, R11 
  
  
                                                          
1 Aversion of this chapter will be published as “Croissance économique et chômage en Roumanie: Une analyse 
régionale de la loi d’Okun” in Canadian Journal of Development Studies, and was written with A. Minea and I. 
Tomuleasa. 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
In the context of the end of the Cold War, the events of December 1989 marked an 
abrupt change in the political regime in Romania, and with it major economic and institutional 
changes. The country has embarked on a transition period, intended to lead to monetary, 
financial and commercial liberalization, and generalization of the market economy. 
However, this transition was associated with significant imbalances from the early 
years. In fact, faced with the reality of the external competition, many Romanian public 
companies, oversized in capital and with low labour productivity, faced strong decreases in 
their activity or even closure. In this context, the first decade of transition was characterized by 
a steady increase in the unemployment rate, from full pre-1990 employment at two figures in 
the late 1990s (about 11.5% in 1999). 
Then, the 2000s marked a turnaround in the economic situation, fuelled by the context 
of intensifying discussions on integration of Romania into international structures, particularly 
in the European Union (EU). Thus, the average real growth rate of GDP over the period 2003-
2007 was above 6.5%, peaking at around 8% in 2008, just before the start of the recent financial 
and economic crisis. 
This article aims to analyze the relationship between income (GDP) and unemployment, 
through the estimation of Okun's Law. Proposed by Okun (1962), this relationship shows a 
strong empirical decreasing link between the GDP growth rate (real) and the unemployment 
rate. In a Keynesian perspective, Okun's Law allows to observe whether demand policies, 
designated to promote economic growth, reduce unemployment in the labour market. In a more 
neoclassical vision, Okun's Law measures the ability of supply policies to improve the 
functioning of the labour market, in order to generate economic growth. 
If the study of Okun's Law was the subject of many contributions (see next section), it 
is only recently that its analysis was extended to the inclusion of a regional dimension (see 
Freeman, 2000, Adanu, 2005, for a discussion on the US and Canadian regions). However, 
unlike these works that are concentrating around the developed countries, the focus in this 
article is on an emerging country, Romania. This choice is motivated by several reasons. First, 
it is the second largest (in terms of population) emerging Central and Eastern Europe country 
among the 13 countries that joined the European Union since 2004.2 Then, Romania has two 
statutes, both emerging country and EU member. The EU membership is important for the 
                                                          
2 The population of Romania in 2011 was around 21 million inhabitants, the seventh most populated and the ninth 
largest (surface) country of the European Union. 
Chapter 2. Economic growth and unemployment in Romania: a regional analysis of Okun's Law 
68 
quality of statistical data, particularly for unemployment measures.3 Finally, the authors have a 
great knowledge of Romanian regional characteristics in the three major regions (Moldova at 
north and northeast, Transylvania at north and north-west and South Wallachia), allowing 
strengthening the interpretations based on econometric estimations. 
The econometric analysis performed for the 1995-2010 period reveals the following 
results. First, if in all Romanian regions our results are consistent with Okun's Law (the Okun 
coefficient is always negative), there are significant regional heterogeneities, concerning the 
significance of the Okun coefficient. Following the robustness analysis of this result through 
the use of several econometric methods, we find that the Okun Law is not significant in two 
regions, Bucharest-Ilfov and West. Second, among the regions where it is significant, the 
magnitude of the Okun coefficient varies greatly from one region to another. For example, if 
we consider the different methods used, it is sized (in absolute value) between 1.63 (South-
West) and 2.75 (South-Muntenia). Finally, the areas where the Okun coefficient is not 
significant differ in terms of highest average rate of economic growth during the period and by 
favourable demographic conditions. However, since Okun's Law is significant in the regions 
most affected by unemployment, public authorities could rely on policies that encourage 
demand to potentially reduce it. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a review of the 
literature on Okun's Law. Section three presents the econometric model and data. Section four 
presents our results. Finally, section five concludes and discusses policy implications. 
  
2.2. Literature review 
 
Despite the recent fifty year celebration (see Ball, Leigh and Loungani, 2013), Okun's 
Law has not lost its interest. Instead, she returned to the scene since the beginning of the recent 
financial crisis and the sharp rise in unemployment that followed (see, for example, Daly and 
Hobijn, 2010). However, its popularity is probably comparable to the controversies surrounding 
it. Indeed, Okun's Law is far from being "universal and unique", as can be seen through (at 
least) three dimensions. 
First, the literature has often referred to the heterogeneity of Okun's Law over the 
studied period (see, for example, Knotek, 2007, and Beaton, 2010) or the perspective adopted 
(Moosa, 1999 and Huang and Yeh, 2013, illustrate different coefficients Okun on the short term 
                                                          
3 The section devoted to data presentation analyzes in detail these issues. 
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vs. long term). Furthermore, in agreement with several studies that identified different Okun 
coefficients during expansion or recession (see, for example, Cuaresma, 2003 or Holmes and 
Silverstone, 2006), more recent works are analyzing the Great Depression in the vision. So, 
using US quarterly data over the period 1949-2011, Owyang and Sekhposyan (2012) find a 
strong instability of the Okun Law from a historical perspective. 
Then, Okun's Law seems to vary with the levels of economic development. On one 
hand, the Okun coefficient is often significant in developed countries, although with rather large 
magnitude differences. For example, in an influential article, Prachowny (1993) shows that the 
Okun coefficient in the US, estimated by Okun (1962) to around 3 (in absolute value), is only 
around 0.7 when it is controlled by the number of weekly hours worked and by the degree of 
utilization of production capacity. However, recent work restore in (large) part the amplitude 
of the coefficient: Attfield and Silverstone (1997) and Coen and Hickman (2006) reveal an 
Okun coefficient close to 2 (in absolute value) in the United States. In addition, several authors, 
including Moosa (1997), Lee (2000), Freeman (2001), Harris and Silverstone (2001), Sögner 
and Stiassny (2002) or Perman and Tavera (2005), identify significant heterogeneity in 
developed countries. For example, according to Freeman (2001), the Okun coefficient is less 
than 1.5 in absolute value in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, near or greater than 2 in 
Canada, the United States and France and even around 4 in Japan4. On the other hand, though 
rarer, works on emerging countries reveal that Okun's Law is less significant compared to 
developed countries. In their panel analysis on 27 European in transition countries, Izyumov 
and Vahaly (2002) find that the Okun coefficient is not significant (at the 5% level) over the 
period 1991-1994, but it becomes significant over the 1995-2000 period. However, these results 
hide significant heterogeneities between these countries. Focusing on eight Central and Eastern 
European countries that joined the EU in 2004, Gabrisch and Buscher (2004) show that the 
Okun coefficient is significant (at the 5% level) only in the Czech Republic over the period 
1994:2-2004:4, or also in Lithuania and Slovenia over a shorter period (1998:1-2004:4).5 These 
results confirm that, as is the case for the period, Okun's Law seems heavily influenced by the 
level of economic development of countries. 
                                                          
4 Among the various factors that influence Okun's Law in developed countries are the conditions on the labor 
market, namely the level of unemployment (Virén, 2001), the stress on the labor market (Malley and Molana 
2008), and labour productivity (Huang and Lin, 2008), or monetary conditions, such as the creation of money 
(Mussard and Philippe, 2009) or membership in the European Monetary Union (Mayes and Virén, 2009). In 
addition, Hutengs and Stadtmann (2013) conclude that the age of the cohort influences the Okun coefficient in 
both the developed EU countries (EU-15) and five emerging countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
5 The presence of not significant Okun coefficients in emerging and developing countries in other parts of the 
world is confirmed, among others, by Lal et al. (2010) or Hanusch (2012), in Asian countries. 
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Finally, a very recent literature explores Okun's Law at regional level. On the North 
American continent, Freeman (2000) found significant differences between the Okun 
coefficient in American regions (between 1.84 and 3.57 in absolute value), while for Canadian 
regions Adanu (2005) highlights, in addition to amplitude heterogeneities (between 0.93 and 
2.14 in absolute value), regions in which the Okun coefficient is not significant. In Europe, 
Kangasharju and Pehkonen (2001) and Kangasharju, Tavera and Nijkamp (2012) highlight 
differences of significance and magnitude of the Okun coefficient in Finland. In Greece, the 
works of Apergis and Rezitis (2003) and Christopoulos (2004) arrive at rather different 
conclusions: the regional Okun coefficients would be higher (in absolute value) for the first, 
but less significant according to the second article. Two other contributions are interested in 
Spanish and French regions. According to Villaverde and Maza (2009), the Okun coefficient is 
significant in 11, and, depending on the method used, up to 15 of the 17 regions studied, but of 
low amplitude (between 0.32 and 1.55 in absolute value). In contrast, in France, Binet and 
Facchini (2013) show that the Okun coefficient is higher (between 0.88 and 1.95 in absolute 
value), but significant only in 14 of the 22 considered regions. Finally, according to Ďurech et 
al. (2014), Okun's Law is only significant in 16 out of 22 Czechs and Slovaks regions. Overall, 
if regional analysis appears to be increasing in developed countries, we can easily observe their 
rarity in developing and emerging economies. In order to precisely appreciate the importance 
of the development level for the significance and magnitude of Okun's Law suggested by the 
literature,  we focus in the following on an emerging country, namely Romania. 
  
2.3. The econometric model and data 
  
2.3.1. The econometric model 
Consider writing a series that depends on time tx  as the sum of a trend component 
T
tx  
and a cyclic component
T
tt
C
t xxx  . By performing the same decomposition for income ( ty ) 
and unemployment ( tu ), we can estimate Okun's Law deviation from trend as a relationship 
between the cyclical components of income and unemployment. 
t
C
t
C
t uy               (1) 
Where   and t  are the constant and the error term, respectively, and   is the 
coefficient of interest. According to Okun's Law, the coefficient   should be statistically 
significant and negative. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
71 
Before estimating the model (1), the question of calculating the variables 
T
tt
C
t yyy   
and 
T
tt
C
t uuu   appears. In contrast to the series ty  and tu the trend components of income    
(
T
ty ) and unemployment (
T
tu ) are not directly observable. However, the literature offers a large 
number of methods to estimate them. In this article, we focus on the econometric techniques 
that take into account the possible presence of a unit root in the observed series ( ty  and tu ). 
Among the methods used to extract the stochastic trend, the most common are the filters. 
If many filters have been proposed, we have chosen in this article, in particular to facilitate the 
comparison of our results with previous studies, to use the filter Hodrick and Prescott (HP 
1997). The HP filter consists in estimating the trend of a series as a result of the minimization 
of the following objective function: 
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The value of the smoothing parameter   plays a central role. With respect to Hodrick and 
Prescott suggestion, which is to use the value 100  for annual data, we rely on the results 
of the spectral analysis performed by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), and adopt the value 25.6 . 
In addition to the HP filter, we propose, as robustness, another method for calculating 
the cyclical components of income and unemployment, namely the first difference (FD) to 
account for the presence of a unit root. In this case, the trend is just equal to the delayed value 
of a period of the series (modelled as a random walk, in logs): 
T
tt
C
t
t
T
t
xxx
xx

 1            (2b) 
 
The two methods described by equation (2a) and (2b) respectively will be used later to identify 
different cyclical components and potentially different relationships between the cycle of 
income and the unemployment cycle. 
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2.3.2. The data 
Compared to the analyses related to the Okun's Law in developed countries, our work 
is focusing on an emerging country, Romania, and requires a more detailed discussion of the 
data used. 
To provide the regional estimates of Okun's Law, our study focuses on regional data on 
the eight Romanian regions as defined by the European NUTS 2 classification, corresponding 
to regions where the population is between 0.8 and 3 million.6 In the absence of regional 
quarterly data for both GDP and unemployment, we use data on annual frequency, covering the 
period 1995-2010. The selection of the temporal dimension was made on several criteria, 
namely (i) the availability of data, (ii) taking into account that the GDP calculation is 
harmonized with the ESA 95 methodology from the year 1995 and (iii) considering a 
stabilization period of five years following the political changes at the end of 1989, particularly 
in relation to measures on unemployment. 
First, measuring income ty  by real GDP (at constant 1995 prices), obtained from 
regional series of nominal GDP, adjusted for price effects using the national GDP deflator, in 
the absence of data for GDP deflator for each region (source: Romanian National Institute of 
Statistics). 
On the other hand, we measured unemployment tu by the percentage of unemployed 
people in the workforce (source: Romanian NIS), in agreement with the methodology of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). Several factors must be taken into account with 
respect to unemployment statistics in Romania. First, recent studies (Albu et al., 2012) estimate 
the size of the informal sector at around 20% of Romania's GDP in the 2010s, and the people 
involved in the informal sector to around 3 million people, about a sixth of the Romanian 
workforce. The importance of the informal sector, especially compared to developed countries, 
could lead to an overestimation of unemployment in the Romanian regions. Second, on the 
contrary, some Romanian specificities could lead to an underestimation of unemployment. In 
particular, if we still refer to the year 2010, according to Albu et al. (2012), the weight of the 
employed population working in agriculture is about 30%, well above other developed 
European countries (France, 3%) and emerging (Poland, 13%) countries. In addition, 
productivity in the Romanian agricultural sector is only 21% of the national average, well below 
other agricultural European countries (France, 70%). Although this population itself does not 
                                                          
6 The only regions where the population is not between these limits are Central and South-Muntenia (around 3.5 
million inhabitants each). 
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count in unemployment statistics, the degree in which it can be considered as employed is 
debatable (and especially given the often erratic nature of agricultural work). Finally, Romania 
has experienced a sharp decline in the total population of about 23 million (1989) to around 21 
million inhabitants (2010), two thirds explained by strong international migration. Since this 
migration is to a large majority of unskilled workers, it could lead to an underestimation of the 
unemployment rate (assuming it is easier to find a job being skilled). However, the fact that this 
migration is not necessarily declared, makes it difficult for statistical measurement and 
generates an ambiguous effect on the size of the active population and the number of 
unemployed people and therefore on the unemployment rate. 
If these elements may influence measurements of unemployment in Romania, it is clear 
that there exists some compensation between their effects.7 Furthermore, compared to most 
emerging and developing countries, unemployment measures in Romania are probably more 
reliable, protected with respect to ideological bias (such as, for example, in China) or 
institutional (since the 1990s, the integration process of Romania to the EU has made the 
Romanian NIS more independent and closer to the standards of the European Union). 
 
2.4. Okun's Law in the Romanian regions 
 
2.4.1. Stationarity tests 
We focus in this section on the stationary cyclical components of unemployment and 
income. To do this, we focus initially on the HP method. Using (2a), we extract the trend 
components of income and unemployment, and then calculate the income and unemployment 
cycles as the gap - relative for income, absolute for unemployment – of the observed series to 
the estimated trend. 
We capture the series properties by using econometric stationarity tests. We present in 
Table 1 the statistics of the stationarity test Kwiatkovski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS, 
1992). According to the first column, the cyclical component of income is stationary, because 
all test values lead to the acceptance of the null hypothesis (at the three common significance 
thresholds). These results remain robust when performing the stationarity test by adding a time 
trend (see column two). Similarly, the last two columns, offering KPSS test statistics for the 
cyclical component of unemployment without (column three) and with (column four) time 
trend, lead to the acceptance of the null hypothesis of stationarity. In total, it is concluded that 
                                                          
7 For example, in their estimates of the NAIRU at national level, Albu et al. (2012) use the same unemployment 
data. 
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the cycles obtained by the extraction of a stochastic trend using the HP method are stationary,8 
and can be used to estimate Okun's Law. 
Table 1. Stationarity tests by region for the cyclical components of income and unemployment 
KPSS test Income cycle (HP filter) Unemployment cycle (HP filter) 
Region constant time trend constant Time trend 
Bucharest-Ilfov 0.0663 0.0578 0.0735 0.0609 
Center 0.0773 0.0674 0.0725 0.0614 
North-East 0.0798 0.0730 0.0758 0.0652 
North-West 0.0883 0.0788 0.0793 0.0718 
South-East 0.0755 0.0756 0.0782 0.0654 
South-Muntenia 0.0912 0.0900 0.0640 0.0662 
South-West 0.0788 0.0732 0.0796 0.0679 
West 0.0772 0.0762 0.0720 0.0657 
Note: The KPSS stationarity test statistics are calculated with a constant and with a constant and a time trend. The 
critical values of the KPSS test with a constant are: 0.347 (10%), 0.463 (5%) and 0.739 (1%), and with a constant 
and a time trend 0.119 (10%), 0.146 (5%) and 0.216 (1%). The optimum lag has been selected using the Schwert 
criterion (1989). 
 
2.4.2. A graphic illustration 
Before presenting the results of the econometric estimates, Figure 1 provides a graphical 
representation of the relationship between the cyclical components of income and 
unemployment, calculated with HP method. 
 
Figure 1. Unemployment and GDP cycles in Romanian regions 
 
 
                                                          
8 The series stationarity is also supported by panel stationarity tests or panel unit root test (results available on 
request). 
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Figure 1 reveals several interesting results. First, comparing the figures on the y and the 
x-axis shows that the amplitude of the income cycle is significantly larger than the cycle of 
unemployment, regardless of the region. Romania is an emerging country on a catch-up path 
(possibly towards the developed countries of the European Union), the presence of high growth 
rates could explain the importance of income cycles. Then, on average, the data seems to 
confirm that the Okun's Law is an equilibrium relationship, since the adjustment line passes 
very close to the origin in all regions. Finally, in agreement with Okun's Law, the relationship 
between unemployment and GDP cycles is decreasing, although the slope of this relationship 
seems less pronounced for Bucharest-Ilfov and West regions. Starting from this simple 
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observations, which insinuates regional heterogeneities of the Okun's Law, we propose in the 
following an econometric analysis. 
 
2.4.3. The results of the econometric estimates 
We expose in Table 2 the Okun Law estimates in the eight Romanian regions. Prior to 
focus on the main results, note that the change in the unemployment explains between a quarter 
and half the change in income as shown by the R2 adjusted for regions where the Okun 
coefficient is significant. In addition, to take account of the possible presence of 
heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation, the standard deviations are estimated by the 
method Newey-West.9 
 
Table 2. The Okun's Law in the Romanian regions 
 Estimation method 
Region 
Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) 
R2 adjusted  First Difference 
(FD) 
R2 adjusted 
Bucharest-Ilfov 
-1.14 
(1.19) 
.0101 -1.66 
(1.18) 
.0912 
Center 
-1.89a 
(.347) 
.4603 -1.77a 
(.397) 
.3624 
North-East 
-1.88a 
(.218) 
.3732 -2.01a 
(.317) 
.3505 
North-West 
-1.70a 
(.510) 
.2352 -1.77a 
(.410) 
.2284 
South-East 
-1.69a 
(.172) 
.3051 -1.71a 
(.321) 
.2514 
South-
Muntenia 
-2.75a 
(.657) 
.2413 -2.65a 
(.599) 
.1261 
South-West 
-1.77a 
(.208) 
.3133 -1.63a 
(.311) 
.2313 
West 
-1.12 
(.871) 
.0483 -1.16 
(.915) 
.0397 
Note: a shows significance at the 5% level. The standard deviations estimated by the Newey-West method for 
correcting for heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation are shown in parentheses. 
  
                                                          
9 In particular, the standard deviations are estimated for a delay equal to three, but we can confirm that the use of 
one or two delays generates only minor variations in their values (results available on request). 
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The results shown in the first column (HP filter), show an inverse relationship between 
the cycles of income and unemployment, reconcilable with Okun's Law in all Romanian regions 
(all coefficients are negative). These results were confirmed by an analysis of entire Romania 
for example, the Okun coefficient is equal to -1.64 when one considers all the regions. These 
results support the presence of a negative relationship between the cyclical components of 
income and unemployment in Romania. 
However, a closer analysis reveals significant regional heterogeneities. If we focus on 
the first column, we first observe that the Okun's Law is statistically significant (at the 5% level) 
only in six of the eight Romanian regions. Next, among the regions where the relationship 
between income and unemployment is significant, there are significant differences in 
amplitude. For example, the Okun coefficient is 1.69 (in absolute value) in South-East, while it 
is equal to 2.75 (in absolute value) in the South-Muntenia region. Finally, it should be noted the 
importance of the Okun coefficient in Romania - an emerging country - compared to developed 
countries.10 On the one hand, at national level, the Okun coefficient in Romania is 1.64 (in 
absolute value), i.e. well above its recent estimated value in Spain (0.96 in absolute value, see 
Villaverde and Maza, 2009) or in France (0.21 in absolute value, see Binet and Facchini, 2013). 
On the other hand, from a regional perspective, the Okun coefficient in Romania is at least 
equal to 1.69 (in absolute value, for example in the South-East) and up to 2.75 in South 
Muntenia, then at most it is equal to 1.55 in Spain (Villaverde and Maza, 2009) and 1.95 in 
France (Binet and Facchini, 2013). These differences are still noticeable if one refers to the 
regional significant coefficients average (1.94 in absolute value), or if we also compare the 
results of previous studies with those of the third column of Table 2. 
Indeed, given the sensitivity of the cyclical component of the method used (see, for 
example, Canova, 1998), we propose in third column of Table 2 estimates of Okun's Law 
concerning the cyclical components calculated by the model (2b), namely the First Difference 
(FD).11 First, the results are again consistent with Okun's Law, since all coefficients are 
negative. Second, in terms of significance, the results are consistent between the two methods 
considered: with respect to the HP method, the number of regions where the Okun coefficient 
is significant is still in number of six. Finally, the Okun coefficients remain remarkably high in 
absolute values when using the FD method (column 3), namely between 1.63 (South-West) and 
                                                          
10 The particular strength of Okun's Law in emerging countries is also defended by Ďurech et al. (2014) for the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
11 Prior to the econometric analysis, we explored the stationarity of income and unemployment cycles obtained 
with the FD method. Like the HP method, tests confirm the stationarity of the series (results available on request). 
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2.65 (South- Muntenia) illustrating yet again the enormous magnitude of the Okun Law in this 
emerging country.12 
  
2.4.4. Regional heterogeneities and underlying factors 
Consistent with the results shown in Table 2, we can identify two groups of regions. On 
the one hand, the areas in which there is a significant relationship between the cyclical 
components of income and unemployment, regardless of the econometric method used. Such is 
the case for most Romanian regions, namely Centre, North-East, North-West, South-East, 
South-Muntenia and South-West. On the other hand, the regions in which the relationship 
between the two variables has a very weak significance. This is particularly the case in 
Bucharest-Ilfov and West regions .Thereafter, we will try to identify factors explaining these 
heterogeneities in the relationship between the income cycle and unemployment cycle in 
Romanian regions. 
First of all, let’s focus on income. To do this, the Romanian regions are arranged in 
ascending order according to the average of real income for the studied period. We notice that 
the areas where Okun's Law is not significant are those with the highest income, namely West 
and Bucharest-Ilfov. Then we realize the same exercise, but this time with real growth rate over 
the period. Once more, both regions present the highest average real growth rate, i.e. 4.1% in 
West and 6.8% in Bucharest-Ilfov (respectively +1.5 and +4.2 percentage points above the 
median of the regions), and are also the ones for which the Okun coefficient is not significant. 
Therefore, we can say that the Okun coefficient does not appear to be significant in the richest 
Romanian regions (i.e. with the higher levels and average growth rate of income). 
Next, we turn our attention to the unemployment. By analyzing the average 
unemployment rate over the period, no clear relationship can be observed, as regions Bucharest-
Ilfov and West are ranked 4th and 6th respectively (in descending order). However, this means 
that Okun's Law works both when unemployment is low (the North-Western and South-
Muntenia regions, with average unemployment rate of 6.21% and 3.61%) or high (the North-
East and South-West regions, with average unemployment rate of 9.74% and 8.88%). 
Finally, we look at several economic development variables. If both the average growth 
rate of foreign direct investment and the percentage of modernized roads (as a measure of public 
                                                          
12 In an earlier version of this article, we followed the literature (see, for example, Freeman, 2000 or Villaverde 
and Maza, 2009) and have also used a third method to calculate income and unemployment cycles, assuming 
Quadratic trend (QT). The estimates confirm the high significance of the Okun's Law in the Romanian regions, 
and reveal Okun coefficients (significant at 5%) even higher in absolute value, i.e. between 2.47 (West) and 6.31 
(South-Muntenia) and equal to 2.95 (and significant at 5%) for the entire Romania (the other results are available 
on request). 
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investment) reveal little information, if not a high concentration around Bucharest-Ilfov, the 
demographic variables provide several insights. Thus, Okun's Law is not significant in the 
regions of Bucharest-Ilfov and West, which are the least populated based on the average of the 
stable population, or only the 6th and 8th if we take into account the workforce over the period 
studied. In addition, these regions are also last regarding the fertility (average 1997-2010) and 
infant mortality (average over the whole period). Finally, the last two Romanian regions from 
the point of view of the share of the population at poverty risk are (average 2007-2010) West 
(15%) and Bucharest-Ilfov (around 5%), far behind most regions exposed, namely South-West 
and North-East (beyond 30% of the total population). Overall, these variables allow to better 
understand the crucial importance of economic development to explain regional heterogeneity 
in the relationship between economic growth and unemployment in the Romanian regions and 
will act as support for the discussion related to the economic policy implications. 
 
2.5. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
A growing literature is interested nowadays to the Okun's Law in a regional perspective. 
Unlike the work focusing on developed countries, we exploit in this paper recent data for 
analysis on an emerging country, namely Romania. In addition to being the second largest 
country in Central and Eastern Europe which has joined the European Union since 2004, 
Romania benefits of more reliable unemployment regional data that many developing or 
emerging countries, justifying such an analysis. 
Our econometric evaluation covering the period 1995-2010 allowed us to highlight the 
following results. First, if a negative relationship between the cycle of income and the 
unemployment cycle exist, its significance depends on the considered region. Second, if we 
focus exclusively on Romanian regions where the Okun coefficient is significant, there are 
significant deviations in amplitude from one region to another. Third, these results prove robust 
to the use of other econometric methods for calculating the cyclical components of income and 
unemployment by using stochastic trend extraction. Finally, with respect to recent work on 
regional Okun's Law in developed countries, our study reveals remarkably high Okun 
coefficients (in absolute value), comparable to those found by Ďurech et al. (2014) in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. In some cases, these coefficients can approach the value estimated by 
Okun (1962) of around 3 (in absolute value). One possible explanation is the emerging nature 
of the Romanian economy, standing on a convergence path (probably towards the rich countries 
of the European Union) characterized by high growth rates. 
Chapter 2. Economic growth and unemployment in Romania: a regional analysis of Okun's Law 
80 
This particular strength of the Okun coefficient emboldens us to research possible 
economic development variables to explain its significance. If the Okun coefficient is not 
significant in the regions with the highest average economic growth over the period, the average 
level of unemployment appears to have no clear influence on its significance. Moreover, we 
find no significant relationship between revenue cycle and cycle of unemployment in regions 
whose population, fertility and child mortality are lowest, and with a smaller share of the 
population at poverty risk. 
Given these results, we can make several policy recommendations. First, Okun's Law is 
clearly not “universally winner”, and it is essential for the Romanian public authorities to take 
into account regional differences in the composition of their policies in matters of growth and 
employment. On the one hand, in regions where the unemployment-income relation is not 
significant, the public authorities cannot make use of demand policies of Keynesian inspiration 
to reduce unemployment. Indeed, these regions have high growth rates, making ineffective 
policies which aim to stimulate the economic growth. Instead, measures aiming to make more 
flexible the regional labour market, as a better match for the unemployed to job offers or 
encouragement of population movements (eg, at least officially, the Western region is the last 
in terms of average arrival of new populations over the period) can prove to be more effective. 
On the other hand, in most Romanian regions the Okun's Law is significant. From a demand 
perspective, this means that the government could, potentially, reduce unemployment through 
macroeconomic policies of Keynesian inspiration. Our estimates reveal an interesting 
specificity in Romania, namely the significance of Okun's Law in both regions with low and 
high unemployment rate (average for the period).13 In particular for regions in the latter group 
(ie North-East, South-West and South-East), which have the lowest average economic growth 
rate, the demand policies aiming to support the growth contribute , according to our results, 
with (statistically) significant unemployment decreases.14 
Finally, the magnitude of the (significant) Okun coefficients in Romania, especially 
compared to developed countries, emphasizes the crucial importance of the Romanian labour 
market in terms of economic growth. In most Romanian regions, reforms to reduce 
unemployment could increase consequently the economic growth. According to our estimates, 
                                                          
13 For comparison, Ďurech et al. (2014) found that Okun's Law is not significant in the Czech and Slovak regions 
characterized by high average unemployment rates. 
14 An explanation of the significance of the Okun's Law in high unemployment areas is related to the massive 
process of emigration of the population of these poor regions (particularly the North-East and South-West) to, 
especially, Spain and Italy. The remaining population often has a higher relative level of qualification, making it 
responsive to any request policies. 
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the impact would be, regardless of the econometric method used, greater than in developed 
countries. Even more, in the current environment, where economic growth remains stagnant, to 
look more closely to the labour market to reduce unemployment could be a way to retrieve a 
virtuous economic growth. 
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An analysis of fiscal multipliers: 
what lessons for developing and emerging countries?1 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In response to the recent financial crisis, many governments adopted fiscal stabilization 
policies, whose multiplier effects generated considerable interest in academia and among policy 
makers. After a brief review of the foundations of fiscal multipliers, the paper presents the 
methods used to measure multipliers and the results, which are sensitive to the position in the 
economic cycle, the state of public finances, monetary policy and characteristics of economies. 
Based on these analyses related to developed countries, we draw lessons for developing and 
emerging economies. 
 
 
Keywords: fiscal multipliers, fiscal policy, developing and emerging countries. 
 
JEL Codes: E62, E63 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 A version of this chapter was published as “Une analyse des multiplicateurs budgétaires: quelles leçons pour les 
pays en développement et émergents?”, Mondes en Développement, vol. 167, pp. 17-33, 2014, and was written 
with J.L. Combes. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
A crucial moment in the analysis of the effects of fiscal policy was the publication of 
the article of Robert Barro (1974), formalizing the “Ricardian Equivalence” according to which, 
by adjusting their behaviour to changes in fiscal policy, by increasing their savings and 
anticipating that an increased public spending will lead to a future increase in their taxes, agents 
make its effect neutral. However, the recent crisis appears to have rediscovered the virtues of 
fiscal policy since many economies have launched massive fiscal stimuli, in the context of 
significant liquidity constraints that render inoperative the functioning of Ricardian 
equivalence. For example, the French Government adopted in 2009 the “Grand emprunt”, a 
recovery plan of 35 billion Euros to finance public investment and, therefore, in addition to its 
stabilizing impact to increase the growth potential trail. The European Economic Recovery Plan 
(2008) implied a fiscal effort estimated at about 2% of European Union GDP cumulatively for 
the period 2009-2010, while The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) foresaw an 
increase in public spending of about 5% of US GDP for the period 2009-2011 (Cimadomo and 
Bénassy-Quéré, 2012). 
These policies placed on the central stage the issue of fiscal multipliers,2 especially as 
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) have recently shown that the IMF has consistently underestimated 
the importance of the multipliers derived from current fiscal austerity programs. Whereas the 
European Commission based its forecasts on the multiplier of 0.5, they are, in fact, greater than 
1. The literature today does not seek so much to defend the theory of unconditional effectiveness 
of a Keynesian relaunch. Many economists are even willing to admit that average multipliers 
could be modest. In exchange, they would become important in particular times, as for example, 
the under-utilization of production factors. 
Cornerstone of Keynesian paradigm, fiscal multipliers determine the impact of an 
exogenous change in a fiscal variable, such as changes in public expenditure ( G ) on changes 
in income ( Y ). Multipliers associated with other fiscal instruments can also be considered 
(Coenen et al., 2012).3 A feature is of major importance when it comes to defining them: the 
                                                          
2 An interesting similarity may be drawn between the emergence of Keynesian doctrine in the twilight of the Great 
Depression, and its re-emerge in popularity after the Great Recession that began in 2008, as if the crisis (major) 
made economists and policy makers more Keynesian or, more likely, as if the major crises increased the value of 
the multiplier. 
3 According to Hegeland (1954) the origin of the multiplier theory comes from the Economic Table of Quesnay 
(1758), in which the variables are reported in both the current period t  and in the next period 1t , which 
estimates a multiplier. More recently, Snowdon and Vane (2005) suggest that the multiplier concept was developed 
in the 1930s jointly by Kahn, Keynes and Giblin, and mentioned in a work published by Kahn (1931). But it was 
the analysis of Keynes (1936) that awarded the multiplier the central role it (still) plays in macroeconomics. 
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time horizon considered. Spilimbergo, Symansky and Schindler (2009) and Gechert and Will 
(2012) distinguish: (i) the impact multiplier, defined as the immediate response of income to 
the fiscal impulse 
t
t
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k


 , (ii) the multiplier at the horizon T , namely 
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  , (iii) the 
peak multiplier, equal to the largest value of the multiplier over a given period 
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The theoretical literature that aims at highlighting fiscal multipliers is rich and 
significantly evolved through time. Initially, fiscal multipliers were demand-side driven, in the 
spirit of the static ISLM model (see Hicks, 1937), and of its dynamic version (see Blanchard, 
1981). As a general characteristic, these setups are able to produce positive fiscal multipliers 
higher than one, a property conserved by aggregated supply-aggregated demand models in the 
short-run, while, as it is largely known, the long-run equilibrium displays. The conclusions of 
these models differ greatly from those of neoclassical and real business cycle models leading 
in general to conclude that fiscal policy is harmful or, at best, neutral. However, in these models, 
a positive shock to government spending can have positive effects on the economy through, in 
particular, the labour supply. An agent facing a permanent increase in public spending sees the 
present value of its tax increase, which may lead it to reduce its demand for leisure and thus to 
work more (Baxter and King, 1993). If, in contrast the increase in spending is temporary, the 
wealth effect is attenuated.4 
Developed as a response to several shortcomings of the RBC models (and in particular 
flexible prices), New Keynesian DSGE models consider sticky prices, in addition to more 
developed micro-foundations (see An and Schorfheide, 2007, for a recent survey). When the 
Ricardian Equivalence is conserved, multipliers, while positive, are less than 1 and depend on 
factors such as the reaction function of the monetary authorities and, specifically, the reaction 
of the real interest rate (Gechert and Will, 2012). When some mechanisms are taken into 
                                                          
 
4 Taking into account the nature of the taxes complicates the mechanism if additional public spending is financed 
by distortionary taxes, incentives to work decreases. However, if taxes are raised late, an intertemporal substitution 
effect can lead to the opposite result and increase at least temporarily labor supply (Burnside et al., 2004). 
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account, such as the existence of distortionary taxes or risk premiums on interest rates in 
contexts of high public debt, these models can generate negative values for multipliers, and 
therefore expansive effects (anti-Keynesian) of budgetary contractions (Briotti, 2005). 
However, in the event of non-Ricardian agents (Cwik and Wieland, 2011; Gali et al., 2007) or 
for sufficiently low nominal interest rates (close to 0), the DSGE model can also generate 
positive multipliers (Woodford, 2011; Freedman et al., 2010). In addition, although the ISLM 
and DSGE models are generally considered incompatible because they are producing divergent 
multipliers (greater than 1 in the first case and less than 1 in the second case), Bénassy (2007) 
shows the possible existence5 of higher than unity multiplier in a DSGE framework of a non 
Ricardian economy with sticky prices. 
When it comes to ranking multipliers, DSGE models conclude that spending multipliers 
are higher than the tax multiplier. For the former, the descending order according to the 
magnitude of the effect is: the public investment multiplier, public consumption, transfers to 
households with liquidity constraints. Regarding the latter, the worst effect on GDP would come 
from an increase in income tax and corporate income tax, followed by consumption taxes and 
property taxes. 
The rest of the article will focus on the econometric literature. Part 1 develops the 
different methods used to estimate fiscal multipliers, part 2 presents recent estimates of 
multipliers. The conclusion deduces lessons for developing and emerging countries. 
   
3.2. Empirical methods used to measure fiscal multipliers 
  
The key mechanism underlying the fiscal multipliers in the Keynesian theory is based 
on the value of the marginal propensity to consume. Therefore, the first evaluations of 
multipliers attempted to estimate econometrically the consumer behaviour in response to fiscal 
shocks. Such models explore the response of consumption to changes in income, and therefore 
provide a direct, but only partial equilibrium effect of fiscal multipliers. The subsequent 
literature provided several major empirical techniques used to estimate fiscal multipliers, 
namely (i) large scale macroeconometric models, (ii) the narrative approach, (iii) Vector 
AutoRegressive models, and (iv) other, more recent, econometric methods. 
                                                          
5 According to Linnemann (2006), assumptions on household’s utility function (complementarity between 
consumption and labor supply, or between the public and private consumption) or the inclusion of productive 
public spending could also lead to multipliers above 1. 
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3.2.1 Large scale macroeconometric models (MACRO) 
An impressive effort to estimate fiscal multipliers is related to the development of 
general equilibrium structural (large scale) macroeconometric models (MACRO). As 
emphasized by Gechert and Will (2012), MACRO models are based on the methodology of the 
Cowles Commission. They consist in estimating macroeconomic consumption and investment 
functions in a setup that combines Keynesian reactions in the short run with Neoclassical 
features in the long run. These models were intensively used in the 1960s and 1970s in a logic 
of economic analysis and policy forecasting (see Modigliani, 1971, or Klein and Young, 1980). 
But they have suffered a loss of interest in the academic world (Chinn, 2013), mainly due to the 
Lucas critique (1976), namely the criticism of the assumption of non –invariance of parameters 
estimated to regime changes in economic policy and the criticism of Sims (1980) on 
identification restrictions that are few theoretically based. However, these models continue to 
be used, among other things by the FED (Federal Reserve System) in the United States (Stein 
and Song 2002; Fair, 1993). 
  
3.2.2 Vector AutoRegressive models (VAR)  
To back-up his critique on the incapacity of MACRO models to identify exogenous 
shocks, Sims (1980) introduced a new methodology, namely Vector AutoRegression (VAR) 
models. These are statistical models that capture the linear interdependencies among multiple 
time series measuring impulse-responses of fiscal shocks. The Structural VAR (SVAR) models 
draw upon economic-based information to achieve the identification of shocks (it can be 
assumed that public spending is a predetermined variable and that state revenues do not react 
immediately to changes in the economic environment: Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). As 
emphasized by Stock and Watson (2001), the most popular form of SVAR is the recursive form: 
based on the Choleski decomposition, it imposes restrictions for obtaining a causal order of the 
VAR variable (it assumes that the fiscal shock does not immediately impact some variables). 
One can thus neutralize the common reactions of fiscal variables in the economic cycle (Fatas 
and Mihov, 2001). To respond to criticism of the ad hoc nature of the order of the recursive 
representation, more developed forms of SVAR models impose elasticity values for the 
automatic stabilizers. Some SVAR also identify exogenous fiscal shocks by imposing sign 
restrictions to the impulse-response functions generated by fiscal shocks (Mountford and Uhlig, 
2009). For their part, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate a SVAR model increased with an 
event analysis in which the identification is made using institutional information on the tax and 
transfer system. Edelberg et al. (1999) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) draw upon the work 
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of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) using political events to identify fiscal shocks, like the exogenous 
increases in military spending. 
Much work has been devoted to expand the SVAR models in different directions, both 
from an economic and methodological standpoint. In the first direction, we are interested in 
modelling the joint behaviour of fiscal and monetary authorities (Favero, 2002), accounting for 
anticipations of the fiscal shock (Tenhofen and Wolff, 2007) or the influence of external factors 
such as global economic conditions and oil prices (Cimadomo and Bénassy-Quéré, 2012). In 
the second direction, the most recent studies estimate VAR models in panel data (Born et al., 
2013). The panel size does not only increase the number of observations, while controlling for 
individual heterogeneity, but it also takes into account the impact of the transmission 
mechanisms between countries that are becoming increasingly important with the economies 
globalization (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). Finally, it should be noted the development of 
nonlinear modelling mechanisms. Models with threshold effect (Threshold VAR: TVAR) allow 
regime changes depending on the state of the economy (Baum et al., 2012; Mittnik and 
Semmler, 2012). 
  
3.2.3 The narrative approach 
Proposed by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and used initially to study the effects of 
monetary shocks (Romer and Romer, 1989), the narrative approach was extended to the 
analysis of fiscal shocks. This method consists in identifying “good experiences”, namely true 
episodes of exogenous fiscal expansions. Although few in number, contributions use war 
episodes as source of identification exogenous increase in public expenditure (Ramey and 
Shapiro, 1998) or the analysis of political discourse as a means to identify exogenous changes 
in taxation (Romer and Romer, 2010). 
The choice of methods could heavily impact the multipliers obtained. Ramey (2011) 
seeks to explain why the VAR methods (which are usually based on an assumption of 
predetermination of public spending within a quarter) and the narrative approach often lead to 
conflicting results. One explanation is that the narrative method better captures when the 
unanticipated changes in public spending would occur. In other words, the shocks identified by 
VAR models would be caused in Granger sense by Ramey and Shapiro dates. The unanticipated 
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component of fiscal policy would therefore not be correctly entered, only in the case of narrative 
methods.6 
  
3.2.4 The estimation of a fiscal policy rule 
The fiscal shock is calculated as the difference in a fiscal rule. Specifically, drawing 
upon Fatas and Mihov (2003), and Afonso et al. (2010), Agnello et al. (2013) which use a 
residual two-step method for calculating the fiscal multipliers. This includes, firstly, the 
estimation of a function of fiscal policy rule (with explanatory variables, the past change in 
public expenditure, the change in economic activity, inflation, public debt and a trend). The 
discretionary part of fiscal policy is then assimilated to the residue. Secondly, the multiplier is 
calculated in a dynamic panel model involving the estimated residuals. This method is based 
on the assumption of a correct specification of the fiscal policy rule function. 
   
3.3. Evidence of fiscal multipliers values 
 
The literature that estimates the fiscal multipliers has gained a remarkably renewed 
interest, particularly because of the need to evaluate the effects of fiscal stabilization programs 
following the economic crisis. The studies differ depending on the econometric model, the 
nature of the fiscal shock, the period or country. The results are presented in two sections. In 
the first section, we are interested in multipliers values when taking into account the 
nonlinearity effects. In the second section, we present the values of the multiplier according to 
the country's level of development. 
  
3.3.1 Nonlinearities in the multipliers effects 
It is well known that the opening level of economies by increasing the marginal 
propensity to import reduces the multiplier. According to Ilzetzki et al. (2013), in relatively 
closed economies, long-term multipliers are close to 1, while negative in more open country. 
But the recent literature is exploring other nonlinearities depending upon the position of the 
economy in the business cycle, the initial fiscal and monetary policy context and the exchange 
rate regime. 
  
                                                          
6 This is an important question, for example, when studying the response of private consumption to a fiscal shock. 
The narrative approach generally tends to reject the Keynesian model (identifying a drop in private consumption 
following a positive fiscal shock), unlike the VAR methods (see also Tenhofen and Wolff, 2007). 
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3.3.1.1 The value of the multiplier according to the position in the economic cycle 
In the case of the United States, and over the period 1930-2008, Hall (2009) does not 
obtain different multipliers for expansion and recession periods. On the contrary, since the 
Second World War, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) show that in the period of expansion 
the spending multiplier is 0 after a year and - 0.1 after two years, while in recession, the same 
multiplier is 1.4 after one year and 1.8 after two years. Focusing on public spending financed 
by deficits, Candelon and Lieb (2013) confirm these results by getting higher multipliers in a 
recession (between 1 and 2.4) than in a boom period (around 0.5). They defend, also, policies 
which aim to increase public spending rather than those of lower taxes. Such asymmetries 
between low multipliers in “good” times and high multipliers in “bad” times (Perotti, 1999) are 
also highlighted in Germany by Baum and Koester (2011), and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2012b) for the OECD countries (the spending multiplier is equal to -0.3 after one or two years 
in expansion, and 0.5 and 0.4 after one year after two years in recession). This result may be 
the consequence of stronger liquidity constraints in a recession. However, the literature is not 
consensual on this question. Using historical data for the United States (1890-2010), Owyang 
et al. (2013) did not observe asymmetries, unlike to what they found on Canadian data (1921-
2011). Similarly, Crafts and Mills (2012) find moderate multiplier between 0.5 and 0.8 on 
British historical data corresponding to an overall economically difficult period (1922-1938). 
These potential asymmetries therefore highlight the need for appropriate econometric 
techniques (see above). Baum et al (2012) estimates, with a TVAR model fiscal multipliers for 
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada and Japan and finds that the 
spending and taxes multipliers are higher in recession. Spending multipliers are much higher 
than tax multipliers. Using the same technique, Batini et al (2012) study the impact of budget 
adjustments in the United States, in the Euro-zone, Italy, France and Japan, in periods of 
recession and expansion. They calculate the cumulative multipliers for spending increase and 
tax cuts and conclude that if the fiscal consolidation began during a recession, the multipliers 
were greater than 1 for spending shocks and less than 1 (positive except for France) for the tax 
shock. Turning to the fiscal consolidation starting in expansion stage, the main difference lies 
in the tax multiplier which may be negative.7 Thus, despite the use of different variables to 
                                                          
7 For example, for the United States and the euro area, the multiplier during periods of expansion is equal to 0.3 
(0.4) after one year and -0.5 (0.1) after two years for the US (euro area). In periods of recession, spending 
multipliers worth 2.2 (2.6) after one year and 2.2 (2.5) after two years for the US (euro area). 
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identify the phases of the cycle, i.e. the output gap and real GDP growth rate, respectively the 
results of these two studies are comparable.8 
  
3.3.1.2 Fiscal multipliers and fiscal position 
Feldstein (1982), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Blanchard (1990), Perotti (1999) and 
more recently Minea and Villieu (2012) showed nonlinearities in the response of the economy 
to a fiscal shock. In the case of Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) 
economies, and over the period 1986-2002, Ary Tanimoune, Combes and Plane (2008) have 
shown non-Keynesian effects of fiscal changes on private consumption and investment, 
particularly in connection with reversals in expectations in highly leveraged economies. 
Similarly, Minea and Villieu (2009) show anti-keynesian effects of an increase in public deficits 
on public investment in a context of high public debt. In the extension of this work, two recent 
studies explore the possible dependence of fiscal multipliers in the public debt ratio. In a sample 
of developed countries, Corsetti et al. (2012) show that fiscal multipliers are lower when public 
debt is high, i.e. over a debt ratio of 100% of GDP. A similar result is reported by Ilzetzki et al. 
(2013), but for a lower threshold of debt, close to 60%. Above this threshold, not only short-
term multipliers are not significant, but the long term multipliers become negative. One possible 
explanation is the negative signal for agents of a fiscal stimulus in an already deteriorated public 
finances situation. 
 
3.3.1.3 Fiscal multipliers and the monetary policy 
Within the traditional ISLM model, the effects of fiscal policy strongly depend on the 
monetary policy. Thus, there exists a particularly interesting case, baptized “liquidity trap” by 
Keynes (1936), in which, from a theoretical point, fiscal shocks might be associated with 
remarkably high multiplier effects. Such effects are supported by the recent work of Chirstiano 
et al. (2011), based on a more sophisticated medium-size DSGE model, emphasizing a 
government spending multiplier much larger than one when there is a (future period) zero lower 
bound on the nominal interest rate.9 
Two studies, however, appear contradictory. Using an empirical New Keynesian model 
for the US, Cogan et al. (2009) find smaller multiplier effects of government purchases during 
                                                          
8 Such threshold effects also appear in Corsetti et al. (2012) who finds, in developed countries, that the fiscal 
multiplier is higher during periods of financial crises. 
9 Intuitively, when interest rates are close to zero, i.e. a liquidity trap, the risk of deflation increases and agents 
seek a greater security, and by doing so they increase the effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
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a zero lower bound. On the contrary, using a comparable setup, Eggertsson (2009) finds 
important multipliers at the zero bound. The main explanation is that, while both considered 
that the increase in government purchases started when the interest rate was zero, only in the 
former case this positive fiscal shock is equally extended over the period that was projected to 
have zero lower bound. The ongoing research seems to comfort the role of the liquidity trap: 
Hall (2009) exhorted a fairly high fiscal multiplier (around 1.7) for zero lower bound nominal 
interest rates, and Woodford (2011) showed that the increase in the response of output 
significantly falls if the increase in government purchases is expected to occur after the zero 
lower bound. 
3.3.1.4 Fiscal multipliers and the exchange rate regime 
In the Mundell-Fleming model, it is well known that the crowding out effect of fiscal 
policy is complete in floating exchange rate regime with capital mobility. A recent literature 
focuses on the actual multiplier values in a flexible exchange rate regime, sometimes with 
opposite conclusions to the predictions of the model: analyzing individual countries, Perotti 
(2006), Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Ramey (2011) and Ravn et al. (2012) emphasize positive 
fiscal multipliers. But more recently, using different methods, different time periods and for 
different levels of development, Corsetti et al. (2012), Born et al. (2013) and Ilzetzki et al. 
(2013) conclude that the fiscal multiplier is higher in a fixed exchange rate regime than in a 
flexible exchange rate regime.10 
 
3.3.2 Multipliers by level of development 
 
3.3.2.1 The case of developed countries 
A very large majority of studies focuses on the United States. Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) found a multiplier close to 1 for public spending. However, further work differs on the 
magnitude of the fiscal multiplier: Mountford and Uhlig (2009) estimate an impact multiplier 
of 0.65 and a long-term multiplier less than 1, and that unlike Fatas and Mihov (2001) who get 
above 1 values in the short-term. 
Work using the VAR on the US economy also explored the sensitivity of the fiscal 
multiplier relative to expectations and therefore questioned the need or not to announce 
budgetary measures. Mountford and Uhlig (2005) conclude that the response of private 
                                                          
10 Other studies, such as Bilbiie et al. (2008), David and Leeper (2011) and Coenen et al. (2012) analyze the fiscal 
shock  transmission mechanism under different exchange rate regimes. 
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consumption to an increase in public spending is positive when the announcement effects are 
taken into account. In contrast, Tenhofen and Wolff (2007) show, for their part, that the 
response of private consumption to a projected increase in expenditures (defences, most 
assumed exogenous) is negative. 
It is important to note that the results for the United States are sensitive to the method 
used. For example, Mertens and Ravn (2013) include a narrative identification in a SVAR 
model to calculate the tax multipliers. Unlike Blanchard and Perotti (2002), but in agreement 
with Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and Romer and Romer (2010), they highlight remarkably 
high fiscal multipliers. 
Turning to OECD countries, Perotti (2006, 2005) reveals high multipliers between 2.3 
and 3.7. Higher than unit multiplier appears to also be at work in the European Union countries: 
using a panel VAR model, Beetsma et al. (2008) emphasize peak multipliers around 1.6. Using 
the INTERLINK model, a MACRO type model, of OECD, Dalsgaard et al. (2001) propose a 
comparative study of spending fiscal multipliers between the United States, Japan and the Euro-
zone. They are interested in spending multipliers at different horizons and in two scenarios: in 
the presence of a specific shock to each country and when all countries are affected by the same 
shock. In the first case, the multipliers decrease between the first and fourth years, from 1.1 to 
0.2 for the United States, from 1.2 to 0.2 for the Euro-zone, and from 1.7 to 0.2 for Japan. Thus, 
higher than unit multipliers on short-term appear to coexist with fairly low multipliers on the 
long-term. But taking into account a global shock increases (United States) or strongly increases 
(Euro-zone and Japan) the short-term multiplier (multipliers are respectively 1.5, 1.9 and 2 6). 
In contrast, the results are slightly different for the fourth year multipliers (respectively equal 
to 0.3, 0.4 and 0.3). 
A study on a panel of 20 high-income countries by Ilzetzki et al. (2013) confirmed the 
existence of positive and persistent fiscal multipliers, in agreement with the findings of Ilzetzki 
and Vegh (2008). This study contradicts the International Monetary Fund (IMF) study (IMF, 
2008), which also gets positive multiplier, but not persistent. 
 
3.3.2.2 The case of developing and emerging countries 
The assessment of fiscal multipliers is new for this group of countries. There is a very 
limited number of studies, which generally rely on panel data to estimate the multiplier for 
developing and emerging countries: Agnelo et al. (2013), Ilzetzki et al. (2013), Ghosh et al. 
(2009), Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), IMF (2008). 
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The IMF (2008) presents fiscal multipliers for developing and emerging countries using 
two alternative methods to measures of fiscal impulse, namely based on elasticities estimation 
(they measure the fiscal impulse using the primary cyclically adjusted balance), and estimates 
based on regressions (they measure the fiscal impulse using changes in the primary balance 
over the previous year). The results are slightly different in the two methods. In the first, the 
tax multiplier is 0.2 after the first and second year, while the positive spending multiplier (0.2) 
after a year becomes negative (-0.2) after two years. The use of regressions to calculate the 
fiscal shock leads to comparable results for the tax multipliers (0.1 and -0.2 after the first and 
second year, respectively) and expenditure multipliers (0.1 and -0.2 after one and two years). 
Concerning the sign of the multiplier, Agnelo et al. (2013) show for low and middle-income 
countries that expansionary fiscal policy has an expansive effect in the short term, but recessive 
in the medium term. With respect to the l multipliers values, results comparable to those of the 
IMF (2008) are obtained by Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) in a panel VAR model estimated over 27 
developing countries: spending multipliers equal 0.4 after one year, 0.1 after two years and -0.1 
after three years. 
Based on panel data for 24 developing and emerging countries, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 
highlight the non-significant character of impact and cumulative multipliers for an increase in 
public consumption. On the contrary, an increase in public investment generates positive 
multipliers. These results can be explained by the characteristics of these economies. Indeed, 
as pointed out by Ghosh et al. (2009), emerging countries have weak institutions, less developed 
financial markets, less credible policies and often unbalanced current accounts. 
   
3.4. Conclusion and Discussion: lessons for developing and emerging countries 
  
The economic crisis continues to affect the global economy. Its importance has led many 
countries to adopt fiscal stimulus measures. Especially in developed countries, the importance 
of the relaunch was unprecedented. It was followed by an increase in debt, which has also 
prompted countries to adopt fiscal austerity programs. In both situations the role of fiscal policy 
is yet again central. 
But this literature review reveals an important fact, namely an opposition between the 
wealth of studies for developed countries and the rarity for developing and emerging countries. 
In addition, the fiscal multipliers are usually lower in these countries than those observed in 
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developed countries.11 The explanation does not yet appear clearly. Another question is whether 
it is better in developing countries to announce changes in fiscal policies. 
The studies analyzing the developed countries highlight the central role played by 
nonlinearities, the position in the economic cycle in the multipliers assessment. According to 
IMF (2012), in the last twenty years, emerging and developing countries have spent more time 
in expansion and experienced less severe recessions than the advanced countries. Therefore, 
one might expect quite different values of fiscal multipliers. In addition, the developing and 
emerging countries have experienced significant increases in their external debt to GDP ratios, 
due to external shocks requiring specific analysis of fiscal multipliers. Finally, with respect to 
developed countries, the design and conduct of monetary policy in developing and emerging 
countries is significantly different. First, these countries have more heterogeneous forms of 
exchange rate regimes, ranging corner solutions, such as dollarization, the free float (see Ilzetzki 
and al , 2010, for a detailed classification of exchange rate regimes). Secondly, their monetary 
systems are in a constant evolution, for example, Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC) 
have recently been involved in major changes in their monetary systems, particularly in relation 
to the recent (for some countries) or future (for other countries) integration in the Euro-zone. 
Thirdly, their low institutional quality makes harder monetary policies, as less credible. Overall, 
all these arguments suggest the need for a specific analysis of the multiplier mechanisms in 
developing and emerging countries. This should take into account the importance of supply 
constraints making less operative the budgetary mechanisms transiting by the demand. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 With the exception of government investment multipliers: Ilzetzki et al. (2013). 
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The Euro and the Crisis: Evidence on Recent Fiscal Multipliers1 
 
 
Abstract 
In response to the current economic crisis, many countries around the world 
adopted large fiscal stimuli, thus reviving the question of fiscal multipliers. 
This paper is a first attempt for a systematic analysis of the behaviour of 
fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone countries. Using Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) estimations for quarterly data on fiscal variables 
for the 1999-2012 period, we unveil several interesting results. First, tax 
multipliers are little affected by being a Eurozone country or not, or by 
experiencing the Eurozone crisis. Second, on the contrary, spending 
multipliers exhibit major differences depending on the considered group of 
countries; in particular, being part of the Eurozone or expecting to adopt the 
Euro in the future makes the response of output to expenditure shocks more 
Keynesian, as this is also the case in the group of Eurozone countries 
affected by the crisis. 
 
JEL Codes: E62, E63, F62, O52 
 
Keywords: Eurozone, fiscal multipliers, economic crisis. 
 
                                                          
1 A version of this chapter was published as “The Euro and The Crisis: Evidence on Recent Fiscal Multipliers”, 
Revue d’Economie Politique, vol. 124, pp.1013-1039, 2014, and was written with J.L. Combes, A. Minea and M. 
Sow. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
101 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Only several years after Euro banknotes and coins were put into circulation, the 
Eurozone was struck by the global financial and economic crisis. Originated from the US, the 
crisis progressively gained in intensity when reaching the Eurozone, nourished by a wide 
variety of factors such as major fiscal worsening caused by extreme increases in public spending 
(for example, wages and pensions, as in Greece or Portugal), property bubbles weakening the 
financial sector (Spain), loss of confidence due to false public statements on the condition of 
fiscal accounts (Greece) generating sky-jumping spreads and snow-ball effects on debt 
dynamics, etc. In a context of financial contagion, these imbalances coagulated into a Eurozone 
crisis, of such a magnitude to the point of being a major threatening for the perenity of the 
Eurozone itself.2 At a global level, the economic importance of the Eurozone and the negative 
spillovers to integrated markets arising from its potential disappearance urged major 
institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, the EIB or the EBRD, to join effort with EU- 
(such as the European Financial Stability Mechanism) or Eurozone-based (such as the European 
Financial Stability Facility) mechanisms in providing massive bailout for many Eurozone 
countries.3 At a national level, the crisis was associated to changes in the political colour of 
governments in many Eurozone countries (for example, Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain). But 
more importantly, many governments adopted national-level massive fiscal stimuli,4 in addition 
to European-level fiscal stimuli, such as the European Economic Recovery Plan, estimated to 
around 2% of the EU GDP cumulated for the 2009-2010 period. However, since 2011, given 
the deterioration of their public finances, many European countries adopted large fiscal 
consolidation plans. 
The underlying theoretical mechanism supporting such large fiscal efforts rests on the 
concept of Keynesian multiplier. According to the Keynesian fiscal multiplier, a one-unit 
change in a fiscal variable, such as an increase in public spending or in taxes, changes the output 
by more than one unit. Consequently, demand-based fiscal policies would be a virtuous tool to 
mitigate the negative effects engendered by the current crisis. If the emergence of Keynesian-
                                                          
2 Recent years newspaper headlines include: “Euro strikes back with biggest gamble in its 11-year history” (May 
2010, in The Guardian), “Merkozy failed to save the eurozone” (December 2011, in Financial Times), or “the euro 
zone is in critical danger” (July 2012, by the IMF). 
3 For example, the bailout programme for Greece is designed to over 200 billion euros, around 70 billion for 
Portugal, and 40 billion for Spain. 
4 According to the International Institute for Labour Studies (2011), the size of the fiscal stimulus since the 
beginning of the crisis is above 4% of GDP in Italy or Germany, and around 1.75% of GDP in France. Particularly 
in France, the stimulus included the famous “Grand Emprunt”, a 35 billion euros public spending devoted to 
financing public investment and supporting economic growth. 
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multiplier based economics was boosted by the devastating effects of the Great Depression 
(1929-1933), the current economic crisis, often called the Great Recession, brought them again 
into the spotlight. Indeed, a very recent and buoyant empirical literature aims at estimating the 
potential effects of the substantial fiscal stimuli implemented since the beginning of the crisis, 
as illustrated by the survey of Hebous (2011) and the meta-analysis of Gechert (2013). In 
particular, inspired by the work of Giavazzi & Pagano (1990) or Alesina & Perotti (1995), a 
recent literature discussed potential anti-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, however without 
reaching a clear-cut conclusion (see, for instance, Guajardo et al., 2011). Among the different 
elements making the effect of fiscal policy complex, liquidity traps and high debt-to-GDP ratios 
play a key role. On the one hand, for instance, Denes et al. (2013) advise against fiscal 
consolidations in a context of liquidity trap, as the negative effects of such fiscal policies are 
not compensated by a decrease in interest rates. On the other hand, in a context of high 
indebtedness, Blanchard & Cottarelli (2010) or Corsetti et al. (2012) emphasize a credibility 
effect of fiscal consolidations, leading to a decrease in risk premia and thus potential positive 
effects on the economy. Consequently, fiscal policy recommendations could be remarkably 
opposite. 
The current study develops the existing literature in several directions. First, if most 
papers gave interest to the US,5 we focus on the Eurozone, particularly in comparison with the 
European Union. To the best of our knowledge, only a relatively small number of papers deal 
with fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone/EU area. For example, Dalsgaard et al (2001) estimate 
public spending multipliers above 1 after one year and below 0.7 after three years. However, 
the use of the MACRO-type INTERLINK model of the OECD is subject to both the Lucas’ 
(1976) Critique and to the problems related to the identification of the shocks emphasized by 
Sims (1980). To deal with these shortcomings, we follow the recent literature and provide VAR-
based estimations. 
Second, previous VAR-based studies involving European countries can be criticized on 
two grounds: on the one hand, for adopting a too general perspective, by mixing both European 
and non-European countries. For example, Auerbach & Gorodnichenko (2013) emphasize 
public spending multipliers equal to 0.5 (-0.3) in recession (expansion) periods for the set of 
OECD countries, while Ilzetziki et al. (2013) find impact (cumulative) public spending 
multipliers of 0.4 (0.7) for high income countries. On the other hand, several studies adopted a 
                                                          
5 See, for example, the seminal contribution of Blanchard & Perotti (2002), and also Fatas & Mihov (2001), 
Mountford & Uhlig (2005), Tenhofen & Wolff (2007), Romer & Romer (2010) or Mertens & Ravn (2013). 
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too narrow perspective, by providing country-individual estimates. For example, for the 1980-
2001 period, Perotti (2005) finds spending multipliers between 0.5 (one year) and -1.1 (three 
years) for Germany, while between -0.3 (one year) and -0.9 (three years) for the UK, while for 
France Baum et al. (2012) illustrate spending multipliers of -0.1 (0.2) in expansion (recession) 
periods.6 In our setup, we focus exclusively on European (Eurozone or EU) groups of countries, 
for which we provide panel-VAR estimations. 
Third, compared to previous panel-VAR-based evidence (see, for example, Batini et al., 
2012), we do not focus on the entire Eurozone, but disentangle our analysis along two 
dimensions. On the one hand, we aim at emphasizing if being in the Eurozone makes a 
difference in terms of fiscal multipliers. To this end, we take advantage of the availability of 
public finance quarterly data and limit our time span to the beginning of the Eurozone,7 namely 
the 1999Q1-2012Q4 period. Moreover, we disentangle the Eurozone/EU areas in several 
groups. Thus, we compare fiscal multipliers between our benchmark case, namely panel-VAR 
estimations on the group of “historical” European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands),8 with those based on panel-VAR estimations for the group of EU 
countries not expected to adopt the Euro (Denmark and the UK) and the group of some countries 
that recently joined the EU (in 2004), not in the Eurozone but expected to join it in the near 
future (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). On the other hand, we explore the effects of 
the crisis in the Eurozone, by comparing fiscal multipliers in the benchmark group with those 
in the group of some Eurozone countries heavily affected by the crisis, namely the so-called 
“PIGS” (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
Finally, we gave particular attention to two subsequent aspects. On the one hand, in 
addition to public spending multipliers, we systematically present tax multipliers, for each of 
the groups of countries described above. On the other hand, we highlight and discuss all the 
types of multipliers emphasized in the literature (see, for example, Spilimbero et al., 2009, or 
Gechert, 2013), namely impact, at some horizon, peak and cumulative multipliers. 
                                                          
6 For evidence on European individual-country multipliers using alternative methods, see HM Treasury (2003) 
based on the European Commission’s QUEST model, or Al-Eyd & Barrell (2005) based on the National Institute’s 
Global Econometric NiGEM model. 
7 Since we aim focusing exclusively on the Eurozone, we specifically did not combine pre- and post-1999 data as 
this is the case in previous studies (for example, Batini et al, 2012, select the 1985-2009 period). 
8 Given its significantly smaller size, we exclude Luxemburg of the six founding members of the European 
Economic Community as established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
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 Our results can be summarized as follows. First, an increase in spending or taxes 
increases output in the benchmark model, albeit the expenditure multiplier is little significant. 
Second, contrary to spending multipliers, tax multipliers are relatively less sensitive to being in 
the Eurozone or experiencing a crisis. Third, contrary to the negative response of output to 
spending shocks in the group of EU non-Eurozone countries, spending multipliers are positive 
both for the Eurozone group of countries and also for the group of recent EU non-Eurozone 
countries that might adopt the Euro in the near future. Fourth, countries affected by the 
Eurozone crisis present significantly positive expenditure multiplier, irrespective of the time 
span used to compute them, namely the entire period or only the crisis period. 
Compared to previous work, emphasizing an important effect of liquidity traps and 
interest rate premia on public debt, our paper shows that being a member of the EU/Eurozone 
significantly impacts the effects of fiscal policy. Being connected to the Eurozone, by either 
membership or through expectations to join the Eurozone in the future, makes expenditure 
multipliers more in agreement with the Keynesian theory, and this is equally the case for the 
group of countries experiencing the current economic crisis compared to the considered group 
of Eurozone countries. 
 The reminder of the manuscript is organized as follows. Section two contains several 
methodological considerations and presents the data, section three illustrates results for the 
benchmark model, and explores the comparative differences of being a Eurozone member or 
being affected by the Eurozone crisis on fiscal multipliers, and section four concludes. 
 
4.2. Methodological considerations and data 
 
4.2.1. Methodological considerations 
Following Blanchard & Perotti (2002) and the related literature, we draw upon a 
multivariate representation based on Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) models to estimate fiscal 
multipliers. Specifically, we combine VAR models with panel data and estimate the following 
Panel VAR (PVAR) model 
  ititiit uXLBaX  ,        (1) 
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with Ni ,1  countries, Tt ,1  time periods, X  the vector of the endogenous variables of the 
model,  LB  the matrix polynomial with L  the lag operator, ia  country fixed effects, and itu  
the vector of errors.9 With respect to our goal, several considerations should be made. First, the 
variables in the vector X  must be stationary; we discuss below the time series properties of 
the variables considered from this perspective. Second, following Ilzetzki et al. (2013), we 
augment the PVAR with country fixed effects, in order to account for time invariant unobserved 
country heterogeneity. Finally, since we aim at estimating fiscal multipliers, i.e. changes in 
output following changes in the fiscal policy, the latter must be modelled as an exogenous 
shock. To this end, we draw upon the Cholesky decomposition and transform the error term 
such as innovations to be orthogonal. 
 Assuming that fiscal shocks are properly identified, we can draw upon the estimation of 
(1) and compute several multipliers. The impact multiplier 
0
0
0
F
Y
k


  measures the response of 
output ( 0Y ) to a fiscal shock ( 0F ) at the initial period, i.e. when the fiscal shock occurs. To 
see how output changes some periods after the fiscal shock took place, we compute the 
multiplier at some future horizon T , namely 
0F
Y
k TT


 . Then, an interesting point is to 
measure when occurred and how large is the strongest response of output to the fiscal shock 
during a horizon T , which can be done through the peak multiplier 
0
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F
Y
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

 . Finally, 
we make use of the cumulative multiplier at some horizon T , computed as the sum of the 
changes in output from the current period until the period T  divided by the sum of changes in 
the fiscal variable over the same period, namely 
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0 , to account for long-term effects.  
  
                                                          
9 For a recent technical survey on the PVAR technique, including its performances when the number of cross-
sections is limited, see Canova & Ciccarelli (2013). 
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4.2.2. Data 
We first describe the data and examine the time series properties of variables, and then discuss 
several issues related to the identification of the PVAR model. 
 
4.2.2.1. Data set and unit root tests 
Since we aim at focusing on the Eurozone, we restrict the sample to the beginning of 
the Eurozone, namely the first quarter of 1999, until the recent period (2012Q4).10 The vector 
of endogenous variables is composed of three series, namely real output, real government 
expenditure and real taxes.11 Contrary to the former, the use of quarterly data for fiscal variables 
may be somehow problematic, especially if major fiscal changes occur on a yearly basis and 
quarterly data are simply interpolated. However, as documented by Eurostat, at least from 1999, 
Eurozone data on fiscal variables are genuine quarterly data, i.e. literally collected on a 
quarterly basis.12 
Two problems arise with our data, namely seasonality and non-stationarity. A 
parsimonious way to deal with them jointly is to define growth rates of all variables between 
the value for a quarter of the current year and the value of the corresponding quarter of the 
previous year (for example, the growth rate between 2000Q1 and 1999Q1). By so doing the 
seasonality problem is obviously tackled, while to deal with the stationary problem we draw 
upon panel unit root tests. 
  
                                                          
10 Given the relatively short time span, the use of the PVAR technique, increasing the time length by the panel 
dimension, is particularly appropriate for our analysis, and it also allows not mixing pre- with post-1999 data. 
11 We used the GDP deflator to obtain real output, while the CPI index to obtain real government expenditure and 
taxes. We report that using only the GDP deflator or the CPI does not alter our findings. 
12 Moreover, we gave a particular attention to taxes, which include taxes on production and imports (including 
VAT), current taxes on income and wealth, and capital taxes, but without social contributions. This is because the 
latter presents a wide variability across countries: for example, in France social contributions in 2005/2010 are 
16.4%/16.7% of GDP, while only 7.6%/7.6% in the UK for the same period (for a total tax to GDP ratio around 
43% in France and 36% in the UK). However, we report that adding social contributions to the tax variable does 
not qualitatively change our results, and particularly the response of GDP to a tax shock (results are available upon 
request). 
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Table 1. Panel unit root tests for macroeconomic series (the benchmark model) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher 
Series with constant with time trend with constant with time trend 
Real GDP growth rate -4.37 (0.00) -3.44 (0.00) 39.1 (0.00) 29.6 (0.00) 
Real Expenditure growth rate -5.33 (0.00) -4.61 (0.00) 50.1 (0.00) 40.7 (0.00) 
Real Taxes growth rate -4.04 (0.00) -2.93 (0.00) 36.7 (0.00) 25.8 (0.00) 
Note: the growth rate of each variable is computed as the relative change between the value of 
the variable in the quarter of the considered year and its value in the corresponding quarter of 
the previous year. We report p-values in brackets. The null hypothesis of the IPS and ADF-
Fisher tests is that the panel contains a unit root after controlling for country fixed effects or for 
country fixed effects and country linear time trends. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of two panel unit root tests, namely the Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 
2003) test and the Fisher-ADF test developed by Maddala & Wu (1999) and Choi (2001), for 
the group of countries in our benchmark model composed of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands. For each of the two tests, the null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root 
after controlling alternatively by country fixed effects or by both country-fixed effects and 
country linear time trends. As emphasized by Table 1, irrespective of the considered test (IPS 
or Fisher-ADF) or of the specification (with or without time trend), we reject the presence of a 
unit root. Consequently, the growth rates of real GDP, expenditure and taxes are stationary in 
the benchmark (Eurozone) model.13 
4.2.2.2. PVAR identification 
Given that all transformed series are integrated of order zero, we explore the dynamic 
relationships between our variables using a PVAR model, allowing computing the response of 
output to fiscal policy shocks using impulse response functions. However, as this is well 
documented in the literature, a critical problem is related to the identification of truly exogenous 
fiscal shocks. As previously emphasized, we follow Fatas & Mihov (2001) and draw upon the 
simple and popular Cholesky decomposition, which consists in ordering the variables in the 
PVAR from the most to the least exogenous. Following the ISLM framework, in which fiscal 
                                                          
13 Panel unit root tests for the remaining group of countries are reported in Appendix A. 
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policy is predetermined, we study the response of output to fiscal shocks by ordering 
expenditure and fiscal before output. Moreover, we follow the related literature (see the recent 
contributions of Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2011, and Ilzetzki et al., 2013) and order expenditure 
first.14 Consequently, the order of variables in our PVAR models is expenditure-taxes-output.15 
4.3. Results 
The section is divided into three subsections. First, we present fiscal multipliers for our 
benchmark model. Second, we explore a potential role for the Euro regarding fiscal multipliers. 
Finally, we investigate the behaviour of fiscal multipliers in some countries having experienced 
the Eurozone crisis. 
 
4.3.1. Fiscal multipliers: the benchmark Eurozone model 
As previously emphasized, our benchmark Eurozone model is composed of founding members 
of the European Economic Community (except Luxemburg, given its small size), namely 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The ordering of variables is spending, 
followed by taxes and finishing by output (all as growth rates). 
Before implementing an impulse response analysis, we must choose the optimal lag 
length for estimating the PVAR. According to the Schwartz information criterion reported in 
the second column of Table 2, we choose the lag 2.16 
 
 
                                                          
14 In addition, we equally report results when inverting the order of the first two variables, i.e. putting first taxes 
and then expenditure. 
15 Remark that, similar to the SVAR of Blanchard & Perotti (2002) allowing also for non zero restrictions on the 
elasticities of automatic stabilizers, the ordering of our variables reproduces the idea that public spending are 
predetermined, in line with the IS-LM model. Alternatively, the identification of shocks could be achieved through 
narrative methods, which consist of identifying exogenous military spending (Ramey & Shapiro, 1998) or of using 
data on historical changes, such as government announcements (Romer & Romer, 2010). However, these methods 
are hardly appropriate for our sample, which focuses exclusively on European Union countries, for (at least) three 
reasons. First, in many of these countries military spending are significantly lower than in the US. Second, the 
approach based on announcements is difficult to implement from a cross-section perspective. Finally, recent work 
explores the extent to which military spending are really exogenous (Fishback, 2014). 
16 In addition Appendix B illustrates the inverse roots of the auto regressive characteristic polynomial of all 
estimated PVAR and clearly confirms their stationarity, since all roots lie inside the unit circle (see Lütkepohl, 
2005); as such, we can use them to derive impulse response functions. Besides, the fact that in all PVAR impulse 
response functions rapidly come to zero after a shock equally supports their stationarity. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
109 
 
Table 2. Lag selection in all PVAR models 
Lag 
Benchmark 
(Eurozone) 
EU non-
Eurozone 
Recent EU-non-
Eurozone 
Eurozone 
crisis 
0 -12.32406 -11.83348 -9.014121 -9.251212 
1 -13.44935 -13.33337 -9.219397 -10.83424 
2 -13.49002 -13.10011 -9.987694 -10.65896 
3 -13.39284 -12.86758 -10.12709 -10.43929 
4 -13.32884 -12.84309 -10.30134 -10.28556 
5 -13.19377 -12.69766 -10.27676 -10.14521 
6 -13.06976 -12.46462 -9.735470 -9.943949 
7 -12.95079 -12.05857 -9.473194 -9.755080 
8 -12.85999 -11.83497 -9.262783 -9.624653 
Note: The Schwartz information criterion is reported for each PVAR up to the eighth lag. Bolded values indicate 
the optimal lag for each PVAR. 
Figure 1 below depicts the results of an impulse response analysis for the benchmark PVAR, 
together with 1000 replications Monte Carlo-based 90% confidence bands. 
Figure 1. Response of output to fiscal shocks (the benchmark model) 
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Note: Impulse response function (solid line) of output to one standard error expenditure (left-hand side) or tax 
(right-hand side) shock, with 1000 replications Monte Carlo-based 90% confidence bands (dotted lines). 
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Figure 1 provides interesting evidence about the aggregated reaction of output to fiscal shocks 
for the five “historical” Eurozone countries. Let us first focus on spending multipliers. Notice 
that the response of output to an increase in expenditure is positive, albeit little significant. 
Moreover, to calculate multipliers, remark that the response of output at any period T  to a 1 
unit increase in government expenditure occurring in the initial period 1t  ( 1 tG ) can be 
computed as 
  G
T
t
T
YG
IRF
G
Y
/1




, with 
TIRF  the value of the impulse response function at the 
period T ,  YG /  the average expenditure to GDP ratio in levels for the considered time period, 
and G  the standard error of the growth rate of expenditure (the size of the assumed fiscal 
expenditure shock). As emphasized by the left-hand-side chart in Figure 1, spending multipliers 
are extremely low: a 1-unit increase in government spending increases output by only 0.006 
units on the impact, by 0.05 units after 1 year, and has virtually no quantitative effect after 2 
years. Regarding the peak multiplier, the largest response of output occurs after 3 quarters and 
it equals only 0.06. Finally, concerning cumulative multipliers, a 1-unit increase of government 
spending generates a cumulative increase of output of only 0.26 in the long-run (defined as the 
cumulated response after 20 quarters), which in addition is not statistically significant (see 
Appendix C).17 
 Although one should be cautious in comparing our findings with previous studies, 
because of different sample composition, method or time span, the expenditure multiplier we 
emphasize are significantly lower (see, for example, Dalsgaard et al., 2001, or Ilzetzki et al., 
2013). Moreover, we report that our results are remarkably robust to several tests, namely 
considering different lags (for example, four, like in Ilzetzki et al., 2013) or changing the order 
of fiscal variables by putting taxes before spending. 
 Let us now turn our attention to taxes. As illustrated by the right-hand side chart in 
Figure 1, an increase in taxes generates a significant positive response of output for around 7 
quarters. Moreover, the magnitude of the short-run response of output to a 1-unit increase in 
taxes is quite important, namely 0.25 on the impact, 0.39 at peak (after 2 quarters) and 0.32 
after one year. This yields quite large long-run multipliers, namely 1.85 cumulated for 20 
                                                          
17 Following a Reviewer’s request, to ensure that no country appears in two different groups, we estimated the 
benchmark model without Italy. We report that expenditure and tax multipliers are qualitatively similar, albeit 
expenditure multipliers are slightly lower (0.04 at peak, against 0.06 if Italy is included) and tax multipliers are 
slightly larger (0.55 at peak, against 0.39 if Italy is included). 
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quarters, which in addition are significantly all along the considered path, as illustrated by 
Appendix C. 
Several arguments can be put forward to support this rather puzzling positive response 
of output to an increase in taxes. Empirically, there is previous evidence for such an effect; for 
example, following his analysis performed on 5 developed countries, Perotti (2005, page 24) 
states that in only 2 of the 10 country-period couples considered the multiplier is significantly 
negative (see also Afonso, 2001, for such effects during a time span previous to ours). In 
addition, Gechert (2013) confirms that previous studies identified both negative and positive 
tax multipliers.18 Theoretically, the positive effect of taxes on output can be compatible with 
the increasing side of a Laffer Curve (see, for example, Minea & Villieu, 2009a), and, more 
interestingly, with anti-Keynesian effects during expansion periods in which the abundance of 
liquidity can be compatible with Ricardian agents (roughly, the first part of our time span) or 
during recession periods (roughly, the last part of our time span) with damaged fiscal stance in 
which changes in expectations occur (see, for example, Giavazzi & Pagano, 1990, and, more 
recently Perotti, 1999, Alesina et al., 2002, or Minea & Villieu, 2009b, 2012, for such 
expectations switches in high-debt contexts). 
 
4.3.2. Fiscal multipliers: what role for the Euro? 
Building on the benchmark results emphasized in the previous subsection, we aim in the 
following exploring if being in the Eurozone makes any difference when it comes to fiscal 
multipliers. To this end, we rely upon two sets of estimations. 
 First, we estimate a PVAR model for EU members that are not Eurozone members, and 
in addition are not expected to join the Euro in the future, namely Denmark and the United 
Kingdom. Panel unit root tests reject the presence of a unit root (see Appendix A), and the 
Schwartz information criterion supports a lag equal to one (see column three in Table 2 above). 
As for the benchmark model, we assume the order expenditure-taxes-output when computing 
impulse response functions. 
                                                          
18 For example, in a recent paper, Tang et al. (2013) emphasize expansionary effects of tax increases in ASEAN 
countries. 
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Figure 2a. Response of output to fiscal shocks (EU non-Eurozone members) 
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Note: Impulse response function (solid line) of output to one standard error expenditure (left-hand side) or tax 
(right-hand side) shock, with 1000 replications Monte Carlo-based 90% confidence bands (dotted lines). 
 
Figure 2a illustrates the response of output to fiscal shocks in EU countries that are not to 
become Eurozone members in the future. Depicted on the left-hand-side chart, the response of 
output to an expenditure shock appears statistically significant in the short-run, albeit relatively 
weak (-0.13 on the impact), while rather large in the long run (-0.74). Moreover, the tax 
multiplier (see the right-hand-side chart) is positive, quite important (peaking at 0.39 after 2 
quarters) and remarkably significant (for around 11 quarters); in addition, as emphasized by 
Appendix C, the cumulated tax multipliers equals 3.01. On the whole, these results outline the 
presence of anti-Keynesian effects in the group of EU countries not aiming at joining the 
Eurozone. 
 
 The second set of estimations focuses on a group of countries that recently joined the 
EU (in 2004) and expected to adopt the Euro at some point in the future, namely the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland.19 Panel unit root tests in Appendix A confirm that growth rates 
of all variables are stationary. According to column four in Table 2 above, we select the lag 
four for the estimation of the PVAR, and we compute the reaction of output to fiscal shocks 
using the ordering expenditure-taxes-output. 
  
                                                          
19 In selecting these countries among those that joined the EU in 2004, we aimed at abstracting from countries that 
either adopted the Euro recently (such as Slovakia, 2009, or Estonia, 2011) or present a (hard) peg monetary system 
(such as a Currency Board in Bulgaria or a Currency Peg in Latvia). 
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Figure 2b. Response of output to fiscal shocks (Recent EU non-Eurozone members) 
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Note: Impulse response function (solid line) of output to one standard error expenditure (left-hand side) or tax 
(right-hand side) shock, with 1000 replications Monte Carlo-based 90% confidence bands (dotted lines). 
 
Figure 2b plots the impulse response function of output to an expenditure shock (left-hand-side 
chart) and to a tax shock (right-hand-side chart). The response of output to a tax shock is 
significant for about 2.5 years, and the associated multipliers equal 0.21 on the impact, 0.31 
after four quarters and 0.34 after 8 quarters, with a peak at 0.43 (after 5 quarters). In addition, 
the long-run multiplier depicted in Appendix C equals 3.11, and is significant for the entire 
considered path (5 years). On the contrary, the significance of the response of output to an 
expenditure shock depends on the time span considered: little significant for about 3 quarters, 
it becomes significantly positive for the following 2 years, and again not significant starting the 
quarter 12. As a result, expenditure multipliers are significant and positive, peaking to 0.19 after 
6 quarters. Interestingly, the long-term expenditure multiplier is quite consistent: the cumulative 
response of output becomes significant after around 3 quarters and equals to as high as 1.58 
after 5 years (see Appendix C). 
 
 Compared to evidence based on the benchmark model, several results emerge. On the 
one hand, the average response of output to a tax shock is reasonably close in sign and 
magnitude in the Eurozone compared to the each of the two EU non-Eurozone groups of 
countries. Consequently, we find that being in the Eurozone does not make much of a difference 
when it comes to tax multipliers (except it is shorter-lived, roughly by one year), neither 
compared to EU non-Eurozone countries (the Denmark and UK group), nor compared to EU 
countries with monetary policies driven by a possible future integration in the Eurozone (the 
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Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland group). However, on the other hand, expenditure 
multipliers are much more contrasted. Compared to the weakly significant positive expenditure 
multipliers in the Eurozone group of countries, raising expenditure decreases output for the EU 
non-Eurozone countries, but increases it in the group of recent EU non-Eurozone countries. 
Since both non-Euro groups of countries present more flexible exchange rates, such differences 
in spending multipliers can be attributable, for example, to differences in their stage of 
economic development or in forward-looking expectations as regards a possible future 
integration in the Eurozone. On the whole, it appears that being in, or getting closer to, the 
Eurozone yields expenditure multipliers more consistent with a Keynesian view: (i) being in 
the Eurozone yields positive (albeit weakly significant) spending multipliers, contrary to 
negative multipliers in the EU non-Eurozone groups of countries; (ii) although both groups of 
countries present flexible exchange rates, spending multipliers are negatively significant in EU 
non-Eurozone countries, while significantly positive in recent EU non-Eurozone countries that 
might integrate the Eurozone in the near future; and (iii) the response of output to a spending 
shock is positive in both Eurozone countries and recent EU countries that could join the 
Eurozone in the next period, while more significant and larger in the latter group of countries 
possibly due to the presence of convergence effects. 
 
4.3.3. Fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone: does the crisis matter? 
In complement to the previous analysis which compared Eurozone groups of countries to 
groups of countries outside the Euro Area, we explore in the following the behaviour of some 
countries heavily affected by the Eurozone crisis, namely Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
After performing unit root tests showing that transformed series are stationary (see Appendix 
A), we estimate a PVAR model with variables ordered expenditure-taxes-output and the lag 
one (see the last column in Table 2 above). 
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Figure 3a. Response of output to fiscal shocks (Eurozone crisis countries) 
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Note: Impulse response function (solid line) of output to one standard error expenditure (left-hand side) or tax 
(right-hand side) shock, with 1000 replications Monte Carlo-based 90% confidence bands (dotted lines). 
 
Figure 3a depicts the response of output to spending and tax shocks (left- and right-hand-side 
charts respectively) for the group of Eurozone crisis countries. Remarkably, the response of 
output to an expenditure shock is positive and significant on the impact, and the multiplier 
equals 0.16. The peak multiplier, equal to 0.20, arises rather rapidly, i.e. in the second quarter, 
after which the magnitude of the multiplier continuously decreases, for example to 0.13 after 2 
years. Given that the response of output is significant for a rather long period, namely 4 and a 
half years, it is not surprising to find a very large cumulative (for 20 quarters) expenditure 
multiplier of 2.18 (see Appendix C). The response of output to a tax shock shows that the tax 
multiplier reaches its maximum after only 2 quarters (0.29), and is significant for about 18 
quarters, leading to a cumulative multiplier (for 20 quarters) of 2.85 (see Appendix C). 
 These results are rather different than what we previously emphasized in the benchmark 
PVAR model. Regarding taxes, although output response is still positive, its magnitude is lower 
(for example, at peak the value of the tax multiplier decreases by around 25%), but its 
persistence is much higher, namely 18 quarters compared to 7 quarters in the benchmark. When 
it comes to expenditure multipliers, they are not only positive, as this was the case for the 
Eurozone group countries, but also more significant and very persistent. Thus, it appears that 
taxes, and particularly spending, multipliers are quite different in the Eurozone group compared 
to the Eurozone crisis group.20 
                                                          
20 Such differences persist if, for example, we drop Italy out of the group of Eurozone crisis countries. 
Chapter 4. The Euro and the Crisis: Evidence on Recent Fiscal Multipliers  
116 
To get a closer look at these findings, we report in Figure 3b the response of output to 
expenditure and tax shocks from a PVAR for the same Eurozone crisis group, but estimated 
only for the crisis period, namely 2008Q1-2012Q4.21 
Figure 3b. Response of output to fiscal shocks during the crisis (Eurozone crisis countries) 
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Note: Impulse response function (solid line) of output to one standard error expenditure (left-hand side) or tax 
(right-hand side) shock, with 1000 replications Monte Carlo-based 90% confidence bands (dotted lines). 
 
Figure 3b illustrates the behaviour of fiscal multipliers during crisis. An increase in taxes 
significantly increases output in the short-run, consistent with a favourable effect of a tax 
consolidation during a crisis period. If we turn our attention to expenditure multipliers, remark 
that output significantly and positively responds to an expenditure shock for about 2 years, 
namely almost the double of the significant reaction to a tax shock, during crisis times for the 
group of Eurozone crisis countries. Thus, it appears that during the crisis, increasing public 
expenditure can be an efficient way to boost output in the short-run, consistently with the recent 
conclusions of Batini et al. (2012) emphasizing positive spending multipliers in recession times 
between 1985 and 2009 in the Euro Area.22 
 
                                                          
21 The unreported Schwarz information criterion supports a lag equal to one. 
22 Although that, compared to the analysis of Fazzari et al. (2012) or Auerbach & Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013), 
we do not detect important magnitude differences in spending multipliers during the crisis period compared to the 
entire period of our sample, confirming the absence of such differences found by Cléau et al. (2013) for France. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
This paper is a first attempt for a systematic analysis of the behaviour of fiscal 
multipliers in the Eurozone countries. Given the relatively limited time span, i.e. the Eurozone 
became effective only in 1999, we combine quarterly fiscal data and the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) technique to describe the dynamic behaviour of output in response to 
fiscal shocks. We aim at exploring two questions, namely (i) are fiscal multipliers different for 
the countries in the Eurozone, and (ii) how did the Eurozone crisis influenced (or not) fiscal 
multipliers. To this end, we begin by providing PVAR-based fiscal multipliers for the 
benchmark model, estimated on the group of founding members of the European Economic 
Community (except Luxemburg, given its small size), namely Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands. 
To answer our first question, we compare23 fiscal multipliers in the benchmark model 
with those based on estimations on two groups of countries, namely EU countries with no future 
commitment to adopt the Euro (Denmark and the United Kingdom) and recent EU countries 
that are expected to join the Euro in the future (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). If 
tax multipliers are fairly close, expenditure multipliers are quite different, and suggest that 
being related to the Eurozone seems to matter when assessing the response of output to 
expenditure shocks. On the one hand, output positively (albeit little significantly) responds to 
an increase in spending for the Eurozone countries, while its response is negative (and 
significant in the first periods) for the EU non-Eurozone countries. On the other hand, 
expenditure multipliers are positive and significant for the group of recent EU non-Eurozone 
countries that might integrate the Eurozone in the near future. 
 Regarding our second question, both expenditure and tax multipliers are different in the 
group of some of the countries heavily affected by the Eurozone crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) compared to the benchmark. The response of output to a tax shock is significant, 
while output significantly, positively and very persistently (around 4.5 years) responds to an 
expenditure increase. Particularly regarding expenditure, it seems that output has again a more 
Keynesian response to spending shocks in Eurozone crisis countries compared to the 
benchmark group of Eurozone countries. Moreover, the existence of significant and positive 
                                                          
23 See Table D1 in Appendix D for a synthetic overview of multipliers across groups. 
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expenditure multipliers for the group of Eurozone crisis countries is confirmed by estimations 
performed by restraining the sample exclusively for the crisis period. 
 Consequently, we revealed that being in the Eurozone or expecting to join the Euro Area 
in the future is associated to different responses of output to expenditure shocks, compared to 
EU non-Eurozone countries. In particular, spending multipliers are more Keynesian in 
Eurozone crisis countries compared to EU countries which are not in the Eurozone. One 
possible topic that we leave for future research might consists in exploring why tax multipliers 
are relatively more stable than expenditure multipliers across different groups of countries, 
using for example the recent method of Towbin & Weber (2013), which allows for interacted 
terms inside a PVAR framework. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Unit root tests 
 
Table A1. Stationarity tests for macroeconomic series (EU non-Eurozone countries) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher 
Series with constant with time trend with constant with time trend 
Real GDP growth rate -2.34 (0.00) -2.07 (0.02) 12.5 (0.01) 10.9 (0.03) 
Real Gov. Expenditure growth rate -3.34 (0.00) -3.35 (0.00) 19.1 (0.00) 17.5 (0.00) 
Real Taxes growth rate -2.93 (0.00) -2.24 (0.01) 16.0 (0.00) 11.5 (0.02) 
Note: the growth rate of each variable is computed as the relative change between the value of the variable in the 
quarter of the considered year and its value in the corresponding quarter of the previous year. We report p-values 
in brackets. The null hypothesis of the IPS and ADF-Fisher tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country fixed effects or for country fixed effects and country linear time trends. 
 
 
Table A2. Stationarity tests for macroeconomic series (Recent EU non-Eurozone countries) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher 
Series with constant with time trend with constant with time trend 
Real GDP growth rate -1.48 (0.06) -1.28 (0.09) 10.8 (0.09) 10.6 (0.10) 
Real Gov. Expenditure growth rate -6.84 (0.00) -7.51 (0.00) 54.3 (0.00) 55.4 (0.00) 
Real Taxes growth rate -2.52 (0.01) -2.16 (0.02) 17.4 (0.01) 14.1 (0.03) 
Note: the growth rate of each variable is computed as the relative change between the value of the variable in the 
quarter of the considered year and its value in the corresponding quarter of the previous year. We report p-values 
in brackets. The null hypothesis of the IPS and ADF-Fisher tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country fixed effects or for country fixed effects and country linear time trends. 
 
 
Table A3. Stationarity tests for macroeconomic series (Eurozone crisis countries) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher 
Series with constant with time trend with constant with time trend 
Real GDP growth rate -2.51 (0.01) -1.71 (0.04) 18.8 (0.02) 13.6 (0.09) 
Real Gov. Expenditure growth rate -8.69 (0.00) -7.19 (0.00) 72.5 (0.00) 57.5 (0.00) 
Real Taxes growth rate -7.60 (0.00) -7.45 (0.00) 63.5 (0.00) 56.9 (0.00) 
Note: the growth rate of each variable is computed as the relative change between the value of the variable in the 
quarter of the considered year and its value in the corresponding quarter of the previous year. We report p-values 
in brackets. The null hypothesis of the IPS and ADF-Fisher tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country fixed effects or for country fixed effects and country linear time trends. 
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Appendix B. Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
Benchmark PVAR (Group of Eurozone countries) 
PVAR with 2 lags (6 roots) 
 
Group of EU non-Eurozone countries 
PVAR with 1 lag (3 roots) 
 
 
 
Group of Recent EU non-Eurozone countries 
PVAR with 4 lags (12 roots) 
 
 
 
Group of Eurozone crisis countries 
PVAR with 1 lag (3 roots) 
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Appendix C. Cumulative fiscal multipliers 
Figure C1. Cumulative multipliers for the Benchmark (Eurozone) PVAR 
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Figure C2a. Cumulative multipliers for the group of EU non-Eurozone countries 
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Figure C2b. Cumulative multipliers for the group of Recent EU non-Eurozone countries 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
Cumulative Expenditure multipliers
impact:0.05
long run:1.58
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
Cumulative Tax multipliers
impact:0.21
long run:3.11
 
Chapter 4. The Euro and the Crisis: Evidence on Recent Fiscal Multipliers  
122 
Figure C3a. Cumulative multipliers for the group of Eurozone crisis countries 
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Figure C3b. Cumulative multipliers for the group of Eurozone crisis countries (2008Q1-2012Q4 period) 
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
Cumulative Expenditure multipliers
impact:0.09
long run:1.26
 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
Cumulative Tax multipliers
impact:0.28
long run:1.55
 
 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
123 
 
Appendix D. An overview of fiscal multipliers across groups 
Table D1. An overview of fiscal multipliers across groups 
Fiscal multipliers 
 
Impact multiplier 
(1st quarter) 
Peak multiplier 
(quarter) 
Cumulative multiplier 
(quarter 20) 
Spending Tax Spending Tax Spending Tax 
EU1 0.006 0.25 0.06 (3qrt) 0.39 (2qrt) 0.26  1.85 
EU2 -0.13 0.33 -0.01 (19qrt) 0.39 (2qrt) -0.74 3.01 
EU3 0.05 0.21 0.19 (6qrt) 0.43 (5qrt) 1.58 3.11 
EU4 0.16 0.17 0.20 (2qrt) 0.29 (2qrt) 2.18 2.85 
EU5 0.09 0.28 0.21 (3qrt) 0.40 (2qrt) 1.26 1.55 
Note: EU1 stands for the benchmark (Eurozone) group of countries, EU2 for EU non-Eurozone countries, EU3 
for Recent EU non-Eurozone countries, EU4 for Eurozone crisis countries for the whole time spam, and EU5 for 
the Eurozone crisis countries during the crisis. 
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A Fresh Look at Fiscal Multipliers: One Size Fits it All? 
Evidence from the Mediterranean Area1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Following the adoption of important fiscal stimuli to fight the recent crisis, 
a large literature estimated fiscal multipliers. Focusing on an area 
particularly appealing, given its diversity and the diversity of the response 
of countries that compose it to the current crisis, namely the Mediterranean 
area, we unveil major disparities regarding the significance, sign, and size 
of fiscal multipliers, depending mainly on economic characteristics, the 
type of multiplier, the time span, and the type of fiscal stimulus. Evidence 
of such important heterogeneities highlights the need for better cooperation 
among countries, particularly regarding the design of fiscal policy. Failing 
to do so might divert public resources to ineffective fiscal policies in some 
countries, or, on the contrary, deprive other countries of potentially high 
benefits of appropriate fiscal policies, including a reliable tool for exiting 
the current crisis. 
 
 
JEL Codes: E62, F62, O57 
 
Keywords: fiscal multipliers; fiscal policy; developing and developed countries. 
  
                                                          
1 A version of this chapter was published as “A New Look at Fiscal Multipliers: One Size Fits it All? Evidence 
from the Mediterranean Area”, Applied Economics, vol. 47, pp. 2728-2744, 2015, and was written with A. Minea. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The recent crisis embraced a global scale. However, its effect was uneven around the world: 
according to the World Bank, real 2009 GDP shrank in most European countries or in North 
America but increased in most continental Asia, while in Latin America, South-Eastern Asia 
and Africa the evidence is more mixed. Such output heterogeneities are probably related to the 
unprecedented fiscal stimuli implemented since the beginning of the crisis all over the world. 
Indeed, according to the 2011 “A review of global fiscal stimulus” of the IILS, the fiscal 
stimulus in 2008-2009 in G20 was around 2 trillion USD, while between 2.6% of 2008 GDP in 
Latin America and Caribbean, and up to an impressive 9.1% of 2008 GDP in Asia and the 
Pacific (excluding Japan and South Korea). Thus, an actual and expanding topic in 
macroeconomics aims at evaluating these fiscal stimuli through measuring fiscal multipliers.2 
A large number of studies estimate fiscal multipliers, drawing upon the VAR 
technique.3 In an influential paper, Blanchard & Perotti (2002) use a Structural VAR (SVAR) 
model, and find a spending multiplier around 1 in the US. Related work emphasized however 
that the size of the multiplier depends on the time span: for example, the short-run spending 
multiplier is between 0.65 (Mountford & Uhlig, 2009) and above 1 (Fatas & Mihov, 2001), 
while below 1 in the long-run (Mountford & Uhlig, 2009). Capitalizing on these findings, many 
studies focused on developed countries. On the one hand, fiscal multipliers seem to be large in 
developed countries. According to Perotti (2005), fiscal multipliers in OECD are between 2.3 
and 3.7, a result confirmed for EU by Beetsma et al. (2008) who find peak multipliers around 
1.6. On the other hand, the persistence of fiscal multipliers in developed countries is more 
subject to debate: contrary to IMF (2008), Ilzetzki et al. (2013) illustrate positive and persistent 
multipliers in 20 high-income countries.4 
                                                          
2 As a cornerstone of the Keynesian theory, the fiscal multiplier plays a central role in the ISLM model of Hicks 
(1937), or in its versions extended to include the supply block (the ASAD model), the influence of the exchange 
rate regime (the Mundell-Fleming model), or economic dynamics (the dynamic-ISLM model of Blanchard, 1981). 
On the contrary, the development of the New Classical Economics in the 1970s focused on fiscal multipliers from 
a more Neoclassical perspective. However, the recent DSGE models allow analyzing multipliers in a wider 
environment, in which Keynesian and Neoclassical elements can coexist. 
3 Alternatively, fiscal multipliers can be estimated using MACRO models (see Chinn, 2013, for a discussion) or 
the narrative approach (Romer & Romer, 2010). If the former technique lost some of its interest nowadays in 
academia (particularly, because of the Lucas’, 1976, critique), recent work provides a comparison between the 
narrative approach and VARs (Mertens & Ravn, 2014). 
4 Additional work on fiscal multipliers in developed countries explores their sensitivity to accounting for 
expectations (Tenhofen & Wolff, 2007), the phase of the economic cycle (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2013), the 
fiscal stance (particularly the debt-to-GDP ratio, Afonso & Sousa, 2012), the method of financing (ElSayed Kandil, 
2013), the openness degree (Ilzetzki et al., 2013), and monetary conditions, including the presence of a liquidity 
trap (Woodford, 2011) or the type of the exchange rate regime (Corsetti et al., 2012). 
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 However, compared to the large body of literature on developed countries, the 
contributions devoted to developing or emerging countries are remarkably scarce. Drawing 
upon a PVAR analysis on 27 developing countries, Ilzetzki & Végh (2008) find remarkably 
weak spending multipliers, namely 0.6 on impact, 0.4 after one year, 0.1 after two years and -
0.1 after three years. Using an alternative methodology, based on the estimation of elasticities 
and regressions to identify fiscal shocks, IMF (2008) equally outlines weak expenditure 
multipliers, around 0.2 after one year, and equal to -0.2 after two years. Finally, if they 
corroborate previous studies by showing that impact and cumulative consumption multipliers 
are not significant in 24 developing countries, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) also find that, on the 
contrary, government investment multipliers are relatively high, namely 0.57 on impact and up 
to 1.6 cumulated after five years. Overall, these results illustrate a potential importance of the 
level of economic development and of the type of the fiscal shock, confirming the important 
current debate in the computation of fiscal multipliers (see, the survey of Hebous, 2011, and 
the recent critique of Blanchard & Leigh, 2013). 
Such heterogeneities are the starting point of our analysis. To take a fresh look at fiscal 
multipliers, we focus on the Mediterranean Area, which provides a particularly appealing 
environment for reappraising fiscal multipliers, for many reasons. Indeed, the area allows 
reproducing, at a smaller scale, worldwide differences in the response of GDP to the Great 
Recession. Countries in the North-West of the Mediterranean Sea, including France, Spain, or 
Turkey, experienced negative growth rates in 2009. On the contrary, South-Eastern 
Mediterranean countries, such as Morocco, Israel, or Syria, conserved positive growth rates in 
2009. Next, many Mediterranean countries adopted important fiscal stimuli. For example, 
major international institutions (including the IMF, the World Bank or the EU) provided bailout 
programs between around 40 billion euros in Spain to more than 200 billion euros in Greece 
since the beginning of the crisis. Alternatively, many countries adopted such fiscal packages at 
a national level, amounting around (in 2008 GDP) 1.75% in France, more than 5% in Italy, and 
above 6% in Turkey. Besides, regarding Northern Africa and Asian Mediterranean countries, 
the 2010 FEMIP-FEMISE report for the EIB emphasized the primary role of fiscal stimuli in 
conducting counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies, leading to an average increase of roughly 
5 pp of the deficit-to-GDP ratio in 2009 relative to 2008. Finally, located around the 
Mediterranean Sea, Mediterranean countries are far from an entirely homogenous area. 
Economically, the area is composed of developed countries (France, Italy, or Spain) and 
emerging and developing countries (Croatia, Morocco, or Turkey), which allows bridging a gap 
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between the literature on developed and developing countries on the effect of fiscal multipliers: 
indeed, contrary to previous studies, the groups of developed and developing countries we study 
are more homogenous, since part of the same Mediterranean area. Geographically, 
Mediterranean countries are located on three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa), and some 
countries, Cyprus and Malta, are islands. Lastly, the Mediterranean area is a mixture of different 
cultures, traditions, religions, etc. 
 Accounting for such heterogeneities when computing fiscal multipliers is at the heart of 
our study. Specifically, we take advantage of the diversity of Mediterranean countries and 
disentangle them in several groups, based on economic and geographic criteria. European 
countries are divided into large-EMU countries who adopted the euro in 1999 or 2001 (Group 
1: France, Greece, Italy and Spain) and small-EMU countries who joined the eurozone only 
recently (Group 2: Cyprus and Malta, in 2008). Next, Group 3 includes developing African 
countries: Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Finally, Group 4 considers developing Asian countries: 
Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey.5 We estimate for each group fiscal multipliers using the 
Panel Vector AutoRegressive (PVAR) method. Adapted for computing output response to 
exogenous fiscal shocks,6 the PVAR method is particularly appropriate for our analysis. Indeed, 
compared to data for GDP and government consumption, data for government investment is 
available for a shorter time span; thus, drawing upon PVAR allows taking advantage of the 
panel dimension to increase the number of observations and estimate government investment 
multipliers, in addition to government consumption multipliers.7 
Using annual data for 1980-2012, we find significant positive government consumption 
and investment multipliers for the entire Mediterranean area. However, as illustrated by our 
main analysis, and backed-up by several robustness tests, these results cover important 
heterogeneities among groups of countries. First, following an increase in public consumption 
or investment, output increases in several groups, according to the Keynesian multiplier effect 
outlined by the traditional ISLM model. Examples include impact or cumulative consumption 
                                                          
5 Given the length of the civil war in Lebanon, we equally considered Group 4 without this country. In addition, 
except for Croatia and Slovenia, for which the existence of some data allows constituting the Group 5 of Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) countries, the lack of data made us abstract from remaining Mediterranean 
countries. 
6 According to Smets & Wouters (2007), the VAR method is widespread in macroeconomics, and is often used as 
benchmark against non-VAR models. More recently, Marglin & Spiegler (2013) concluded that, compared to 
alternative techniques used to compute fiscal multipliers (for example, large-scale macroecononomic or DSGE 
models), VAR models are superior in fitting the data.  
7 Indeed, data for government investment is less available than for government consumption. Besides, given the 
lack of quarterly data for fiscal aggregates for the largest majority of Mediterranean countries, our analysis is 
performed on annual data. 
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(investment) multipliers in African (Asian) countries. However, in other cases, including 
consumption (investment) shocks in Asian (small-EMU) countries, output response is not 
statistically significant, in line with the famous Ricardian Equivalence Theorem of Barro 
(1974). Besides, we equally unveil anti-Keynesian effects: for example, the impact investment 
multiplier is negative in African countries, while for large-EMU countries we reveal a dynamic 
trade-off between short and medium-long-run effects (i.e. the cumulative multiplier increases 
and then decreases). 
Second, we highlight the importance of the size of the economy and of the level of 
economic development. On the one hand, as suggested by the Mundell-Fleming model, fiscal 
multipliers are less significant and/or weaker in small economies (small-EMU or FRY 
countries), compared to large-EMU countries. On the other hand, the influence of the level of 
economic development is less straightforward, and particularly depends on the fiscal shock. 
Indeed, peak consumption multipliers are almost double in African compared to small-EMU 
countries, but peak investment multipliers are higher in large-EMU compared to African 
countries. Similarly, cumulative multipliers are much higher in large-EMU countries, but more 
persistent in developing countries (for example, the consumption multiplier in Africa or the 
investment multiplier in Asia). 
Finally, we unveil differences both in size and significance of fiscal multipliers, mainly 
depending on the period or the fiscal shock. For example, one interesting result is the 
significance (at any time span) of cumulative consumption multipliers for African countries, 
and of cumulative investment multipliers for Asian countries. Moreover, large-EMU countries 
present larger short-medium-term multipliers compared to small-EMU countries, but the 
consumption multiplier is significant on the impact and in the long-run only in the latter group. 
In addition, we reveal particularly high fiscal multipliers. For example, for large-EMU 
countries, the peak investment multiplier equals 1.18, while cumulative multipliers are as high 
as 1.84 (government consumption) or 2.15 (government investment). These strong multipliers, 
i.e. above 1, show that important Keynesian effects might be at work in some groups of 
countries. 
The policy implications of our analysis are numerous. Importantly, the effects of fiscal 
policy depend upon the characteristics of the group of countries (such as, large or small, 
developed or developing, etc.). Moreover, the type of fiscal stimulus is of crucial importance, 
since government consumption/investment shocks can foster, or not, output for the same group 
of countries. Finally, the magnitude of fiscal multipliers can largely differ among groups of 
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countries. Consequently, our study covering a wide range of heterogeneous areas emphasizes 
that fiscal policy must be adapted to economic specificities, and implemented particularly in 
areas with comparable characteristics to areas in which fiscal multipliers were found to be 
significant (and, preferably, of a high magnitude). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and 
data, section 3 computes output reaction to fiscal shocks in the Mediterranean area, section 4 
compares fiscal multipliers across groups of countries, section 5 provides several robustness 
checks, and section 6 concludes. 
 
5.2. The econometric model and the dataset 
5.2.1. The econometric model 
The PVAR Model 
Drawing upon the recent literature computing fiscal multipliers based on Blanchard & Perotti 
(2002)’s seminal paper, we estimate a VAR model. Specifically, we exploit the panel dimension 
within a VAR framework to estimate a Panel VAR (PVAR) model (see Canova & Ciccarelli, 
2013, for a survey on PVARs). Indexing countries by Ni ,...,1  and time by Tt ,...,1 , our 
structural model is 
  ittiit CuXLBAX  1, ,        (1) 
with X  the vector of endogenous variables, A  and  LB , with L  the lag operator, matrices 
describing simultaneous and lagged relationships between variables, respectively, and itu  the 
vector of errors, which is orthogonal since C  is a diagonal matrix. 
Multiplying (1) by the inverse of A , namely 
1A , we obtain 
  ittiit CuAXLBAX
1
1,
1 

  ,       (2) 
which we write in reduced form as 
ttiit aXX  1, , where  LBAa
1  and itt CuA
1 .   (3) 
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Since (3) can be estimated on groups of countries, it is particularly appropriate for cases 
in which the time dimension of data is relatively limited. In addition, we include fixed effects 
in every PVAR to account for time-invariant unobserved country-heterogeneity. 
 
PVAR identification 
Provided that all variables are  0I , we draw upon PVARs to compute output response 
to fiscal shocks, using an impulse-response analysis. Then, an important issue, already 
highlighted in the literature, concerns the identification of truly exogenous fiscal shocks. To do 
so, we draw upon the conventional Cholesky decomposition (see, e.g., Fatas & Mihov, 2001; 
Ilzetzki et al., 2013), implying variables in PVAR to be ordered from the most to the least 
exogenous. To reproduce the features of the ISLM theoretical model, and particularly the fact 
that fiscal policy is predetermined, we order fiscal variables before output. Next, in the spirit of 
Musgrave (1939), Oxley & Martin (1991) and Alesina & Perotti (1997), among others, consider 
that public investment is easier to change than public consumption, mainly because changing 
public consumption is economically more difficult (since it encloses persistent functioning or 
transfer spending) or politically unpopular. To account for this evidence, we order consumption 
before investment.8 Finally, the number of lags is chosen separately for each PVAR using 
information criteria. 
 
The fiscal multiplier 
The most common definition of a fiscal multiplier is the change in output due to a one-
unit change in the considered fiscal variable. The recent literature (Spilimbergo et al, 2009; 
Gechert & Will, 2012) emphasized several types of multipliers, depending on the assumed 
horizon. We focus here on four types of multipliers. To see how output ( Y ) changes some 
periods after the fiscal shock ( S ) occurred, we compute the multiplier at some future horizon 
T , namely 
1S
Y
m TT


  (for the initial period 1T  we obtain the impact multiplier). Then, we 
investigate when output response is the strongest by identifying the largest, or peak, multiplier 
                                                          
8 In addition, the robustness section presents results based on alternative ordering of fiscal variables. 
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, over a period T . Finally, we account for medium-long-term effects using 
the cumulative multiplier at T , computed as the ratio between the sum of changes in output 
and in the fiscal variable over the period 1 to T : 
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. 
Regarding the magnitude of multipliers, since IRFs are computed for a shock equal to 
one-standard deviation, we compute multipliers for a one-unit change in fiscal stimulus as 
 YS
IRF
S
Y St
t
t
/
/



. In this expression,  YS /  is the average ratio between the fiscal variable and 
GDP for the considered period, and S  is the standard deviation of the error of the fiscal 
variable. 
 
5.2.2. Dataset 
 For the reasons explained in introduction, we focus on Mediterranean countries. Given 
the lack of quarterly data for African and Asian countries in our sample, we employ annual 
data. In most cases, estimations are performed for the 1980-2012 period. However, for some 
countries (Group 3), we stopped in 2010, namely previous to the beginning of major economic 
imbalances due to political tensions (particularly, the Arab Spring). 
We measure fiscal multipliers using three endogenous regressors. On the one hand, an 
outcome variable, namely real output, obtained by applying the GDP Deflator (base 2005 for 
all countries9) to nominal GDP measured in local currency units (source WDI). On the other 
hand, we consider two fiscal policy variables, namely government consumption and 
government investment. The former is measured by real public consumption, obtained by 
applying the GDP Deflator to nominal government final consumption expenditure.10 According 
to its definition in WDI, this series contains all government current expenditures for purchases 
of goods and services (including compensation of employees), as well as most expenditure on 
                                                          
9 The base year for the GDP deflator depends on the considered country (see WDI for details). The 2005 common 
base was chosen since it was already the base year for most countries, while for remaining countries the deflator 
was recomputed to correspond to the 2005 base year. 
10 The use of the GDP deflator for public consumption and investment was decided based on its availability. 
However, whenever available, we alternatively used the CPI. We report that results remain remarkably stable. 
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national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of 
government investment. 
Contrary to GDP and government consumption, data on government investment was 
harder to obtain. For some countries, such as France, Greece, Italy or Spain, we drew upon 
OECD and EUROSTAT databases to obtain nominal government investment. Moreover, for 
other countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, we computed public 
investment as the difference between nominal gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and 
nominal private GFCF (source WDI). Finally, for remaining countries, such as Malta, Cyprus, 
Israel, and, for 1980-1986, Turkey, we used IMF’s GFS database, and measured it by nominal 
government capital expenditure. As for public consumption, we used the GDP Deflator to 
obtain real public investment.11 
To deal with the non-stationarity problem, we defined yearly real growth rates of 
variables. As illustrated by Appendix A, we examined time-series properties of variables using 
three panel unit root tests, namely the Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 2003) test, the Fisher-ADF test 
developed by Maddala & Wu (1999) and Choi (2001), and the Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002) 
test. Low p-values reported in Appendix A lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit 
root for growth rates of variables. Since series are stationary, we use them in the following to 
estimate PVARs and compute fiscal multipliers. 
  
                                                          
11 Special attention was paid when combining data from different sources, or when computing public investment 
as the difference between total and private GFCF. For example, in the latter case, we compared our data with those 
from individual country reports (for example, for Morocco, Tunisia or Turkey), and did not unveil major 
differences between series. 
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5.3. Fiscal multipliers in Mediterranean countries 
We first present results for a PVAR for the entire Mediterranean area, followed by results for 
each group of countries. 
 
5.3.1. Fiscal multipliers: the benchmark model 
Our benchmark PVAR is estimated for all Mediterranean countries for which data were 
available for 1980-2012.12 
Figure 1. Output response to fiscal shocks (benchmark) 
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Note for Figures 1-5: We report output response to a one standard-error shock on government consumption (left-
hand side) and government investment (right-hand side). On each side are reported 90% confidence bands 
computed by Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 replications. 
 
Based on the estimation of a PVAR with lag 4 (according to information criteria), Figure 
1 depicts the response of GDP to a one standard-error increase in government consumption 
(left-hand side) and government investment (right-hand side), along with 90% confidence 
bands computed by Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 replications.13 Following a positive 
consumption shock, output positively and significantly responds on impact. Moreover, output 
reaction remains positive and becomes again significant after four years, before dying out. 
Similarly, the response of GDP to an increase in government investment is positive and 
significant on impact. In addition, output is still positive and significant in the second period, 
                                                          
12 Appendix D details data availability and sources for all countries. 
13 Figures illustrate that PVARs are correctly specified since IRFs return to zero. In addition, Appendix B shows 
that all roots of characteristic AR polynomials are inside the unit circle, confirming the stationarity of PVARs. 
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suggesting that the effects of investment shocks on output are more persistent than the effects 
of consumptions shocks. This latter result is confirmed when computing the magnitude of 
government consumption and investment multipliers: albeit they are fairly close on impact 
(around 0.55), the investment multiplier is three times larger than the consumption multiplier 
after one year (0.34 and 0.10, respectively). Finally, irrespective of the fiscal shock, peak 
multipliers correspond to first-year (or impact) multipliers. 
Given that this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to compute fiscal 
multipliers in Mediterranean countries, comparison with other studies must be done with 
caution. Even so, our government investment multipliers (obtained for a sample mixing 
developing and developed countries) are comparable to those emphasized by, for example, 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013), namely between 0.39 (developed countries) and 0.57 (developing 
countries) after one quarter. However, contrary to this study, we unveil public consumption 
multipliers of higher magnitude after one year.14 
Starting from this benchmark model, the next two subsections compute multipliers for 
groups of countries identified using economic and geographic characteristics. 
 
5.3.2. Fiscal multipliers in Mediterranean Europe 
 Mediterranean Europe is composed mostly of developed countries. To better capture 
fiscal multipliers, we divided them based on the year of adoption of the euro and the size of the 
country, and created two groups. Group 1 contains countries that adopted the euro from its very 
beginning in 1999, namely France, Italy and Spain, to whom we added Greece (who introduced 
it only 2 years latter, in 2001), and which are relatively large economies (Greece to a lesser 
extent). Group 2 includes Cyprus and Malta, who joined the eurozone in 2008,15 and in addition 
are small countries. 
 Using information criteria, we selected the lag 4 for the PVAR for Group 1. Figure 2 
reports IRFs of GDP to a one-standard error fiscal shock, and their confidence bands. 
                                                          
14 In addition, our results remain robust if we move away from the optimal lag and use, for example, a lag of 2. 
15 Given its adoption of the euro in 2007, Slovenia might have also entered this group. Unfortunately, data are 
available only since 1990 (1995) for GDP and government consumption (investment). 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
139 
 
Figure 2. Output response to fiscal shocks in Group 1 (EMU-large) 
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Although positive, output response to a consumption shock is weakly significant on 
impact, but becomes significant in period 2 (and, to a lesser extent, in period 5). On the contrary, 
following a raise in investment, output significantly increases both on impact and in period 2, 
while it decreases in periods 6 to 9 (albeit the significance is weaker), and then dies out. 
Differences in output response to consumption and investment shocks are even more 
pronounced if we look at the magnitude of fiscal multipliers. Contrary to consumption 
multipliers, at most around 0.9 (period 2), investment multipliers are above unit in two periods 
(1.18 and 1.05 in the first and second year). In addition, albeit less significant, consumption 
multipliers are always positive, while for investment multipliers there seems to be a trade-off 
between significantly positive multipliers in the first periods (short-run) and significantly 
negative multipliers after roughly 5 years (medium-run). 
 
Turning to Group 2 (Cyprus and Malta), Figure 3 illustrates output response from a 
PVAR with lag 1. Output response to a consumption shock is positive but significant only on 
impact, while never significant following an investment shock. In addition, fiscal multipliers 
are remarkably weak (for example, the peak investment multiplier equals only 0.20 and is not 
significant), and die out rapidly. 
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Figure 3. Output response to fiscal shocks in Group 2 (EMU-small) 
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5.3.3. Fiscal multipliers in Mediterranean Africa and Asia 
 African and Asian Mediterranean countries are all emerging or developing countries. 
Because of scarcity of data, we drew upon a unique criterion, namely the geographic location, 
to distinguish among groups. Thus, Group 3 includes North-African countries (Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia), while Group 4 contains Asian countries (Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey). 
 Let us first focus on Group 3. As previously emphasized, we stopped our sample in 
2010, namely the year before the irruption of the Arab Spring. We estimate a PVAR with lag 
1, and display in Figure 4 IRFs of output to fiscal shocks, and their 90% confidence bands. 
Figure 4. Output response to fiscal shocks in Group 3 (Africa) 
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 Output response to a consumption shock is positive on impact, but not statistically 
significant starting period 2. On the contrary, output negatively responds on impact to an 
investment shock, and remains significant for the next 3-4 years. Such discrepancies equally 
arise for fiscal multipliers. Peak multipliers occur on impact for consumption, while in period 
2 for investment shocks. The consumption multiplier is remarkably high in period 1 (0.92), 
while only between -0.32 and 0.34 for the investment multiplier. Indeed, consumption 
(investment) multipliers oscillate between positive (negative) and negative (positive) values 
roughly for the first five years, but only investment multipliers are statistically significant. 
 The last set of estimations focuses on Asian Mediterranean countries (Group 4).16 
Results based on a PVAR with lag 2 are reported in Figure 5. Output response to a public 
consumption shock is weak and never significant. On the contrary, output vigorously responds 
to a public investment change, as the impact multiplier equals 0.79 and is significant. However, 
output response turns into not significant starting year 2. 
Figure 5. Output response to fiscal shocks in Group 4 (Asia) 
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16 Due to the importance of the civil war and smaller data availability in Lebanon, we equally estimated the PVAR 
without this country. We report that results are consistent with conclusions in the main text. 
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5.4. Fiscal multipliers across Mediterranean groups of countries: A comparison 
 Capitalizing on the previous section, we provide a comparison between fiscal 
multipliers across groups of countries. We begin with short-term and peak multipliers, and then 
discuss cumulative multipliers. 
 
5.4.1. Short term and peak multipliers 
Table 1a presents short-run fiscal multipliers, namely on impact (y1), and after one (y2) and 
two (y3) years, as well as peak multipliers over the period (up to year 10). Results for the new 
Group 5 report output response to a consumption shock computed from a PVAR with lag 1 for 
two small FRY countries, namely Croatia and Slovenia (see also Appendix C).17 
Table 1a. Short-run and peak fiscal multipliers 
  
y1-impact y2 y3 peak 
Cons.  Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. 
All countries 0.57* 0.53* 0.10 0.34* 0.00 -0.07 0.57* 0.53* 
G1 (EMU-large) 0.22 1.18* 0.87* 1.05* 0.25 -0.08 0.87* 1.18* 
G2 (EMU-small) 0.49* 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.03 0.49* 0.20 
G3 (Africa) 0.92* -0.32* -0.41 0.34* 0.14 -0.18* 0.92* 0.34* 
G4 (Asia) 0.17 0.79* -0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.08 0.17 0.79* 
G5 (FRY-small) 0.61   -0.03   -0.02   0.61   
Note for Tables 1a-b: Government consumption and investment multipliers computed based on output response 
to changes in the corresponding fiscal variable estimated for each group of countries from the PVAR models in 
the previous section. * significant at the 10% level. 
 
Regarding impact multipliers, the presence of positive and significant consumption 
multipliers for all Mediterranean countries (0.57) is driven by the group of small-EMU (0.49), 
and particularly by the group of African (0.92) countries. On the contrary, impact investment 
multipliers are significant only for large-EMU (1.18) and Asian (0.79) countries, and even 
negative for African countries (-0.32). 
                                                          
17 The limited availability of government investment data (2009-2012 for Croatia) impeded computing investment 
multipliers. Moreover, since data for output and government consumption is available only for 1995-2012 (see 
Appendix D), consumption multipliers should be considered with caution. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
143 
 
Peak multipliers reveal that in most groups output positively and significantly responds 
to fiscal shocks at least in one period; exceptions are Asian and FRY countries for consumption 
shocks, and small-EMU countries for investment shocks. Remarkably, in large-EMU and in 
African countries, output significantly responds to both consumption and investment shocks, 
and the magnitude is higher for consumption (large-EMU), respectively investment (Africa) 
multipliers. 
Last, short-run multipliers display little significance, with some exceptions. Regarding 
consumption multipliers, output increases by 0.87 for large-EMU countries. Regarding 
investment multipliers, output increases between 0.34 (Africa) and 1.05 (large-EMU), while it 
decreases by 0.18 (in y3) for African countries. 
To summarize, regarding common patterns across groups of Mediterranean countries, 
peak multipliers are close to impact multipliers, suggesting that fiscal shocks are rapidly 
transmitted to output. The fact that fiscal multipliers are short-lived is confirmed by the lack of 
significance of virtually all multipliers in the short-run (y3). However, there are some 
exceptions, mainly in large-EMU and African countries, in which output response is significant 
even after 3-5 years. 
Moreover, we unveil remarkable heterogeneities across groups of countries. First, fiscal 
multipliers are stronger and more significant in large-EMU, compared to small-EMU or small-
FRY countries, confirming the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model of lower effects in 
smaller and more open economies. Second, fiscal multipliers are quite opposite among African 
and Asian Mediterranean countries. Interestingly, output responds positively to consumption in 
Africa, but to investment in Asia on impact.18 Third, in some groups, only one type of fiscal 
policy engenders a significant output response: only the consumption multiplier is significant 
in small-EMU, while only the investment multiplier in Asia. 
Finally, output response to fiscal shocks differs both in sign and magnitude across 
groups. For example, although most investment multipliers are positive, we equally reveal 
negative investment multipliers in African countries, suggesting a possible crowding-out effect 
of public investment on private investment. In addition, large differences characterize the size 
of multipliers. For example, even when significant, peak consumption multipliers can be almost 
double in developing African countries (0.92) compared to developed small-EMU countries 
(0.49). These differences are even stronger for peak investment multipliers, estimated between 
0.34 in developing African countries and up to 1.18 in developed large-EMU countries, 
                                                          
18 Despite relatively weak consumption multipliers in y2 and y3, corroborating some findings of IMF (2008) or 
Ilzetzki & Végh (2008), we illustrate strong impact consumption multipliers in African developing countries. 
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suggesting that the level of economic development, probably correlated with the size of the 
country, can also play a role for fiscal multipliers. Remarkably, we emphasize investment 
multipliers above one (in years 1-2), coherent with the Keynesian theory, for the relatively 
closed and large-EMU economies. 
 
5.4.2. Cumulative fiscal multipliers 
In complement to peak and short-run multipliers, we now focus on cumulative multipliers.19 
Since we use annual data, we associate to short-, medium-, and long-run multipliers the 
cumulative multiplier at year 3, 5, and 10, respectively. 
Table 1b. Cumulative and long-run fiscal multipliers 
 
y1-impact y3 (short-run) y5 (medium-run) y10 (long-run) 
Cons.  Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. 
All countries 0.57* 0.53* 0.67* 0.80* 0.93* 1.09* 0.98* 1.18* 
G1 (EMU-large) 0.22 1.18* 1.34* 2.15* 1.84* 1.65* 1.67 -0.35 
G2 (EMU-small) 0.49* 0.00 0.74* 0.23 0.76* 0.24 0.76* 0.24 
G3 (Africa) 0.92* -0.32* 0.65* -0.15 0.61* -0.11 0.60* -0.09 
G4 (Asia) 0.17 0.79* 0.05 0.98* 0.02 1.00* 0.01 0.99* 
G5 (FRY-small) 0.61  0.56  0.54  0.54  
 
 Compared to static multipliers, cumulative multipliers in Table 1b present a more 
dynamic landscape of output response. Results for all countries show that, first, both 
consumption and investment multipliers increase in time and are significant at any time span. 
Second, albeit on impact output reacts more to a consumption (0.57) compared to an investment 
(0.53) shock, the latter multiplier becomes relatively more important starting y3 (0.80 versus 
0.67). Third, both cumulative multipliers are close to one in the long-run, and the investment 
multiplier even climbs above unit (1.18). Nevertheless, as illustrated by Table 1b and Appendix 
C, results for the entire sample cover significant heterogeneities across groups of Mediterranean 
countries. 
                                                          
19 We assume a zero-discount rate when computing cumulative multipliers. We report that results are comparable 
for small (for example, 2%) discount rates. 
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First, particularly in the groups of small countries, output response is never significant. 
This is the case, for example, for the consumption (investment) multiplier in small-FRY (small-
EMU) countries. 
Second, there exist several patterns for the significance of multipliers. Compared to the 
benchmark case in which multipliers are always significant, the investment multiplier is 
significant on impact but not in the following periods for African countries, while the 
consumption multiplier for large-EMU countries is not significant neither on impact nor in the 
long-run, but significant in the short-medium-run. 
Third, some patterns equally emerge for the dynamic behavior on multipliers. Compared 
to the benchmark case or to groups of countries in which (i) cumulative multipliers always 
increase in time (investment multiplier in small-EMU), fiscal multipliers can (ii) always 
decrease in time (consumption multiplier in Africa), or (iii) present an inverted-U shape 
(consumption multiplier in large-EMU or investment multiplier in Asia). Consequently, the 
maximum cumulative multiplier arises at different time span: (i) in the long-run (investment 
multiplier in small-EMU); (ii) on impact (consumption multiplier in Africa); (iii) before the 
medium-run (roughly, in years 2-4, investment multiplier in large-EMU); or (iv) after the 
medium-run (roughly, in y8, consumption multiplier in large-EMU). 
Fourth, the long-run persistence of output significant response differs both across 
groups and with respect to the fiscal shock. Consumption multipliers are still significant in the 
long-run for small-EMU and African countries, while only for Asian countries if we consider 
investment multipliers. Moreover, long-run fiscal multipliers are equally different in size. In 
particular, the long-run investment multiplier in Asian countries (0.99) is higher than the long-
run consumption multiplier in small-EMU (0.76) and African (0.60) countries. 
Overall, these results can be summarized as follows. In small countries, cumulative 
fiscal multipliers are often not significant (for example, investment (consumption) multipliers 
for small-EMU (FRY) countries). Besides, only in small-EMU countries the consumption 
multiplier is always significant, and quite important in the medium-long-run (0.76), showing 
that being part of the eurozone might have supported more Keynesian output responses to 
consumption shocks. Indeed, albeit not significant in the long-run, fiscal multipliers in large-
EMU countries are remarkably high: the consumption multiplier equals 1.84 in the medium-
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run and the investment multiplier is as high as 2.18 in y4.20 Moreover, there is more than the 
level of economic development to explain the long-run significance and magnitude of 
multipliers: output significantly increases only following consumption shocks in developing 
African countries, but only following investment shocks in developing Asian countries. Finally, 
with respect to the standard ISLM model, we find evidence supporting Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy in the medium-run (for example, significant consumption and/or investment 
multipliers in large- and small-EMU, and in African countries) and even in the long-run (for 
example, significant investment multipliers in Asian countries, consistent with the conclusions 
of the endogenous growth model with public investment of Barro, 1990). However, to an equal 
extent, we find no evidence of Keynesian effects in some groups of countries, as fiscal 
multipliers are never significant (for example, investment multipliers in large-EMU or 
consumption multipliers in Asian and FRY countries), coherent with the conclusions of the 
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem of Barro (1974). In addition, we even emphasize anti-
Keynesian output responses to fiscal shocks, possibly related to crowding-out effects on private 
consumption and investment.21 This is the case on impact and in the short-run for investment 
multipliers in African countries, while in large-EMU countries there seems to be a dynamic 
trade-off between output increase in the short-run and its decrease in the medium-long-run, for 
both consumption and investment shocks. 
 
                                                          
20 High consumption multipliers in large-EMU countries are consistent with the work of Perotti (2005) or Beetsma 
et al. (2008). However, our investment multipliers are much larger than those emphasized by Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 
for high-income countries (which are below 1 in the short-run, and rapidly become not significant). 
21 Contrary to significantly impact or cumulative investment multipliers in developing countries in Ilzetzki et al. 
(2013), but consistent with the conclusions of Agnello et al. (2013), emphasizing that expansionary fiscal policies 
increase private consumption and investment in the short-run, but decrease them in the medium-run, in low- and 
lower-middle income countries. 
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5.5. Robustness 
As previously acknowledged, our results are robust to several alternative specifications, namely 
for a lag different of the optimal lag, or when using (small) discount rates to compute 
cumulative multipliers. In the following, we consider several robustness tests. 
 
5.5.1. Ordering of fiscal variables 
In our main analysis variables were ordered as public consumption-public investment-GDP. If 
putting fiscal variables before GDP matches the traditional ISLM model, we account for the 
more mixed evidence on the exogeneity of public consumption relative to public investment, 
and present in Tables 2a-b fiscal multipliers based on PVARs in which we order public 
investment before public consumption. 
Table 2a. Short-run and peak fiscal multipliers (alternative ordering of fiscal variables) 
 
y1-impact y2 y3 peak 
Cons.  Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. 
All countries 0.55* 0.56* 0.08 0.34* 0.00 -0.07 0.55* 0.56* 
G1 (EMU-large) 0.08 1.21* 0.74* 1.21* 0.25 -0.03 0.74* 1.21* 
G2 (EMU-small) 0.49* -0.09 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.49* 0.16 
G3 (Africa) 0.95* -0.30* -0.44 0.34* 0.16 -0.18* 0.95* 0.34* 
G4 (Asia) 0.16 0.79* -0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.08 0.16 0.79* 
 
Table 2b. Cumulative and long-run fiscal multipliers (alternative ordering of fiscal variables) 
  
y1-impact y3 (short-run) y5 (medium-run) y10 (long-run) 
Cons.  Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. 
All countries 0.55* 0.56* 0.63* 0.83* 0.88* 1.13* 0.94* 1.23* 
G1 (EMU-large) 0.08 1.21* 1.07* 2.38* 1.63* 1.99* 1.69 -0.02 
G2 (EMU-small) 0.49* -0.09 0.76* 0.09 0.78* 0.10 0.78* 0.10 
G3 (Africa) 0.95* -0.30* 0.66* -0.14 0.62* -0.10 0.61* -0.09 
G4 (Asia) 0.16 0.79* 0.04 0.98* 0.00 1.00* 0.00 1.00* 
Note for Tables 2a-b: Government consumption and investment multipliers computed based on output response 
from PVARs, with the alternative ordering public investment-public consumption-GDP. * significant at the 10% 
level. 
As illustrated by Tables 2a-b, irrespective of the type of multiplier (impact, peak, or cumulative) 
or the type of fiscal shock (consumption or investment), fiscal multipliers are remarkably close 
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in significance, sign and magnitude to their values in our main analysis, reported in Tables 1a-
b. Thus, our results are robust to an alternative ordering of fiscal variables. 
 
5.5.2. Control variables 
Our main results are derived from PVARs composed of 3 variables (public consumption and 
investment, and GDP). We now extend PVARs’ dimension by including, inside PVARs’ 
structure, several control variables selected for their relevance, namely the current account, 
public debt, and inflation.22 Tables 3a-b report fiscal multipliers based on PVARs augmented 
with control variables.23 
 
Table 3a. Short-run and peak fiscal multipliers (control variables included) 
 
y1-impact y2 y3 peak 
Cons.  Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. 
All countries 0.49* 0.37* 0.06 0.24* -0.20 -0.06 0.49* 0.37* 
G1 (EMU-large) 0.14 1.29* 1.01* 1.02* 0.42 -0.42 1.14* 1.29* 
G2 (EMU-small) 0.37* 0.30 -0.02 0.15 0.44* 0.34 0.44* 0.34 
G3 (Africa) 1.28* -0.31* -0.31 0.27* 0.04 -0.11 1.28* 0.27* 
G4 (Asia) 0.20 0.77* 0.00 0.16 0.08 -0.09 0.20 0.77* 
 
  
                                                          
22 These control variables are not available for FRY countries (G5), which we drop. Moreover, for small-EMU 
countries, we use the real effective exchange rate (REER) to capture competitiveness effects, given the lack of 
data for the current account. Appendix E details control variables’ definitions and sources. 
23 We conserved the ordering of variables from the main analysis (namely, consumption before investment), 
followed by control variables ordered as: current account, public debt, and inflation. 
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Table 3b. Cumulative and long-run fiscal multipliers (control variables included) 
 
y1-impact y3 (short-run) y5 (medium-run) y10 (long-run) 
Cons.  Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. 
All countries 0.49* 0.37* 0.35* 0.55* 0.20 0.37 0.06 -0.27 
G1 (EMU-large) 0.14 1.29* 1.58* 1.89* 2.34* 1.50 3.14* 0.53 
G2 (EMU-small) 0.37* 0.30 0.79* 0.79* 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.88 
G3 (Africa) 1.28* -0.31* 1.01* -0.15 1.05* -0.06 1.44* 0.03 
G4 (Asia) 0.20 0.77* 0.29 0.85* 0.31 0.75* 0.31 0.77* 
Note for Tables 3a-b: Government consumption and investment multipliers computed based on output response 
from PVARs extended to include control variables. G2 includes the REER instead of the current account. * 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
Comparing Tables 1a-b with Tables 3a-b shows little difference regarding the significance, 
sign, and magnitude of fiscal multipliers, with two (minor) exceptions. First, the consumption 
multiplier for small-EMU countries is less persistent (not significant in y3), making 
corresponding cumulative multipliers not significant in medium-long-run. Second, long-run 
(medium-long-run) consumption multipliers are larger (above 1) for large-EMU (African) 
countries. These results comfort our previous findings of stronger multipliers in large, 
compared to small, countries, and of important consumption multipliers in African countries. 
Thus, accounting for current account, public debt, and inflation, allows confirming the 
robustness of our main findings. 
 
5.5.3. Computation of main variables 
Our main results are derived from PVARs based on growth rates of variables. From a wider 
perspective, these growth rates could be seen as the cyclical component of variables under the 
assumption that they follow a random walk (in logs). Alternatively, we can employ detrending 
methods that appropriately isolate the cyclical component of )1(I  series. In this paper, we 
compute these cyclical components using the most popular detrending method, namely the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 (Ravn & Uhlig, 2002, provide a 
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thorough discussion for the choice of this value for annual data). Tables 4a-b report fiscal 
multipliers based on PVARs on HP-detrended variables.24 
Table 4a. Short-run and peak fiscal multipliers (HP-detrended variables) 
 
y1-impact y2 y3 peak 
Cons.  Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. 
All countries 0.23* 0.54* -0.07 0.21 -0.12 -0.35 0.23* 0.54* 
G1 (EMU-large) 0.24* 1.14* 0.50* 0.80* -0.34* -0.53* 0.50* 1.14* 
G2 (EMU-small) 0.12 0.08 -0.13 0.13 0.28 0.16 0.28 0.16 
G3 (Africa) 1.26* -0.34* -0.59 0.16 -0.12 -0.11 1.26* 0.16 
G4 (Asia) 0.16 1.32* -0.03 -0.09 -0.17 -0.47* 0.16 1.32* 
G5 (FRY-small) 0.69  -0.08  -0.39  0.69  
 
Table 4b. Cumulative and long-run fiscal multipliers (HP-detrended variables) 
 
y1-impact y3 (short-run) y5 (medium-run) y10 (long-run) 
Cons.  Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. Cons. Invest. 
All countries 0.23* 0.54* 0.04 0.40* 0.14 0.25* 0.11 0.35* 
G1 (EMU-large) 0.24* 1.14* 0.39 1.41* -0.04 0.30 0.16 0.79* 
G2 (EMU-small) 0.12 0.08 0.27 0.37 0.29 0.19 0.27 0.26 
G3 (Africa) 1.26* -0.34* 0.55 -0.29* 0.67* -0.24* 0.66* -0.26* 
G4 (Asia) 0.16 1.32* -0.05 0.76* 0.15 0.57* 0.10 0.70* 
G5 (FRY-small) 0.69  0.22  0.40  0.38  
Note for Tables 4a-b: Government consumption and investment multipliers computed based on output response 
from PVARs, with variables computed by HP-detrending with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 for annual data. * 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
Compared to our main findings from Tables 1a-b, the analysis based on HP-detrended series 
unveils the following results. First, fiscal multipliers are still weaker and less significant in the 
groups of small, compared to large, countries. Indeed, multipliers are never significant for 
small-EMU and FRY countries, contrary to large-EMU countries in which peak and cumulative 
multipliers are still significant and large (albeit some significance loss can be noted for 
cumulative consumption multipliers). Second, African and Asian countries still display 
                                                          
24 Unit root tests confirm that HP-detrended series are stationary (results are available upon request). 
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different responses to fiscal shocks. Indeed, peak and most cumulative consumption 
(investment) multipliers are positive and significant for African (Asian) countries, and, 
remarkably, peak multipliers are now above unit. Finally, we obtain, yet again, negative 
investment multipliers in African countries, which corroborates previous findings of negative 
impact multipliers by illustrating negative cumulative investment multipliers in African 
countries at all horizons, including in the long-run. To summarize, using an alternative method 
to compute series, namely, the HP filter, leads to comparable conclusions, therefore confirming 
once again the robustness of our main findings. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
To mitigate the negative effects of the current crisis, many governments around the world 
implemented large fiscal stimuli. This paper extends the literature by computing fiscal 
multipliers in groups of Mediterranean countries, which present the advantage of covering a 
wide range of economic and geographic contexts. Estimations based on the PVAR technique, 
backed-up by several robustness tests, unveiled important heterogeneities across groups of 
countries, depending on (i) economic characteristics, i.e. the size of the country or the level of 
economic development, (ii) geographical characteristics, i.e. the location of countries (Europe, 
Africa, Asia), (iii) the multiplier (impact, peak, cumulative), (iv) the time span (short-, medium-
, long-run), and (v) the fiscal stimulus (government consumption or investment). 
 Such heterogeneities in fiscal multipliers clearly go against a common, unique, fiscal 
policy. Indeed, according to our analysis, such a policy could generate a wide range of 
conflicting outcomes, running from strongly Keynesian to important anti-Keynesian. To 
minimize such heterogeneities, two strategies might be of help. On the one hand, our results 
suggest that an output-enhancing fiscal policy should be implemented differentially, 
particularly according to the characteristics of each group of countries. On the other hand, our 
findings support the need for better cooperation. For the Mediterranean area, this is the 
underlying message of the creation, in July 2008, of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 
Replacing the former Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (signed in 1995), the UfM aims at 
tightening relations between the EU and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, in areas 
such as business, transport, and urban development, energy, water and environment, higher 
education and research, and social and civil affairs. 
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From a wider perspective, given the wide range of countries it covers (developed and 
developing, small or large, in a monetary union – eurozone – or with autonomous monetary 
policy), our study provides valuable lessons by highlighting the need for better fiscal policy 
cooperation among countries, aimed at generating higher cohesion, better convergence, and 
enhanced coordination (for example, in terms of trade, labor force mobility, monetary policies, 
or business cycle synchronization). Failing to do so might divert public resources to ineffective 
fiscal policies in some countries, or, on the contrary, deprive other countries of potentially high 
benefits of appropriate fiscal policies (in terms of growth, welfare, unemployment, etc.), 
including a reliable tool for exiting the current economic crisis. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A. Unit root tests 
 
Table A0. Unit root tests (benchmark – all countries) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher Levin-Lin-Chu 
Series constant time trend constant time trend constant time trend 
Real GDP growth rate 
-17.97 
(0.00) -17.34 (0.00) 165.20 (0.00) 462.72 (0.00) 
-22.82 (0.00) -20.96 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Consumption growth 
rate 
-11.71 
(0.00) -11.87 (0.00) 162.97 (0.00) 169.67 (0.00) 
-9.44 (0.00) -10.35 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Investment growth rate 
-14.35 
(0.00) -13.06 (0.00) 212.74 (0.00) 180.53 (0.00) 
-14.40 (0.00) -12.77 (0.00) 
Note: The null hypothesis of IPS, ADF-Fisher, and Levin-Lin-Chu tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country-fixed effects or for country-fixed effects and country-linear time trends. p-values reported 
in brackets. 
 
Table A1. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 1 – France, Greece, Italy, Spain) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher Levin-Lin-Chu 
Series constant time trend constant time trend constant time trend 
Real GDP growth rate -2.17 (0.01) -1.34 (0.09) 19.18 (0.01) 17.94 (0.02) -1.56 (0.05) -2.53 (0.01) 
Real Gov. Consumption growth 
rate -5.38 (0.00) -4.63 (0.00) 43.76 (0.00) 35.14 (0.00) -4.03 (0.00) -3.19 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Investment growth rate -6.24 (0.00) -5.69 (0.00) 55.93 (0.00) 46.92 (0.03) -7.22 (0.00) -6.56 (0.00) 
Note: The null hypothesis of IPS, ADF-Fisher, and Levin-Lin-Chu tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country-fixed effects or for country-fixed effects and country-linear time trends. p-values reported 
in brackets. 
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Table A2. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 2 – Cyprus, Malta) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher Levin-Lin-Chu 
Series constant time trend constant time trend constant time trend 
Real GDP growth rate -3.92 (0.00) -4.76 (0.00) 21.66 (0.00) 25.31 (0.00) -3.85 (0.00) -4.64 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Consumption growth 
rate -4.72 (0.00) -5.89 (0.00) 27.73 (0.00) 31.37 (0.00) -6.04 (0.00) -7.03 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Investment growth rate -7.13 (0.00) -6.83 (0.00) 42.26 (0.00) 37.06 (0.00) -7.62 (0.00) -7.02 (0.00) 
Note: The null hypothesis of IPS, ADF-Fisher, and Levin-Lin-Chu tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country-fixed effects or for country-fixed effects and country-linear time trends. p-values reported 
in brackets. 
 
Table A3. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 3 – Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher Levin-Lin-Chu 
Series constant time trend constant time trend constant time trend 
Real GDP growth rate 
-11.43 
(0.00) -11.15 (0.00) 69.88 (0.00) 127.67 (0.00) -10.81 (0.00) -9.72 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Consumption growth 
rate -4.96 (0.00) -5.31 (0.00) 35.40 (0.00) 33.87 (0.00) -4.46 (0.00) -4.27 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Investment growth rate -9.88 (0.00) -9.35 (0.00) 71.32 (0.00) 63.50 (0.00) -8.72 (0.00) -7.83 (0.00) 
Note: The null hypothesis of IPS, ADF-Fisher, and Levin-Lin-Chu tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country-fixed effects or for country-fixed effects and country-linear time trends. p-values reported 
in brackets. 
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Table A4. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 4 –Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher Levin-Lin-Chu 
Series constant time trend constant time trend constant time trend 
Real GDP growth rate 
-17.32 
(0.00) -16.32 (0.00) 61.59 (0.00) 296.17 (0.00) -22.91 (0.00) -20.55 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Consumption growth 
rate 
-11.06 
(0.00) -10.56 (0.01) 87.27 (0.00) 93.58 (0.00) -8.32 (0.00) -7.94 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Investment growth rate -7.43 (0.00) -6.23 (0.00) 61.66 (0.00) 48.03 (0.00) -7.27 (0.00) -6.13 (0.00) 
Note: The null hypothesis of IPS, ADF-Fisher, and Levin-Lin-Chu tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country-fixed effects or for country-fixed effects and country-linear time trends. p-values reported 
in brackets. 
 
Table A5. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 5 – Croatia, Slovenia) 
Test Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) ADF-Fisher Levin-Lin-Chu 
Series constant time trend constant time trend constant time trend 
Real GDP growth rate -2.01 (0.02) -1.39 (0.08) 11.31 (0.02) 9.01 (0.06) -2.89 (0.00) -3.03 (0.00) 
Real Gov. Consumption growth 
rate -3.58 (0.00) -2.55 (0.00) 18.71 (0.00) 12.65 (0.01) -3.93 (0.00) -3.47 (0.00) 
Note: The null hypothesis of IPS, ADF-Fisher, and Levin-Lin-Chu tests is that the panel contains a unit root after 
controlling for country-fixed effects or for country-fixed effects and country-linear time trends. p-values reported 
in brackets. 
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Appendix B. Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomials 
Benchmark PVAR (All countries) 
PVAR with 4 lags (12 roots) 
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Group 2 (Cyprus, Malta) 
PVAR with 1 lag (3 roots) 
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Group 3 (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) 
PVAR with 1 lag (3 roots) 
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Group 4 (Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey) 
PVAR with 2 lags (6 roots) 
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Group 5 (Croatia, Slovenia) 
PVAR with 1 lag (2 roots) 
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Appendix C. Cumulative fiscal multipliers 
Figure C0. Cumulative multipliers for the Benchmark PVAR (all countries) 
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Figure C1. Cumulative multipliers for the Group 1 (France, Greece, Italy, Spain) 
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Figure C2. Cumulative multipliers for Group 2 (Cyprus, Malta) 
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Figure C3. Cumulative multipliers for the Group 3 (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) 
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Figure C4. Cumulative multipliers for the Group 4 (Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey) 
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Figure C5. Output response to a consumption shock and cumulative multipliers for the Group 
5 (Croatia, Slovenia) 
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Appendix D. Mediterranean countries and data sources 
Country GDP Source 
Government 
consumption 
Source 
Government 
investment 
Source 
Croatia 1995-2011 
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In
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1995-2011 
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t 
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o
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2009-2012 Eurostat 
Cyprus 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 Eurostat; IMF 
Egypt 1982-2010 1982-2010 1982-2010 WDI 
France 1980-2012 1980-2012 1980-2012 Eurostat; OECD 
Greece 1980-2012 1980-2012 1980-2012 Eurostat; OECD 
Israel 1980-2012 1980-2012 1980-2012 IMF 
Italy 1980-2012 1980-2012 1980-2012 Eurostat; OECD 
Lebanon 1988-2012 1989-2012 1990-2012 WDI 
Malta 1980-2011 1980-2011 1980-2011 Eurostat; IMF 
Morocco 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 WDI 
Slovenia 1990-2011 1990-2011 1995-2011 Eurostat 
Spain 1980-2012 1980-2012 1980-2012 Eurostat; OECD 
Syria 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 WDI 
Tunisia 1980-2009 1980-2009 1980-2009 WDI 
Turkey 1980-2012 1980-2012 1980-2012 WDI; IMF 
Note: WDI stands for World Development Indicators. 
Appendix E. Control variables 
Variables Descriptions Source 
CAB % of GDP IMF, WEO Database 
Debt % of GDP IMF, Historical Public Debt Database 
Inflation 
Inflation (annual %) transformed in adjusted 
inflation computed as infl/(infl+1) 
IMF, WEO Database 
REER 
Real effective exchange rate index 
(2005 = 100) 
Eurostat Database 
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Output Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in 
Central and Eastern European Countries1 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In spite of the rapidly growing research on fiscal multipliers over the recent 
years, little evidence has been so far accumulated in developing and 
emerging economies. This paper investigates the nature and the size of 
fiscal multipliers in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). 
Unlike most of existing literature, we draw upon a panel vector error 
correction model, which appropriately captures the common long-term path 
of CEEC, while allowing for different short-run dynamics, in an integrated 
setup. Our main results show that the spending multiplier is positive, but 
low on average. Moreover, its sign, significance and magnitude vary across 
CEEC. Finally, both impulse and cumulative fiscal multipliers are sensitive 
to a wide range of CEEC characteristics, including the exchange rate 
regime, the level of economic development, the fiscal stance, and the 
openness degree. 
 
JEL Codes: E62, O11, P35 
 
Keywords: Central and Eastern European Countries; fiscal multipliers; 
panel vector error correction model. 
  
                                                          
1 A version of this chapter will be published as “Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Central and Eastern European 
Countries”in Post-Communist Economies, and was written with J.L. Combes, A. Minea and T. Yogo. 
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6.1. Introduction 
The fiscal multiplier has received a renewed attention since the recent financial crisis 
and the widespread fiscal stimulus implemented by many countries around the world. In spite 
of the rapidly growing research on fiscal multiplier over the recent years, so far little evidence 
has been accumulated in emerging and developing economies.2 
In this paper, we develop the literature by investigating the effect of discretionary fiscal 
change on economic activity in 11 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). CEEC 
share some specific characteristics that may affect the multiplier. Specifically, they are 
relatively small open economies with relatively low debt levels, and are currently implementing 
structural reforms that are more or less correlated with the accession to the European 
(Monetary) Union (E(M)U). In this respect, assessing the nature and the size of the effects of 
fiscal stimulus is of great interest to implement a more tailored fiscal policy. 
The contribution of our paper is fourfold. First, unlike the existing literature that relies 
extensively on VAR models, our analysis uses a Panel Vector Error Correction model 
(PVECM), selected for its appealing features for CEEC. Indeed, on the one hand, all CEEC in 
our sample are expected to follow a common dynamic in the long-term, driven by their 
integration process in the E(M)U. As such, drawing upon methods that remove this long-term 
dynamic (for example, through first-differentiation, as this is the case in stationary VAR 
models), would significantly affect the estimation of fiscal multipliers. On the other hand, albeit 
following a common long-run path, CEEC may present different short-run dynamics. Models 
that do not account for such country-heterogeneities (such as PVAR) or abstract of the common 
long-run path (such as individual country-estimated VAR) are equally likely to produce biased 
estimations of fiscal multipliers. Consequently, unlike most studies, we take full advantage of 
the statistical properties of the data, and particularly of co-integration between variables, by 
using an error correction model on a panel data setting. This methodology is appropriate for 
computing both pooled and country-specific fiscal multipliers within the same framework, 
while controlling for the common long-run relationship between CEEC. 
Second, a crucial issue is related to the identification of truly exogenous fiscal shocks. 
We define spending shocks as the cyclically-adjusted component of government spending. By 
so doing, we isolate an unexpected change in fiscal policy as the source of fiscal shocks. Third, 
we employ genuine (i.e. not interpolated) quarterly data for the period 1999q1-2013q3, which 
is fairly rare in the literature related to computing fiscal multipliers. Fourth, after presenting 
                                                          
2 The next section discusses the contributions devoted to developing and emerging countries. 
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pooled and country-specific multipliers, we explore the sensitivity of the effect of fiscal policy 
by disentangling CEEC across several of their major characteristics, namely the exchange rate 
regime (ERR), the level of economic development, the fiscal stance, and the openness degree. 
Our results are as follows. First, we find that impact and four-quarter cumulative 
multipliers are positive and significant for CEEC. Although the size of impact multipliers is 
fairly small, namely between 0.07 and 0.09 (depending on the estimation method), cumulative 
multipliers can be up to four times higher compared to impact multipliers, namely between 0.21 
and 0.31. Second, we unveil significant differences among fiscal multipliers across CEEC. 
Although positive in most countries, impact and cumulative multipliers can be statistically not 
significant or even negative in some CEEC. In addition, the magnitude of cumulative 
multipliers differs by a factor of four between CEEC, and climbs up to a large value of 0.7. 
Third, we show that not accounting for a common (instead of country-individual) long-term 
path can leave to important significance and size differences for fiscal multipliers in several 
CEEC of our sample. Finally, both impact and cumulative fiscal multipliers are sensitive to 
CEEC specificities. Albeit the ERR is found to be unimportant for output’s response to fiscal 
shocks on impact, the ERR affects its cumulative response; in particular, cumulative multipliers 
are significant in pegged and floating ERR, and not significant in intermediate ERR. Next, both 
impact and cumulative multipliers are mainly significant in relatively less developed CEEC and 
in CEEC with relatively lower debt-to-GDP ratios. Finally, consistent with the predictions of 
the Mundell-Fleming model, we find that cumulative multipliers are significant only in 
relatively less open CEEC. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes the findings of 
previous studies. Section III presents the data and outlines the methodology. Section IV 
illustrates the main results. Section V discusses the sensitivity of fiscal multipliers to several 
CEEC structural characteristics, and Section VI concludes. 
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6.2. Literature review 
The major fiscal stimuli implemented by governments in response to the recent crisis reopened 
the topic of the multiplier in academia.3 As pioneered by Keynes (1936), the multiplier predicts 
a more than 1 to 1 change in GDP following a fiscal shock. However, as emphasized by 
Blanchard and Leigh (2013), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was significantly under-
evaluating fiscal multipliers. According to Marglin and Spiegler (2013), such conflicting 
findings are engendered by the use of different methodologies, time span, type of government 
spending, and, according to Chahrour et al. (2012), different identification methods for fiscal 
shocks. 
Indeed, the literature devoted to the estimation of fiscal multipliers is particularly rich, 
and involves the use of many methods. Theoretically, fiscal multipliers can be approached using 
(i) the ISLM model in its static (Hicks, 1937) and dynamic (Blanchard, 1981) forms, (ii) Real 
Business Cycle (RBC) models, developed under the New Classical economics (Long and 
Plosser, 1983), and (iii) New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
models (Gechert and Will, 2012). Econometrically, fiscal multipliers can be computed using (i) 
the Narrative Approach (Romer and Romer, 2010), (ii) the Vector AutoRegression (VAR) 
models (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), (iii) single-equations models (Barro and Redlick, 2009), 
(iv) instrumental variables (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014), (v) panel models (Almunia et al., 
2010), and (vi) two-stage residual techniques (Agnello et al., 2013). 
Due to the large strand of literature that focused on estimating fiscal multipliers, we 
present in the following the results of the studies that are the closest to our paper, by focusing 
on developing countries. Based on the estimation of elasticities and regressions to isolate fiscal 
shocks, IMF (2008) illustrates spending multipliers of 0.2 (-0.2) after one (two) years. Such low 
spending multipliers equally emerge from the PVAR analysis of Ilzetzki & Végh (2008), 
performed on 27 developing countries, namely 0.6/0.4/0.1 on impact/1st/2nd year. More 
recently, Kraay (2012, 2014) finds a spending multiplier of 0.5 (0.4) based on a sample of 29 
(102) developing countries, while Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find public consumption multipliers 
equal to -0.03 (0.4) on impact (after 4 quarters). Finally, Minea & Mustea (2015) reveal short-
lived impact and short-run fiscal multipliers for developing Asian and African Mediterranean 
                                                          
3 At country level, many European countries took up bailout programs (30, 40, and 200 billion euros in France, 
Spain, and Greece, respectively). At supranational level, the EU and the US adopted fiscal packages of roughly 
2% and 5% of their GDP for 2009-2010, respectively. According to the IILS (2011), fiscal stimuli during 2008-
2009 were around 2 trillion USD for the G20 group, 9.1% of 2008 GDP in Asia and the Pacific (excluding Japan 
and South Korea), and 2.6% of 2008 GDP in Latin America and Caribbean. 
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countries. Overall, these studies emphasize that fiscal multipliers are fairly low in developing 
countries. 
 
6.3. Data and Methodology 
We aim at empirically assessing output effects of a discretionary fiscal policy in CEEC. We 
begin by presenting the data, and then we expose the methodology. 
 
6.3.1. Data 
 
We use quarterly data for a sample of 11 CEEC over the period 1999q1-2013q3 (see Tables 
A.1a-b in Appendix for the list of countries and descriptive statistics).4 Except for Central 
Government debt, which is measured by the quarterly public sector debt of the World Bank, all 
data are from EUROSTAT. 
Two main reasons justify the choice of quarterly data. First, as compared to annual data, 
the use of quarterly data is crucial for capturing the fact that fiscal authorities can respond to 
output shocks as rapidly as only after one quarter (Ilzetzki et al., 2013). Second, quarterly data 
provide a substantial increase in the number of degrees of freedom compared to annual data, an 
important feature given the relative small time span usually available for European post-
communist economies (hardly 15 years, in our study). In particular, as pointed out by Ilzetzki 
et al. (2013), interpolated quarterly data may lead to spurious regressions since, by construction, 
the interpolation creates a strong correlation between government spending and output. Thus, 
we use only genuine quarterly data, namely data that were originally collected at quarterly 
frequency.5 
Our main variables are the gross domestic product (GDP), the total government 
expenditure, defined as the sum of the general government final consumption and gross fixed 
capital formation, and taxes, which include taxes on imports and exports less subsidies. Prior 
to their use in regressions, all variables are deflated by the consumer index (CPI) and seasonally 
adjusted using a moving-average filter. 
  
                                                          
4 Although collected data cover the period 1992q2-2013q3, our sample starts in 1999q1 for several reasons. First, 
we allow CEEC to stabilize from the major imbalances engendered by the end of the Cold War. Second, we obtain 
a balanced sample with data collected at quarterly frequency. 
5 Most EU countries comply with the Common statistical standard in the European Monetary Union (ESA95), 
which encourages the collection of fiscal data at quarterly frequency. As such, CEEC in our sample started 
collecting quarterly-frequency data only since 1995. 
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6.3.2. Time series properties of variables 
 
We explore time series properties of variables using three types of panel unit root tests. 
On the one hand, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Fisher-type test of Choi (2001) and the 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) unit root test, which both assume the null hypothesis that all 
panels contain a unit root against the alternative of at least one stationary panel. Compared to 
alternative tests (such as Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002), these tests present the advantages of 
allowing the autoregressive parameter to be country-specific and of not requiring panels to be 
strongly balanced. On the other hand, to account for the presence of a relatively weak number 
of countries and time dimension, which is inherent when analyzing CEEC, we equally draw 
upon the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) unit root test. 
Provided variables are integrated of the same order, we test in the following for 
cointegration. For this purpose, we revert to the cointegration tests coined by Westerlund 
(2007), which extend to panel data the time series test of Banerjee et al. (1998). These tests 
assume the null hypothesis of no cointegration. In particular, compared to alternative tests (such 
as, for example, the residual-based test of Pedroni, 2004), Westerlund (2007) tests were selected 
on the basis of allowing individual short-run dynamics and for remaining consistent in the 
presence of possibly serial-correlated errors and weak exogenous regressors. 
 
6.3.3. The econometric model 
 
In this sub-section, we discuss the error correction specification and the choice of the 
appropriate estimator. The use of the error correction framework can be justified both 
empirically and theoretically. 
Empirically, the choice of the appropriate model strongly depends upon the statistical 
properties of the data. The existing literature on fiscal multipliers extensively resorts to the 
VAR methodology, either with country or panel data. However, the use of an error correction 
model is suitable when series are non stationary and cointegrated, as this is the case in our 
analysis. 
From a theoretical standpoint, it is not unreasonable to assume that the effect of fiscal 
policy on output is not independent of the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, all 
the more given the common long-term path of CEEC, driven by their integration process in the 
E(M)U (see Nenovsky and Villieu, 2011). Therefore, it is suitable to account for the long-run 
equilibrium when assessing the response of output to the fiscal impulse. 
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In line with Pesaran et al. (1999), we assume an autoregressive distributed lag model 
(ARDL), with p  lags for the dependent variable and q  lags for each of the RHS variables 
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with Ni ,1  countries, Tt ,1  periods, gdp  the log of real GDP, itx  the vector of explanatory 
variables, namely the log of government expenditure and of tax revenues, i  country-specific 
fixed effects, and it  the error term. Since our goal is to evaluate the effect of government 
spending on output, it is necessary to include taxes as a control variable, as spending are not 
independent of taxes (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).6 
Assuming that variables are I(1) and cointegrated, we reparameterise model (1) into the 
following error correction model (Pesaran et al., 1999) 
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part of (2)–in levels–captures the long-run relationship, while the second part–in differences–
illustrates the short-run adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. Parameter i  is the error-
correcting term and measures the speed of adjustment. To validate the existence of a long-run 
relationship, this parameter should be negative and significant. 
The literature suggests three main approaches for the estimation of model (2): (i) the 
dynamic fixed effect (DFE) estimator uses pooled data and allows the intercept to differ across 
groups; however, if the assumption of the common slope fails to hold, then the estimator is 
inconsistent; (ii) the pooling mean group estimator (PMG) combines both pooling and 
averaging; it assumes long-run coefficients to be equal across groups, but allows short-run 
coefficients to differ across groups, and (iii) the mean group (MG) estimator, which allows 
intercepts, slope coefficients and errors variances to differ across groups (Pesaran and Smith, 
1995). In this paper, since we aim at capturing long-term dynamics, we start by using the DFE 
estimator. Then, we draw upon previous evidence and econometric tests to make the case for 
the use of the PMG estimator as the most appropriate for our sample of CEEC. Indeed, the use 
                                                          
6 Prior to the adoption of this specification, we performed several estimations that included inflation, the real 
exchange rate or the interest rate as control variables. Since the inclusion of these controls does not significantly 
affect the coefficients of interest, we opted for this more parsimonious specification that has the merit of preserving 
substantial degrees of freedom, thus limiting the danger of biased estimates (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995). 
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of the PMG estimator will allow assessing the short-run dynamic of countries, while controlling 
for the long-run relationship between spending and output. 
 
6.3.4. Building a measure of discretionary expenditure shocks 
 
The main feature of the error correction model (2) is that short-run dynamics of variables are 
influenced by deviations from the long-run equilibrium. Thus, short-run coefficients capture 
output’s responsiveness to fiscal policy adjustments with respect to the long-run equilibrium. 
However, there is no reason to believe that observed variations in fiscal policy are exogenous 
or unexpected. Usually, the related literature based on VAR models usually relies on a simple 
Cholesky-decomposition of shocks, in which identification arises from the ordering of 
variables. In this paper, we draw upon the methodology of Fatas and Mihov (2003, 2006), 
Afonso et al. (2010) and Agnello et al. (2013), and construct a measure of discretionary fiscal 
policy as follows. 
Assuming that public spending can be decomposed into a structural (anticipated) and a 
residual (non-anticipated) component, we define discretionary spending shocks as the 
cyclically-adjusted component of government spending, which reflects unexpected fiscal policy 
changes. For each of 11 CEEC in our sample, we estimate the following model using quarterly 
data over the period 1999q1-2013q3 
    itititiitiitiiit trenddebtogapGG   1loglog ,   (3) 
with G  total government spending, ogap  the output gap (based on the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered 
log of real GDP), debt  the central government debt in % of GDP, and trend  the time trend. 
Consequently, we capture spending shocks through the residuals  . 
Equation (3) differs from the specification of Fatas and Mihov (2003) and Agnello et al. 
(2013). Indeed, following Blanchard (1993), and closely related Fatas and Mihov (2006), we 
estimate equation (3) in levels. In addition, compared to Fatas and Mihov (2006) who use GDP 
growth, we employ the output gap to capture the business cycle, for the following reasons. 
Output gap has the advantage of controlling for the degree of inflation pressure. Next, it also 
captures the state of unemployment, because a zero output gap corresponds to full employment. 
Moreover, a negative output gap suggests the existence of available excess capacities, while the 
crowding-out of private investment may be independent of the sign of the GDP growth rate. 
Finally, we control for fiscal policy sustainability and for the persistence of the responsiveness 
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of fiscal policy to the business cycle, using the debt-to-GDP ratio and lagged government 
spending, respectively. 
 
6.4. Fiscal multipliers in CEEC: Main results 
 
6.4.1. Stationarity and cointegration 
 
To assess the stationarity of our main variables, we report in Table 1 the results of the Fisher-
ADF, IPS and LLC unit root tests. We include in the auto-regressive specification of each test 
both the trend and the intercept, to test for both difference and trend stationarity. As illustrated 
by Table 1, the log of real GDP, total government expenditure and tax revenues are 
nonstationary, since, irrespective of the test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the presence 
of a unit root. In addition, as emphasized by low p-values, these variables are stationary in first-
difference, once again irrespective of the considered test. Since variables are integrated of the 
same order, we look in the following for potential cointegration relations among them. 
 
Table 1: Unit root tests 
Variables ADF IPS LLC 
 Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Log(real GDP) 
Z: 3.78 0.99 W-T-bar: 3.61 0.99 T*: 2.11 0.98 
Pm: -0.21 0.58     
D(Log of real GDP) 
Z: -3.12 0.00 W-T-bar: -3.30 0.00 T*: -7.20 0.00 
Pm: 6.51 0.00     
Log(Total Government Expenditures) 
Z: 5.11 1.00 W-T-bar: 5.23 1.00 T*: 0.84 0.80 
Pm: -2.34 0.99     
D(Log(Total Government Expenditures)) 
Z: -2.04 0.02 W-T-bar: -2.05 0.01 T*:-7.70 0.00 
Pm: 2.13 0.01     
Log(Taxes revenues) 
Z: 2.56 0.99 W-T-bar: 2.18 0.98 T*: 2.80 0.99 
Pm: -2.19 0.98     
D(Log(Taxes revenues)) 
Z: -9.50 0.00 W-T-bar: -14.4 0.00 T*: -15.93 0.00 
Pm: 19.1 0.00     
Note: Z is the inverse normal statistic, Pm is the modified inverse chi-squared. The null hypothesis is “all panel 
contain a unit root”. The specification includes a trend and an intercept. We use 4 lags following the AIC test. 
 
To assess cointegration, we draw upon Westerlund’s (2007) tests. These tests assume 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration, against four different specifications of the alternative 
hypothesis: the group mean test and its asymptotic version, which consider the alternative 
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hypothesis that the panel is cointegrated as a whole, and the panel mean test and its asymptotic 
version, which consider the alternative hypothesis that there is at least one cross-section unit 
for which the series are cointegrated. To preserve the consistency and the size accuracy in the 
case of cross-sectional dependence, we carry out the tests using bootstrap with 1000 
replications. Table 2 provides the results of testing for a potential cointegration relationship 
between real GDP, government expenditure and taxes. Irrespective of the considered test, low 
p-values in Table 2 support the presence of cointegration between variables. 
Table 2: Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests 
Statistic Value Z-value P-value 
Gt -2.896 -3.100 0.003 
Ga -13.982 -2.568 0.003 
Pt -8.476 -2.706 0.033 
Pa -10.233 -2.591 0.039 
Note: Gt and Pt are respectively the group mean test and the panel mean test. Ga and Pa refer to the asymptotic 
version of the test. The null hypothesis is “no cointegration”. We use 3 lags following the AIC test. 
 
Given that series in level are all I(1) and co-integrated, we will draw in the following 
upon an error correction models to compute output’s response to spending shocks. 
 
6.4.2. Fiscal multipliers in CEEC countries: full sample 
To estimate fiscal multipliers, we proceed in three steps. First, we isolate public spending 
shocks. Table 3 illustrates the results of the OLS estimation of equation (3), for each of the 11 
CEEC in our sample.7 As signalled by positively-significant coefficients of output gap, 
government expenditure is pro-cyclical in all (but Croatia) CEEC in our sample, consistent with 
previous evidence on developing and emerging countries (see Dalic, 2013). Furthermore, non 
significant or positive debt coefficients suggest that the adjustment in response to indebtedness 
takes place more likely through an adjustment of taxes than of public spending. Finally, 
irrespective of the considered country, fairly high R2 values support the quality of our 
specification for purging most of anticipated public spending, and isolate public spending 
shocks through the country-specific error terms. 
 
                                                          
7 Fatas and Mihov (2003) noticed that using OLS or IV in this first-stage regression leads to comparable results. 
We tested several specifications, in which output gap is generated alternatively using one and three GDP lags, to 
avoid reverse causality. We report that we did not unveil significant changes in our results (estimations are 
available upon request). 
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Table 3: Estimates of the discretionary component of the fiscal policy 
Dependent variable: Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
Log(Total Government expenditure)            
                        
Log(Total Government expenditure),t-1 0.882*** 1.100*** 0.740*** 0.968*** 0.745*** 0.857*** 0.905*** 0.682*** 0.526*** 0.765*** 0.846*** 
 (0.0999) (0.0393) (0.0999) (0.0476) (0.0817) (0.0846) (0.0848) (0.0949) (0.0747) (0.0932) (0.0686) 
Output gap 1.134** 0.00541 0.541*** 0.339** 0.826*** 0.327* 0.475** 0.568*** 1.464*** 0.512** 0.441* 
 (0.552) (0.180) (0.187) (0.161) (0.267) (0.173) (0.222) (0.195) (0.273) (0.226) (0.259) 
Real debt of the central government % GDP 0.0192  0.0237* 0.238*** 0.0247** -0.0291 0.0322 -0.0321 0.0609 -5.67e-05 -0.0105 
 (0.0116)  (0.0125) (0.0725) (0.0106) (0.0390) (0.0227) (0.0199) (0.0547) (0.0118) (0.0133) 
Time trend 0.00197 -0.00237*** 0.00263* -0.00114 -0.00207*** 0.00122 0.000443 0.00382*** 0.00213** 0.00286*** 0.000267 
 (0.00214) (0.000546) (0.00149) (0.000791) (0.000685) (0.00180) (0.00158) (0.00134) (0.000976) (0.000998) (0.000366) 
Constant 1.878 -1.617** 4.676** 0.541 4.703*** 2.318* 1.555 5.991*** 8.542*** 3.998** 2.662** 
 (1.581) (0.658) (1.783) (0.740) (1.493) (1.324) (1.354) (1.792) (1.339) (1.610) (1.180) 
            
Observations 46 42 50 51 51 51 51 51 43 50 51 
Adjusted R-squared 0.969 0.991 0.992 0.988 0.877 0.960 0.981 0.936 0.960 0.980 0.951 
F-stat 348.9 1488 1457 1053 89.78 301.8 643.8 183.3 255.0 607.5 245.9 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Debt data is unavailable for Croatia. 
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Second, we use these recovered shocks as a measure of unanticipated public spending 
in the estimation of the error correction model. However, drawing upon residuals from another 
equation in the error correction model may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, we correct 
standard errors using the Jackknife resampling procedure, which consists of repeatedly 
computing standard errors, by omitting each time one observation.104 In our specific case, to 
take into account both individual and time variability, the statistics are computed leaving out 
one country.105 
The first column of Table 4 reports the results of the error correction model used to 
compute the effects of unanticipated public expenditure on output for the full sample of 11 
CEEC, based on the dynamic fixed effect (DFE) estimator with four lags, as suggested by AIC 
tests. Several points must be highlighted. The error correction term is significant and negative, 
thus supporting our modelling strategy. Next, the fourth lag of unexpected expenditure is 
significant, consistent with the tests for the choice of the optimal lag. Finally, our strategy of 
controlling for tax revenues is supported by their significant coefficients. Based on this model, 
we compute in the following fiscal multipliers. 
                                                          
104 Note that performing a standard bootstrap would underestimate time variability in our analysis. 
105 In addition, this procedure allows detecting outliers using Jackknife pseudo-values (Mooney and Duval, 1993). 
This is a particularly appealing feature, given that the estimator we use is sensitive to outliers especially when the 
cross-section dimension is weak (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
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Table 4: Output’s response to fiscal policy 
  DFE PMG 
Long Run   
Log(Real GDP)   
Error correction term -0.0386*** -0.0375* 
 (0.0121) (0.0220) 
Log(Total Government expenditure) 0.223 0.829*** 
 (0.326) (0.0652) 
Log(Tax revenues) 0.545** -0.231*** 
 (0.262) (0.0763) 
Short Run   
D(Log(Real GDP))   
D(Log(Real GDP),t-1) 0.796*** 0.626*** 
 (0.0543) (0.0701) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-2) -0.759*** -0.183* 
 (0.0597) (0.0962) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-3) 0.659*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0684) (0.0681) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-4) 0.0516 -0.00700 
 (0.0575) (0.0781) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure)) 0.0283*** 0.0401*** 
 (0.00759) (0.0112) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-1) 0.00755 -0.00515 
 (0.00906) (0.00879) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-2) 0.0465*** 0.0109 
 (0.00820) (0.00719) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-3) 0.0141 0.0189 
 (0.0114) (0.0119) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-4) 0.0358*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.00447) (0.00416) 
D(Log(Tax revenues)) 0.220*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0283) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-1) -0.0589*** -0.00177 
 (0.0203) (0.0219) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-2) 0.0954*** -0.0101 
 (0.0211) (0.0177) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-3) -0.0744*** 0.000766 
 (0.0197) (0.0243) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-4) -0.0909** 0.00451 
 (0.0425) (0.0292) 
Constant 0.219*** 0.294* 
 (0.0599) (0.169) 
Observations 482 482 
Number of countries 11 11 
Log Likelihood  1942 
Hausman Test p-value  0.1842 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the 
discretionary component of government spending (the residuals of equation (3)). Standard errors are corrected 
using the Jackknife procedure. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that countries share a common long-run 
trend. The p-value of this test equals 0.18, thus accepting the null hypothesis and suggesting that the PMG estimator 
is preferred. 
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The third and last step consists of computing fiscal multipliers. Following the related 
literature, we focus on two multipliers. On the one hand, we compute the impact multiplier as 
 Y/G
m
G
Y
t
t 00 


 , with 
t
t
exp
gdp
m


0  the derivative of the log of GDP with respect to the log 
of expenditure, and  Y/G  the average expenditure-to-GDP ratio. On the other hand, we 
compute the cumulative multiplier over four quarters (1 year) as 
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For the full sample model, 028300 .m   (see Table 4) and   42800.Y/G   (see Table 
A.2a in the Appendix), leading to an impact multiplier equal to 0.07. Since the multiplier is 
significant (see Table 5), we find that, in other words, an increase of 1 unit in government 
expenditure increases GDP by 0.07 units. In addition, to account for a possible delay in output’s 
response to the fiscal stimulus, we compute the cumulative multiplier. Given that 132304 .M   
(see Table 4), the one-year cumulative multipliers equals 0.31 (and is significant, see Table 5). 
These findings call for two remarks. 
First, although spending multipliers are positive and significant, their magnitude is 
weak. As such our results for emerging CEEC are consistent with previous studies emphasizing 
fairly small multipliers in developing countries. 
Second, note that these values are based on the DFE estimator. However, this estimator 
rests on the assumption that all CEEC in our sample share a common long-term path and a 
common short-run dynamic. Regarding the latter, there are several reasons making the 
assumption of a common short-run dynamic unrealistic. Indeed, for example, given that some 
CEEC in our sample integrated the EU in 2004, others in 2007, and other did not integrate the 
EU yet, and the fact that our sample mixes CEEC that adopted the euro with CEEC that did not, 
we allow in the following for different short-run dynamics for the CEEC in our sample. 
Regarding the former assumption, we draw upon the Hausman Chi-2 test, which tests the null 
hypothesis of a common long-term coefficient against the alternative of different coefficients. 
Based on the associated p-value equal to 0.18 (see the bottom of Table 4), we accept the null 
hypothesis of a common long-term path for the CEEC in our sample. Consequently, in the 
following, our baseline specification assumes a common long-term path and different short-run 
dynamics, by using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator. 
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PMG-based estimated impact and cumulative multipliers equal 0.09 and 0.21, 
respectively, and are significant. Thus, accounting for different short-run dynamics slightly 
increases output’s response on impact, but decreases it by roughly one-third cumulated for four 
quarters. In what follows, we draw upon PMG estimators to compute country-specific fiscal 
multipliers. 
 
Table 5: Impact and cumulative fiscal multipliers for the full sample 
 Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) Pooling Mean Group (PMG) 
Multiplier Value Std Dev Value Std Dev 
Impact 0.07*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.02 
Cumulative 0.31*** 0.07 0.21** 0.07 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
6.4.3. Fiscal multipliers in CEEC: country-evidence 
One of the key contributions of this paper is to provide both full sample (aggregate) and 
country estimates of the fiscal multiplier within a unique framework. Based on PMG 
estimations of the effect of public expenditure on output (see Table 6), Table 7 reports fiscal 
multipliers for each of the 11 CEEC in our sample (Table A.2a in the Appendix presents 
country-specific descriptive statistics for public expenditure). 
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Table 6: Pooling Mean Group (PMG) country-estimates of the effect of public spending on output 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 Short run coefficient by country   LR 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth Bulgaria Croatia Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia  
Log(Real GDP)             
Log(Total Government Expenditure)            0.813*** 
            (0.0702) 
Log(Tax revenues)            -0.221*** 
             (0.0823) 
Error correction term -0.119*** -0.0940*** 0.000599 -0.0227** -0.0578** -0.0243* -0.0578*** -0.0279* -0.176*** -0.00662 -0.0508**  
 (0.0368) (0.0240) (0.00480) (0.00900) (0.0247) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0396) (0.00915) (0.0219)  
D(Log(Real GDP))             
D(Log(Real GDP),t-1) 0.725*** 0.264* 1.023*** 0.403** 0.879*** 0.765*** 0.505*** 0.646*** 0.491*** 0.925*** 0.471***  
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.153) (0.160) (0.144) (0.146) (0.123) (0.155) (0.128) (0.152) (0.107)  
D(Log(Real GDP),t-2) -0.575*** -0.0670 -0.417 0.317* -0.364* -0.232 0.0587 -0.0642 -0.542*** -0.546*** -0.160  
 (0.189) (0.135) (0.254) (0.188) (0.194) (0.156) (0.148) (0.205) (0.164) (0.181) (0.115)  
D(Log(Real GDP),t-3) 0.640*** 0.242** 0.391 -0.0865 0.334* 0.358** -0.0993 0.209 0.227 0.505*** 0.124  
 (0.177) (0.119) (0.241) (0.180) (0.193) (0.157) (0.148) (0.183) (0.204) (0.191) (0.115)  
D(Log(Real GDP),t-4) 0.365* -0.257*** -0.0208 -0.175 -0.226* -0.290** 0.00684 -0.181 0.399*** -0.169 0.387***  
 (0.200) (0.0843) (0.143) (0.140) (0.134) (0.121) (0.130) (0.127) (0.152) (0.153) (0.0986)  
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure)) 0.00652 0.0598*** 0.0975*** 0.0465*** 0.0249 0.0122 0.0619*** 0.0470*** -0.0214 0.0384 0.0818***  
 (0.0153) (0.0102) (0.0264) (0.0113) (0.0169) (0.0129) (0.0146) (0.0112) (0.0181) (0.0239) (0.0151)  
D(Log(unexpected Government expenditure),t-1) 0.0159 -0.0172 0.0130 0.0201 -0.0152 -0.0285** 0.0174 0.0133 -0.0726*** -0.0553*** 0.00515  
 (0.0157) (0.0129) (0.0287) (0.0129) (0.0167) (0.0124) (0.0182) (0.0148) (0.0182) (0.0202) (0.0179)  
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-2) 0.0211 -0.00433 0.0945*** -0.000310 0.0137 -0.0103 -0.0103 0.0441*** 0.00902 0.0488** 7.50e-05  
 (0.0139) (0.0163) (0.0248) (0.0121) (0.0190) (0.0127) (0.0170) (0.0154) (0.0222) (0.0241) (0.0180)  
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-3) 0.0170 -0.0428*** 0.0832*** 0.0508*** 0.0115 -0.0200* 0.0432*** 0.00540 -0.0276 -0.0104 0.0433**  
 (0.0115) (0.0154) (0.0248) (0.00904) (0.0158) (0.0119) (0.0160) (0.0130) (0.0226) (0.0214) (0.0177)  
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-4) 0.0292*** 0.0153 0.0436* 0.0371*** 0.0172 0.0428*** 0.0367*** 0.0432*** 0.0163 0.0326 -0.00970  
 (0.00973) (0.0132) (0.0247) (0.0111) (0.0190) (0.0120) (0.0109) (0.0127) (0.0185) (0.0214) (0.0145)  
D(Log(Tax revenues)) 0.122*** 0.350*** 0.0890** 0.173*** 0.247*** 0.229*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 0.366*** 0.124** 0.244***  
 (0.0467) (0.0361) (0.0415) (0.0300) (0.0744) (0.0387) (0.0539) (0.0491) (0.0701) (0.0485) (0.0453)  
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-1) -0.145** 0.133** 9.90e-05 -0.0639 -0.0400 -0.0176 0.0913 0.0267 0.0356 -0.0382 0.0644  
 (0.0610) (0.0618) (0.0463) (0.0403) (0.0777) (0.0494) (0.0612) (0.0608) (0.0909) (0.0521) (0.0418)  
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-2) 0.0921 -0.0435 -0.0671 0.0392 -0.0614 0.0732 -0.00154 -0.0823 -0.0295 0.00764 -0.0358  
 (0.0723) (0.0592) (0.0507) (0.0451) (0.0818) (0.0470) (0.0605) (0.0579) (0.0596) (0.0589) (0.0401)  
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-3) -0.0866 0.151*** -0.0439 0.131*** -0.0642 -0.0135 -0.110* -0.0234 0.0492 -0.00398 0.0440  
 (0.0710) (0.0470) (0.0490) (0.0420) (0.0798) (0.0464) (0.0588) (0.0562) (0.0534) (0.0532) (0.0395)  
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-4) 0.000854 0.136*** -0.0807* 0.0989** 0.107 -0.0399 0.0365 0.0160 -0.127** 0.0669 -0.178***  
 (0.0542) (0.0490) (0.0475) (0.0386) (0.0771) (0.0457) (0.0650) (0.0520) (0.0612) (0.0560) (0.0369)  
Constant -0.899*** 0.731*** -0.00248 0.161** 0.465** 0.177* 0.434*** 0.241* 1.412*** 0.0538 0.387**  
 (0.272) (0.182) (0.0383) (0.0630) (0.198) (0.0975) (0.0960) (0.124) (0.295) (0.0696) (0.169)  
Observations 482 
Log likelihood 1939 
Number of countries 11 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the discretionary component of government spending. 
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Table 7a: Fiscal multipliers by country (PMG estimator) 
Multiplier Impact Std dev Cumulative Std dev 
Bulgaria 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.10 
Croatia 0.13*** 0.02 0.07 0.10 
Czech Republic 0.21*** 0.04 0.68*** 0.16 
Estonia 0.10*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.05 
Hungary 0.06* 0.04 0.07 0.13 
Latvia 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.09 
Lithuania 0.15*** 0.03 0.34** 0.11 
Poland 0.12** 0.03 0.35** 0.11 
Romania  -0.05* 0.03 -0.18** 0.08 
Slovakia 0.09** 0.04 -0.01 0.10 
Slovenia  0.19*** 0.03 0.29** 0.09 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Analogous to estimations for the pooled sample, we present results for both impact and 
cumulative multipliers. Let us discuss impact multipliers. First, regarding sign differences, 
although most multipliers are positive, we equally reveal statistically not significant multipliers 
(for example, in Bulgaria or Latvia), and even a negative impact multiplier in Romania (albeit 
weakly significant). Second, we emphasize magnitude differences across multipliers in CEEC: 
for example, the impact multiplier in Czech Republic and Slovenia is roughly four times higher 
compared to Romania (in absolute value), and roughly two times higher if we stick to significant 
positive multipliers, for example in Estonia and Poland. 
Such sign and magnitude heterogeneities equally arise if we consider the cumulated 
response of GDP to fiscal shocks after four quarters. On the one hand, cumulative multipliers 
are positive in most countries, and remain non significant in Bulgaria or Hungary. However, 
we now find negative multipliers in three out of the eleven countries of our sample, namely 
Latvia, Romania and Slovakia. On the other hand, the magnitude of cumulative multipliers is 
stronger compared to impact multipliers; for example, the multiplier is around 0.3 in four 
countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia), and even as high as 0.7 in Czech Republic. 
These results call for two remarks. On the one hand, recall that multipliers were 
computed based on a model that assumed a common long-term path and different short-run 
dynamics among CEEC. If the fact of not accounting for the long-term path (for example, like 
in PVAR models) is an obvious drawback, we can illustrate the differences induced by not 
accounting for a common trend by comparing our results with mean group (MG) estimates, 
which assume different long-term paths (in addition to different short-run dynamics) among 
CEEC (see Table A.5 in the Appendix for MG estimated coefficients). 
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Table 7b: Fiscal multipliers by country (MG estimator) 
Multiplier Impact Std dev Cumulative Std dev 
Bulgaria -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.12 
Croatia 0.13*** 0.03 0.02 0.16 
Czech Republic 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.26 
Estonia 0.10** 0.03 0.32*** 0.07 
Hungary 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.19 
Latvia 0.11** 0.04 0.41** 0.18 
Lithuania 0.17*** 0.04 0.55** 0.18 
Poland 0.11** 0.04 0.31** 0.15 
Romania -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.15 
Slovakia 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.15 
Slovenia 0.15** 0.04 0.26** 0.13 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Compared to Table 7a, Table 7b emphasizes significant difference for both impact and 
cumulative multipliers. Focusing on impact multipliers, not accounting for a common long-
term path would (i) overestimate their significance in Latvia and underestimate it in Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and, to some extent, in Romania, and (ii) overestimate their size in Latvia 
and underestimate it in Czech Republic and Slovakia. These differences are reinforced 
regarding cumulative multipliers. For example, not accounting for a common long-term path 
would (i) overestimate their significance in Latvia and underestimate it in Czech Republic, 
Romania and Slovakia, and (ii) overestimate their size in Latvia and Lithuania, and 
underestimate it in Czech Republic and in Romania (particularly for Romania, the estimated 
coefficient would be positive, instead of significantly negative). 
On the other hand, country-evidence unveils important short-run heterogeneities across CEEC. 
Consistent with the standard ISLM model, we emphasize Keynesian effects of fiscal policy both on 
impact and after one year, in most of CEEC in our sample. However, in several countries we do not find 
significant multipliers, neither on impact (for example, in Bulgaria and Hungary), nor cumulated after 
four quarters (for example, in Bulgaria and Latvia), in line with the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem of 
Barro (1974). In addition, we even find anti-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy on output, in the form of 
negative multipliers (for example, in Romania on impact, and in Latvia, Romania and Slovakia 
cumulated after four quarters). Thus, even if CEEC are expected to converge in the long-run towards a 
common steady-state, the dynamic of their output following fiscal shocks might be quite different. This 
calls for a closer look at specificities at work in CEEC. 
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6.5. Fiscal multipliers in CEEC: Conditionality upon structural characteristics 
Heterogeneities in output’s response to fiscal policy unveiled in the previous section are 
probably related to economic and structural differences among CEEC. In the following, we 
analyze the sensitivity of multipliers to such differences. 
We consider four structural characteristics of CEEC. First, we seize differences in 
monetary policy by considering alternatively countries with fixed (pegged), intermediate and 
flexible exchange rate regime (ERR), using the classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2010) reported 
in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Second, to account for the level of economic development, we 
divide CEEC using the level of income (average over 1999:q1-2013:q3), into low- and high-
income CEEC, respectively. Third, we capture the fiscal stance using the public debt106 to 
distinguish among low-debt CEEC (with a debt ratio of 22% of GDP on average over 1999:q1-
2013:q3) and high-debt CEEC (with an average debt ratio of 48% of GDP for the same 
period).107 Finally, we take into account the openness degree using the level of exports in 
percentage of GDP, and, accordingly, we divide CEEC into countries with relatively low and 
high openness degree, respectively. Table 8 presents the countries in each group. 
 
Table 8: List of groups of countries based on CEEC’ structural characteristics 
 Exchange Rate Regime (ERR) Level of income Public Debt (%GDP) Openness degree (%GDP) 
 Pegged Intermediate Floating Low High Low High Low High 
Group mean - - - 5.25e+07 2.84e+08 22.42 48.29 45.11 69.25 
 Bulgaria Croatia Poland Bulgaria Czech R. Czech R. Bulgaria Bulgaria Czech R. 
 Estonia Czech R. Romania Croatia Hungary Estonia Croatia Croatia Estonia 
 Lithuania Hungary  Estonia Poland Latvia Hungary Latvia Hungary 
 Slovenia Latvia  Latvia Romania Lithuania Poland Lithuania Slovakia 
  Slovakia  Lithuania Slovakia Romania Slovakia Poland Slovenia 
  Slovenia  Slovenia  Slovenia  Romania  
 
Based on Table 8, Table 9 presents the estimations of the effect of unexpected 
government spending on output using the PMG estimator,108 and Table 10 reports the associated 
multipliers (Table A.2b in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for each group of 
countries). 
                                                          
106 We use the gross consolidated debt of the central government (the same measures is used, for example, by 
Ilzetzki et al., 2013). 
107 We split countries based on the median public debt to GDP ratio for the sample period 1999:q1-2013:q3. 
Considering median public debt, instead of an exogenous threshold of 60% (as suggested by the Maastricht 
Treaty), is justified by the fact that in our sample only Hungary presents a debt ratio above this threshold. 
108 Since the lag structure changes across structural characteristics, and due to the loses in degrees of freedom, we 
set the number of lags equal to 4 (the same is done by Ilzetzki et al., 2013, in their analysis based on quarterly 
data). 
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Table 9: PMG estimates of the effect of unexpected government spending on output when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics 
  Full 
model 
Exchange Rate Regime (ERR) Level of income Public debt (% of GDP) Openness degree 
  Pegged Intermediate Floating Low High Low High Low High 
Long Run                     
Log(Real GDP)           
Error correction term -0.0375* -0.0121 -0.182** 0.0452 -0.0260 -0.170*** -0.0766 -0.0905** 0.0101 -0.125 
 (0.0220) (0.0414) (0.0751) (0.0769) (0.0328) (0.0551) (0.0845) (0.0418) (0.00907) (0.0777) 
Log(Total Government Expenditure) 0.829*** 1.146*** 0.772*** 0.809*** 0.899*** 0.130*** 0.677*** 0.281*** 2.779 0.581*** 
 (0.0652) (0.107) (0.0314) (0.114) (0.0559) (0.0502) (0.0373) (0.0918) (1.827) (0.0615) 
Log(Tax revenues) -0.231*** -0.517*** 0.272*** 0.258** -0.289*** 0.736*** 0.332*** 0.611*** -1.872 0.405*** 
 (0.0763) (0.110) (0.0235) (0.123) (0.0670) (0.0456) (0.0293) (0.0961) (1.975) (0.0470) 
Short Run           
Control for Real GDP (up until the lag 4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure)) 0.0401*** 0.0510*** 0.0347** 0.0541*** 0.0479*** 0.0245* 0.0481*** 0.0260** 0.0400*** 0.0363** 
 (0.0112) (0.0197) (0.0136) (0.0202) (0.0122) (0.0137) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0131) (0.0144) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-1) -0.00515 0.0139*** -0.0103 0.0203 0.00183 -0.0214 -0.00226 -0.00592 -0.00339 -0.0184 
 (0.00879) (0.00482) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.00754) (0.0162) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.00908) (0.0156) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-2) 0.0109 0.00610 0.0195 0.0378*** 0.00169 0.0134*** 0.0101 0.00648 0.00870 -0.00211 
 (0.00719) (0.00854) (0.0244) (0.0143) (0.00664) (0.00171) (0.00785) (0.00701) (0.00965) (0.00627) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-3) 0.0189 0.0390*** 0.0166 0.0329*** 0.0175 0.0176* 0.0377*** -0.00325 0.00266 0.0313*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0100) (0.0210) (0.00918) (0.0144) (0.00903) (0.0107) (0.0156) (0.0134) (0.00943) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-4) 0.0253*** 0.0290*** 0.0329* 0.0388 0.0271*** 0.0147* 0.0307*** 0.0214*** 0.0347*** 0.0119 
 (0.00416) (0.00990) (0.0195) (0.0276) (0.00690) (0.00780) (0.00980) (0.00314) (0.00532) (0.00933) 
Control for Taxes (up until the lag 4) and for the Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 482 179 237 77 262 220 267 215 254 228 
Number of countries 11 4 7 2 6 5 6 5 6 5 
Log Likelihood 1942 752.0 1028 286.4 1116 843.3 1098 851.6 996.4 931.0 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the discretionary component of government spending (the residuals 
of equation (3)). Standard errors are corrected using the Jackknife resampling procedure. We control for Real GDP and for Taxes up until the lag 4 (the full table is reported in 
Appendix as Table A.4). 
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Table 10: Fiscal multipliers when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics (PMG) 
Multiplier Impact Std dev Cumulative Std dev 
Full model 0.09*** 0.02 0.21** 0.07 
Exchange Rate Regime     
Pegged 0.11** 0.04 0.32*** 0.05 
Intermediate 0.07** 0.03 0.20 0.15 
Floating 0.13** 0.05 0.46*** 0.04 
Level of Economic Development     
Low income 0.11*** 0.02 0.22** 0.06 
High income 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.07 
Level of Debt-to-GDP Ratio     
Low debt 0.10*** 0.02 0.28*** 0.07 
High debt 0.06** 0.02 0.10 0.06 
Openness Degree     
Low openness 0.11*** 0.02 0.26** 0.07 
High openness 0.08** 0.03 0.13 0.09 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Let us first focus on the type of the exchange rate regime. As shown by Table 10, the ERR does 
not seem to matter for the impact response of output to changes in fiscal policy: impact 
multipliers equal 0.11, 0.07 and 0.13, respectively. On the contrary, cumulative multipliers are 
highly sensitive to the ERR. For example, on the one hand, the cumulated response of output is 
0.32 for pegged ERR, compared to statistically 0 (i.e. not significant) for intermediate ERR, 
consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model and previous evidence of more effective fiscal 
stimulus under pegged regimes in developed countries (Born et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
the cumulated fiscal multiplier for floating ERR equals 0.46, and is equally higher than for 
intermediate ERR, consistent yet again with evidence for developed countries (Monacelli and 
Perotti, 2010, Ramey, 2011).109 These results asserting that corner (namely, pegged and 
flexible) ERR perform better than intermediate ERR when it comes to fiscal multipliers seem 
to suggest that the weak credibility of intermediate ERR in CEEC in our sample reduces the 
efficiency of fiscal policy. 
Second, using median income as cut-off, Table 10 shows that the multiplier is sensitive 
to the level of economic development. Specifically, both impact and cumulative multipliers are 
significant only in low-income, relative to high-income CEEC. Thus, our findings suggest the 
presence of growth-effects of fiscal policies in less developed CEEC. 
                                                          
109 Albeit inconsistent with the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model, this result meets some recent findings 
in the literature on developed countries; for example, Corsetti et al. (2012) explain that an expansionary fiscal 
policy can be associated with a real depreciation of the currency, thus boosting economic activity. For a recent 
discussion of heterogeneities related to the exchange rate regime in CEEC, see Josifidis et al. (2013). 
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Third, to account for a potential role of the fiscal stance, we compute multipliers for 
CEEC with relatively low and high debt-to-GDP ratios, respectively. Result in Table 10 display 
impact multipliers of 0.10 and 0.06, and cumulative multipliers of 0.28 and statistically 0 for 
CEEC with low and high debt, respectively. Thus, our findings mirror the recent literature 
emphasizing nonlinear effects of fiscal policy on economic growth in a context of relatively 
high public debt,110 and defend sound macroeconomic environments (and particularly, low 
debt) as a tool for reinforcing the efficiency of fiscal-policy-based measures for supporting 
economic growth. 
Finally, we use the level of exports in percentage of GDP to divide CEEC between 
countries with low and high openness degree, respectively. As this was the case for the ERR, 
the openness degree is not found to influence the effects of fiscal policy on impact. On the 
contrary, cumulative multipliers are significant only in relatively less open CEEC (0.26, against 
statistically 0 in relatively more open CEEC), consistent with the predictions of the 
conventional Mundell-Fleming model. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
Despite an impressive strand of literature estimating fiscal multipliers in developed countries, 
evidence for developing and emerging countries remains remarkably scarce. This paper 
provides new insights into how fiscal stimulus affects the output in 11 emerging Central and 
Eastern European Countries, based on a rather different methodological approach. Indeed, if 
most studies draw upon VAR models, we use a Panel Vector Error Correction model, selected 
for its particularly appealing features when it comes to CEEC: on the one hand, it allows 
accounting for their common long-run path, supported by their integration in the E(M)U, and, 
on the other hand, it permits computing different short-run dynamics in an integrated framework 
that controls for their common long-run path. In addition, we pay special attention to identifying 
truly exogenous shocks, through implementing an econometric procedure together with using 
genuine quarterly data. 
Estimations performed over the period 1999q1-2013q3 unveil the following results. 
First, fiscal multipliers are positive and significant for CEEC, albeit with important differences 
between impact and four-quarter cumulative multipliers. Second, country-specific multipliers 
                                                          
110 Such nonlinear effects of fiscal policy on growth in high-debt contexts are emphasized by Minea & Parent 
(2012) and Egert (2015) in developed countries, and by Eberhardt & Presbitero (2013) and Kourtellos et al. (2013) 
in developing countries. In addition, fiscal multipliers were also find to decline in developed countries, but above 
higher debt thresholds, namely 60% (Ilzetzki et al., 2013) or 100% (Corsetti et al., 2012). 
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are heterogeneous across CEEC, in sign, significance, and magnitude. Third, impact and 
cumulative fiscal multipliers are strongly sensitive to CEEC’ characteristics. In particular, we 
find significant multipliers in CEEC with fixed or floating ERR, in less developed CEEC, in 
the CEEC with relatively low public debt-to-GDP ratios, and in relatively less open CEEC. 
These results have important policy implications. Overall, the presence of relatively 
small multipliers suggests that the efficiency of expansionary fiscal policies is rather limited. 
However, this also means that CEEC countries in our sample are likely to be little affected by 
policies that involve fiscal consolidations. Example of such policies include fiscal reforms 
designed to ensure fiscal convergence towards the fiscal conditions in E(M)U countries, 
including more public-investment oriented policies, reforms aimed at reducing the weight of 
wasteful public spending, the adoption of fiscal rules related to the Stability and Growth Pact, 
and so forth. 
In addition, our results also highlight the presence of important heterogeneities among 
the CEEC in our sample, which provides interesting insights regarding the path they should 
follow for increasing the convergence towards the EMU. First, our findings suggest that a 
strategy for improving growth effects of fiscal policy in small open CEEC is to move towards 
extreme ERR. This is a particularly appealing finding: compared to the CEEC that already 
integrated the euro zone, the remaining countries should perform structural reforms allowing 
moving towards more fixity in their exchange rate arrangements, thus creating an additional 
incentive for joining the eurozone in the future. Second, since multipliers are relatively larger 
in a context of sound fiscal stance, our paper makes the case for reforms that foster fiscal 
discipline, including the adoption of fiscal rules as the ones at work in the EMU. Finally, since 
the effects of fiscal policy are found to be significant exclusively in less developed CEEC, 
drawing upon a sound fiscal policy might improve the convergence process towards countries 
in the euro zone. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1a: List of countries 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
Table A.1b: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev Min Max 
Real GDP 482 1.59e+08 1.78e+08 1.68e+07 8.76e+08 
Government expenditure 482 6.75e+07 7.19e+07 7246924 4.21e+08 
Tax revenues 482 1.91e+07 2.25e+07 1757586 1.16e+08 
Real exchange rate 482 101.3819 11.21874 69.44 135.55 
Central government debt (% GDP) 429 29.68998 18.11024 1 81 
Export of goods & services (% GDP) 482 55.67858 16.1442 23.62175 89.89667 
 
Table A.2a: Summary statistics of government expenditure in % of GDP (by country) 
  Mean Std Dev 
Full model 42.79962 6.02706 
Bulgaria 39.34807 7.50139 
Croatia 44.42253 3.09011 
Czech Republic 46.89297 3.09541 
Estonia 47.13088 4.45549 
Hungary 43.43218 5.52663 
Latvia 44.40612 6.04969 
Lithuania 41.18482 4.95491 
Poland 38.35802 5.01909 
Romania 39.54567 5.12169 
Slovakia 44.36725 7.31942 
Slovenia 42.85272 2.58801 
 
Table A.2b: Summary statistics of government expenditure in % of GDP (by category) 
  Mean Std Dev 
Full model 42.79962 6.02706 
Pegged regime 42.82518 5.972292 
Intermediate regime 45.07149 5.150866 
Floating regime 39.68591 4.971359 
Low income 42.77994 5.701126 
High Income 42.82263 6.395615 
Low Debt 43.80545 5.278542 
High Debt 42.79962 6.02706 
Low Openness 40.65295 5.876038 
High Openness 45.20631 5.239712 
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Table A.3: CEEC’ ERR classification based on Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
Code Fine classification Coarse classification Countries 
1 No separate legal tender   Bulgaria, Estonia 
2 Pre announced peg or currency board Pegged Lithuania, Slovenia 
4 De facto Peg    
8 De facto crawling band that is narrowed than or equal to+/-2%   Croatia, Czech Republic 
9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%  Hungary, Latvia 
10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% Intermediate Slovakia 
11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%  Slovenia 
 (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time)    
12 Managed floating Floating Poland, Romania 
14 Freely falling   
15 Dual market in which parallel market data is missing. Other  
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Table A.4: PMG estimates of the effect of unexpected government spending on output when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics (full Table 9) 
  
Full 
model 
Exchange Rate Regime (ERR) Level of income Public debt (% of GDP) Openness degree 
  Pegged Intermediate Floating Low High Low High Low High 
Long Run                     
Log(Real GDP)           
Error correction term -0.0375* -0.0121 -0.182** 0.0452 -0.0260 -0.170*** -0.0766 -0.0905** 0.0101 -0.125 
 (0.0220) (0.0414) (0.0751) (0.0769) (0.0328) (0.0551) (0.0845) (0.0418) (0.00907) (0.0777) 
Log(Total Government Expenditure) 0.829*** 1.146*** 0.772*** 0.809*** 0.899*** 0.130*** 0.677*** 0.281*** 2.779 0.581*** 
 (0.0652) (0.107) (0.0314) (0.114) (0.0559) (0.0502) (0.0373) (0.0918) (1.827) (0.0615) 
Log(Tax revenues) -0.231*** -0.517*** 0.272*** 0.258** -0.289*** 0.736*** 0.332*** 0.611*** -1.872 0.405*** 
 (0.0763) (0.110) (0.0235) (0.123) (0.0670) (0.0456) (0.0293) (0.0961) (1.975) (0.0470) 
Short Run           
D(Log(Real GDP))           
D(Log(Real GDP),t-1) 0.626*** 0.506*** 0.614*** 0.603*** 0.524*** 0.751*** 0.619*** 0.628*** 0.668*** 0.691*** 
 (0.0701) (0.0671) (0.0859) (0.0298) (0.0736) (0.104) (0.0685) (0.123) (0.0426) (0.0978) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-2) -0.183* -0.0701 -0.217** -0.0848 -0.0811 -0.228 -0.114 -0.248 -0.179 -0.169 
 (0.0962) (0.207) (0.0924) (0.341) (0.128) (0.147) (0.128) (0.202) (0.180) (0.132) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-3) 0.216*** 0.0873 0.306*** 0.179 0.148 0.296*** 0.136* 0.430*** 0.310*** 0.174** 
 (0.0681) (0.161) (0.0762) (0.140) (0.113) (0.0360) (0.0807) (0.103) (0.108) (0.0880) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-4) -0.00700 0.162 -0.0195 0.221 0.0290 0.0589 0.144 -0.125** 0.00320 0.0446 
 (0.0781) (0.168) (0.160) (0.381) (0.132) (0.102) (0.124) (0.0511) (0.134) (0.108) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure)) 0.0401*** 0.0510*** 0.0347** 0.0541*** 0.0479*** 0.0245* 0.0481*** 0.0260** 0.0400*** 0.0363** 
 (0.0112) (0.0197) (0.0136) (0.0202) (0.0122) (0.0137) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0131) (0.0144) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-1) -0.00515 0.0139*** -0.0103 0.0203 0.00183 -0.0214 -0.00226 -0.00592 -0.00339 -0.0184 
 (0.00879) (0.00482) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.00754) (0.0162) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.00908) (0.0156) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-2) 0.0109 0.00610 0.0195 0.0378*** 0.00169 0.0134*** 0.0101 0.00648 0.00870 -0.00211 
 (0.00719) (0.00854) (0.0244) (0.0143) (0.00664) (0.00171) (0.00785) (0.00701) (0.00965) (0.00627) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-3) 0.0189 0.0390*** 0.0166 0.0329*** 0.0175 0.0176* 0.0377*** -0.00325 0.00266 0.0313*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0100) (0.0210) (0.00918) (0.0144) (0.00903) (0.0107) (0.0156) (0.0134) (0.00943) 
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D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-4) 0.0253*** 0.0290*** 0.0329* 0.0388 0.0271*** 0.0147* 0.0307*** 0.0214*** 0.0347*** 0.0119 
 (0.00416) (0.00990) (0.0195) (0.0276) (0.00690) (0.00780) (0.00980) (0.00314) (0.00532) (0.00933) 
D(Log(Tax revenues)) 0.221*** 0.178*** 0.181*** 0.279*** 0.218*** 0.142*** 0.188*** 0.208*** 0.253*** 0.145*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0341) (0.0532) (0.0224) (0.0323) (0.0217) (0.0456) (0.0428) (0.0311) (0.0347) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-1) -0.00177 -0.0106 -0.0416 -0.000159 0.00391 -0.0586*** -0.0204 -0.0311 -0.0356 -0.0407 
 (0.0219) (0.0549) (0.0289) (0.0497) (0.0391) (0.0103) (0.0235) (0.0384) (0.0217) (0.0254) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-2) -0.0101 0.0226* -0.0831** -0.00679 0.0190 -0.0998*** -0.0160 -0.0430 -0.0214 -0.0447 
 (0.0177) (0.0127) (0.0360) (0.0557) (0.0200) (0.0275) (0.0318) (0.0510) (0.0439) (0.0353) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-3) 0.000766 0.0103 -0.0371 -0.0580*** 0.0292 -0.105*** -0.0261 -0.0594 -0.0505 -0.0139 
 (0.0243) (0.0570) (0.0456) (0.0106) (0.0416) (0.0220) (0.0421) (0.0438) (0.0328) (0.0402) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-4) 0.00451 -0.0291 -0.0670 -0.0985 -0.00281 -0.0760 -0.105*** 0.0239 -0.0304 -0.0474 
 (0.0292) (0.0537) (0.0679) (0.114) (0.0428) (0.0564) (0.0392) (0.0317) (0.0461) (0.0641) 
Constant 0.294* 0.0744 0.0771**  0.187 0.737*** 0.0901 0.326** 0.358 0.208 
 (0.169) (0.272) (0.0314)  (0.238) (0.238) (0.0984) (0.153) (0.314) (0.131) 
Observations 482 179 237 77 262 220 267 215 254 228 
Number of countries 11 4 7 2 6 5 6 5 6 5 
Log Likelihood 1942 752.0 1028 286.4 1116 843.3 1098 851.6 996.4 931.0 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the discretionary component of government spending (the residuals 
of equation (3)). Standard errors are corrected using the Jackknife resampling procedure. 
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Table A.5: MG country-estimates of the effect of public spending on output 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Short run coefficient by country   
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth Bulgaria Croatia Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
Log(Real GDP)                       
Log(Total Governement Expenditures) 6.860 0.937*** 0.620*** 0.599 0.280** -0.876** 0.722*** 0.270** -0.175 0.794*** 0.805*** 
 (20.72) (0.327) (0.0785) (0.520) (0.125) (0.420) (0.165) (0.132) (0.307) (0.243) (0.236) 
Log(Taxes revenues) -5.958 -0.467 0.375*** 0.208 0.821*** 2.487*** 0.263 0.614*** 1.044*** 0.476** -0.878*** 
  (19.73) (0.689) (0.0602) (0.582) (0.133) (0.587) (0.285) (0.139) (0.367) (0.224) (0.257) 
Error correction term 0.0159 -0.0880* -0.415*** -0.0775 -0.362*** -0.0935*** -0.160*** -0.216** -0.235* -0.153*** -0.0832** 
 (0.0511) (0.0467) (0.114) (0.0740) (0.110) (0.0259) (0.0606) (0.0866) (0.142) (0.0559) (0.0396) 
D(Log(Real GDP))            
D(Log(Real GDP),t-1) 0.638*** 0.262 0.893*** 0.370* 0.749*** 0.619*** 0.531*** 0.327 0.674*** 0.712*** 0.351** 
 (0.150) (0.194) (0.165) (0.197) (0.163) (0.165) (0.148) (0.203) (0.183) (0.186) (0.145) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-2) -0.674*** -0.0644 -0.344 0.453* -0.0896 -0.104 0.0948 0.308 -0.463*** -0.414* -0.0798 
 (0.196) (0.189) (0.250) (0.239) (0.234) (0.181) (0.188) (0.245) (0.178) (0.213) (0.144) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-3) 0.495*** 0.217 0.175 -0.138 0.392* 0.261 -0.0559 0.239 0.321 0.258 0.110 
 (0.183) (0.173) (0.232) (0.225) (0.217) (0.183) (0.186) (0.236) (0.223) (0.230) (0.139) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-4) 0.515** -0.249** 0.0661 -0.240 0.0815 -0.136 0.0895 -0.155 0.580*** -0.214 0.489*** 
 (0.208) (0.119) (0.154) (0.241) (0.200) (0.161) (0.172) (0.160) (0.200) (0.180) (0.160) 
D(Log(Total Governement Expenditures)) -0.0191 0.0595*** 0.0256 0.0516*** 0.00990 0.0509*** 0.0708*** 0.0437** -0.00569 0.00989 0.0665*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0155) (0.0303) (0.0149) (0.0219) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0297) (0.0205) 
D(Log(Total Governement Expenditures),t-1) -0.00853 -0.0170 -0.0611* 0.0196 -0.0162 0.0266 0.0292 0.0296 -0.0452** -0.0420* 0.0144 
 (0.0174) (0.0195) (0.0352) (0.0163) (0.0242) (0.0239) (0.0251) (0.0192) (0.0207) (0.0231) (0.0234) 
D(Log(Total Governement Expenditures),t-2) 0.0269** -0.00416 -0.0147 -0.00997 -0.00712 0.0368 0.0152 0.0193 0.0261 0.00564 0.00310 
 (0.0132) (0.0259) (0.0339) (0.0162) (0.0230) (0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0207) (0.0232) (0.0290) (0.0224) 
D(Log(Total Governement Expenditures),t-3) 0.000933 -0.0406* 0.0324 0.0510*** 0.0152 0.0215 0.0639*** 0.00967 0.0156 0.0156 0.0364* 
 (0.0120) (0.0242) (0.0302) (0.0112) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0233) (0.0187) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0214) 
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D(Log(Total Governement Expenditures),t-4) 0.0276*** 0.0150 -0.00851 0.0403*** 0.00393 0.0484*** 0.0520*** 0.0186 0.0364* 0.0277 -0.00741 
 (0.00974) (0.0189) (0.0312) (0.0136) (0.0217) (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0172) (0.0197) (0.0249) (0.0171) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues)) 0.0827* 0.359*** 0.0147 0.147*** 0.0655 0.0568 0.169** 0.232*** 0.111 0.0699 0.240*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0606) (0.0546) (0.0532) (0.102) (0.0685) (0.0782) (0.0637) (0.137) (0.0675) (0.0543) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues),t-1) -0.144** 0.142 -0.112** -0.0910* -0.0962 -0.168** 0.0191 -0.00654 -0.0718 -0.0343 0.0963 
 (0.0610) (0.0917) (0.0555) (0.0537) (0.0919) (0.0661) (0.0856) (0.0783) (0.124) (0.0788) (0.0591) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues),t-2) 0.0520 -0.0315 -0.116** 0.00156 -0.194** -0.0481 -0.0738 -0.125 -0.119 0.0225 -0.0146 
 (0.0696) (0.0872) (0.0570) (0.0617) (0.0959) (0.0627) (0.0907) (0.0810) (0.0957) (0.0767) (0.0722) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues),t-3) -0.0541 0.164** -0.0848 0.119* -0.217** -0.0790 -0.181** -0.142* -0.163* -0.00360 0.0581 
 (0.0691) (0.0725) (0.0524) (0.0615) (0.104) (0.0564) (0.0848) (0.0795) (0.0989) (0.0716) (0.0602) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues),t-4) -0.181** 0.145** -0.200*** 0.0845 -0.102 -0.123* -0.0429 -0.0747 -0.259*** 0.0987 -0.136** 
 (0.0727) (0.0740) (0.0627) (0.0595) (0.107) (0.0635) (0.0910) (0.0757) (0.0872) (0.0716) (0.0622) 
Constant 0.0655 0.849** 0.619*** 0.327 -0.0353 -0.525** 0.241 0.837** 1.099*** -0.486* 1.526*** 
 (0.415) (0.357) (0.201) (0.273) (0.343) (0.241) (0.230) (0.347) (0.398) (0.254) (0.578) 
Observations 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 
Log likelihood 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the discretionary component of government spending (the residuals 
of equation (3)). Standard errors are corrected using the Jackknife resampling procedure. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
Some of the major effects of the recent crisis include unemployment increases and 
economic growth downturns. As emphasized in introduction, world economies are still 
struggling with these problems, and try to find the appropriate policy combination to fight the 
effects of the crisis and put their economies back on track. In this context, our work found 
inspiration in the rule of thumb known as Okun’s Law (Okun, 1962) and in the concept of fiscal 
multiplier (popularized by Keynes, 1936), as the starting point for a series of discussions centred 
on the relationship between supply, demand and economic growth. 
The objective of this thesis was to contribute to this debate and to provide policymakers 
with information regarding specific regions and areas, in order to implement appropriate policy 
measures to stimulate economic growth. More precisely, we focused our analysis on the 
unemployment-output growth relationship and on the output effects of fiscal stimuli. The 
addressed topics and the econometric methods used in this thesis make our results a contribution 
to the ongoing discussion on how to reduce unemployment and on the growth consequences of 
fiscal stimuli. The results of our analysis can generate reflective tracks likely to fuel the ongoing 
debate. These results and tracks are presented in the six chapters of this thesis. 
After briefly presenting in the General Introduction the effects of the recent crisis, we 
approach in Chapter 1 the unemployment problem in two emerging CEE countries selected for 
their relevance, namely the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Drawing upon Okun’s (1962) work, 
our results show that the negative relationship between the GDP cycle and the unemployment 
cycle stands for the two countries, both at country and regional level. In addition, we 
emphasized important heterogeneities among Czech and Slovak regions when it comes to the 
significance of the coefficients. Considering the regions where the coefficient is not significant 
and the fact that after the Cold War these countries entered an unemployment-generating 
deindustrialization process, our findings raise questions about the possibility of some regions 
to enter in an underemployment trap after being already in an underdevelopment trap 
(characterized by low economic growth rates). Moreover, these regions are characterized by 
low levels of FDI, GFCF, R&D spending or low number of students. To this end, policymakers 
should consider supply-based policies in order to reduce the unemployment, together with 
policies aiming at attracting FDI (a successful example is the Moravian Silesian region in 
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Slovakia). Capitalizing on these results, Chapter 2 presents evidence of regional Okun’s Law 
in another emerging CEE country, namely Romania, selected for being the second largest 
emerging CEE country (after Poland). The results suggest that, in the majority of regions, 
demand-based policies of Keynesian inspirations can be put in place in order to reduce 
unemployment and to stimulate regional economic growth. The two regions in which the 
Okun’s coefficient is not significant are characterized by the highest growth rates over the 
studied period, suggesting that only supply-based policies can affect the unemployment. 
Turning to the fiscal multiplier, Chapter 3 surveys the recent (i.e. since the beginning of 
the recent crisis) literature on this topic. The survey highlights that the recent literature is almost 
exclusively focused on developed countries, while studies dealing with emerging and 
developing countries are remarkably rare (and in particular, multipliers are found to be 
relatively lower in the latter countries). Furthermore, we emphasized the way the fiscal 
multiplier may be sensitive to a wide set of variables: (i) the position in the economic cycle 
suggests that multipliers are bigger in recession periods; (ii) the fiscal position reveals lower 
multipliers when public debt is high, (iii) the monetary policy, specifically during zero lower 
bond periods, fosters fiscal multipliers, and (iv) the fixed exchange rate regimes is related to 
higher multipliers. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ilzetzki and al. (2013), but 
focusing on European countries that are in, intend to, or do not intend to join the Eurozone, 
Chapter 4 reveals the following results regarding the behaviour of the fiscal multiplier. 
Regarding tax multipliers, no significant differences can be observed between the different 
groups of countries. On the contrary, an expenditure shock generates a positive and significant 
response of output in Eurozone countries, Eurozone crisis countries and countries that have the 
intention to join the Eurozone in the future, while a negative and significant response for 
countries that are not expected to join the Euro area. As such, our analysis suggests that being 
part of a Monetary Union or having the intention to join one in the future, generates positive 
and significant fiscal multipliers. When controlling for the crisis period, we obtained results 
consistent with previous conclusions of the literature, namely higher (peak) multipliers in crisis 
periods. 
We extend our research by focusing in Chapter 5 on the Mediterranean Area, which is 
appropriate for studying output effects of fiscal stimuli, since it regroups developed and 
developing countries, small and large countries, and also countries that are in a monetary union 
and countries with an autonomous monetary policy. To this end, we made use of the PVAR 
methodology, and we used a wide set of alternative specifications (ordering of the fiscal 
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variables, control variables, computation of the main variables), in order to test the robustness 
of our results. The response of output to public consumption and public investment shocks is 
consistent with the Keynesian theory; this is the case for example for consumption (investment) 
impact and cumulative multipliers in African (Asian) countries. A not significant output 
response, in accordance with the Ricardian Equivalence (Barro, 1974), is obtained for an 
investment (consumption) shock in small EMU (Asian) countries. Moreover, our estimations 
also reveal anti-Keynesians output responses, i.e. at impact, for an investment shock in African 
countries. All these results remain remarkably stable to several robustness tests, and highlight, 
on the one hand, that policy measures, including the choice of the type of fiscal stimulus, should 
be carefully designed in accordance with country/area economic characteristics and needs. On 
the other hand, our results suggest the need for better convergence and policy coordination 
between countries. 
Finally, we develop the previously-used methods by drawing in Chapter 6 upon a panel 
vector error correction model (PVECM), and focusing on emerging Central and Eastern 
European Countries. We considered this methodology to be the most appropriate for this area, 
taking into account that, although these countries may display different paths in the short-run, 
they share a long-run common path, namely the integration process in the EMU. Our analysis 
unveils relatively small expenditure multipliers, which might suggest that expansionary fiscal 
policies have a fairly weak effect. However, we equally emphasize important heterogeneities at 
country-level. Specifically, we reveal significant multipliers for less developed CEEC 
countries, in relatively closed CEEC, in the CEEC with low debt to GDP ratio and with fixed 
or floating exchange regime rates. 
To fight the recent crisis, governments all over the world put in place at first stimulus 
packages followed by stabilization measures, thus recognizing the importance of the demand 
mechanism on the short and medium term. Our research purpose was to analyze the complexity 
of demand, supply and growth relationship. In order to do this we studied different regions, 
countries and areas for a better and complex understanding of how these relationships work. 
Our results reveal strong heterogeneities between regions and countries for both studied topics 
in this thesis, namely the Okun Law and the fiscal multiplier, suggesting that there is no unique 
optimal design for economic policy and that policy measures must be established taking into 
account each economy characteristics and needs. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
195 
The results obtained in this thesis could be extended in several directions. As showed 
by our results, the regional significance of Okun’s coefficient may differ across the considered 
country, in the sense that the coefficient is significant in developed Czech and Slovak regions, 
while not significant in Romanian developed regions. Future work could explore the sources of 
such heterogeneities, and an appealing and viable starting point will be to upgrade Okun’s Law 
with variables that account for the quality of institutions or corruption index, given the 
importance of institutions in these countries. Regarding multipliers, an immediate development 
would be to provide an explanation as why tax multipliers are relatively more stable across 
different groups of countries. Next, our results could be developed by taking a closer look at 
possible sources of nonlinearities in the significance, size and magnitude of fiscal multipliers, 
such as the phase of the economic cycle or the type of the fiscal policy (i.e. restrictive or 
expansionary). Furthermore, from an econometric standpoint, an interesting development of our 
work would consist of accounting for possible spillovers, both at regional and country-level, to 
better understand the behaviour of Okun’s coefficients and of fiscal multipliers, through the use 
of appropriate spatial econometrics techniques. Finally, our research could be developed to 
allow accounting for the impact of monetary policy when analyzing the relationship between 
unemployment, fiscal policy and economic growth. 
 
 
 196 
 
 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
197 
Bibliography General introduction 
 
- Attfield, C. and B. Silverstone (1998) “Okun’s Law, Cointegration and Gap Variables” 
Journal of Macroeconomics 20, 625-637. 
- Ball, L., Jalles, J. and P. Loungani (2015) “Do forecasters belive in Okun’s Law? An 
assessment of unemployment and output forecast” International Journal of Forecasting 31, 
176-184. 
- Ball, L., Leigh, D. and P. Loungani (2013a) “Okun’s Law: fit at fifty?” NBER working paper 
no. 18668 13/10. 
- Ball, L., Furceri, D., Leigh, D. and P. Loungani (2013b) “Does one Law fit All? Cross-country 
evidence on Okun’s Law” New School talk September 10. 
- Baxter, M. and R. King (1999) “Measuring Business Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass Filters 
for Economic Time Series” Review of Economics and Statistics 81, 575-593. 
- Bezemer, D (2009) “No One Saw this coming: Understanding Financial Crisis through 
Accounting Models” SOM Research Reports of University of Groningen 09002, 56p. 
- Blanchard, O. (2015) “Contours of Macroeconomic Policy in the Future” http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2015/04/02/contours-of-macroeconomic-policy-in-the-future/. 
- Blanchard, O. (2014) “As demand improves, time to focus more on supply” http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2014/04/08/as-demand-improves-time-to-focus-more-on-supply/ 
- Carmignani, F. (2015) “The international effect of US government expenditure” Economic 
Modeling 47, 63-73. 
- Cazes, S., Verick, S. and C. Heuer (2009) “Labour market policies in times of crisis” 
Employment Working paper no. 35. 
- Daly, M. and B. Hobijn (2010) “Okun’s Law and the unemployment surprise of 2009” Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2010-07. 
- Daly, M., Fernald, J., Jorda, O. and F. Nechio (2014) “Interpreting deviations from Okun’s 
Law” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2014-12. 
- Erhel, C., and C. Levionnois (2013) “Labour Market Policies in Times of Crisis: A 
Comparison of the 1992-1993 and 2008-2010 Recessions” Documents de travail du Centre 
d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2013.60 
- Furceri, D. and P. Loungani (2014) “Growth: An essential Part of a Cure for Unemployment” 
http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2014/11/19/growth-an-essential-part-of-a-cure-for-
unemployment/ 
- G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting (2015) “Global Prospects and 
Policy Challenges” http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/2015/020915.pdf. 
- Gabrisch, H. and H. Buscher (2006) “The Relationship between Unemployment and Output 
in Post-communist Countries” Post-Communist Economies 18, 261-276.  
Bibliography 
198 
- Gordon, R. (1984) “Unemployment and potential output in the 1980s” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 2, 537-586.  
- Gordon, R. (2010) “Okun’s Law and Productivity Innovations.” American Economic Review: 
Papers & Proceedings 100, 11-15.  
- Hodrick, R. and E. Prescott (1997) “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29, 1-16. 
-Hutengs, O. and G. Stadtmann (2014) “Don’t trust anybody over 30: youth unemployment and 
Okun’s law in CEE countries” Bank I Kredit 45, 1-16. 
- Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E. and C. Vegh (2013) “How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 239-254. 
- Ilzetzki, E. and C. Vegh (2008) “Procyclical Fiscal Policy In Developing Countries: Truth Or 
Fiction?” NBER Working Paper no. 14191, 61 p. 
- International Institute for Labour Studies (2011) “A review of global fiscal stimulus” EC-IILS 
Joint Discussion Paper Series 5. 
- International Labor Office (2015) World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2015. 
- International Labor Organization (2009a) “Review of sector-specific stimulus packages and 
policy responses to the global economic crisis” ILO Geneva Working paper 01/05.2009. 
- International Labor Organization (2009b) “Protecting people, promoting jobs: a Survey of 
Country Employment and Social Protection Policy Responses to the Global Economic Crisis” 
ILO report for the G20 Leaders’ Summit, Pittsburgh. 
- International Monetary Fund (2015) The Global Financial Stability Report April 2015. 
- International Monetary Fund (2010) World Economic Outlook April 2010. 
- Lagarde, C. (2014) “Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European Recovery” http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2014/01/28/jobs-and-growth-supporting-the-european-recovery/. 
- Lee, J. (2000) “The Robustness of Okun’s Law: Evidence from OECD Countries” Journal of 
Macroeconomics 22, 331-356. 
- Lodewijks, J. (1989) “Arthur Okun’s contribution to the macroeconomic policy debates in the 
1970s” Economic Analysis and Policy 19, 141-166. 
- Mayes, D. and M. Virén (2009) “Changes in behavior under EMU” Economic Modelling 26, 
751-759. 
- Melguizo Chafer, C. (2015) “An analysis of the Okun law for the Spanish provinces” Research 
Institute of Applied Economics and Regional Quantitative Analysis Research Group, Working 
paper no. 2015/01 1/37. 
- Meyer, B. and M. Tasci (2010) “An unstable Okun’s Law, not the best rule of thumb” 
Economic Commentary Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 2012-08. 
- Moosa, I. (1997) “A cross-country comparison of Okun’s coefficient” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 24, 335-356. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
199 
- Moosa, I. (1999) “Cyclical output, cyclical unemployment, and Okun’s coefficient: A 
Structural time series approach” International Review of Economics and Finance 8, 293-304. 
- Okun, A. (1962) “Potential GNP: Its measurement and significance” American Statistical 
Association, Proceedings of the Business and Economics Section, 98-104.  
- Owyang, M. and K. Vermann (2013) “Okun’s Law in Recession and Recovery” Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Synopses 2013-23 
 - Perman, R., Stephan, G. and C. Tavéra (2015) “Okun's law-a meta-analysis” The Manchester 
School 83, 101-126 
- Petrović P., M. Arsić and A. Nojković (2014) “Fiscal Multipliers in Emerging European Economies”, 
FC Research Papers no. 14/01. 
- Prachowny, M. (1993) “Okun’s law: Theoretical foundations and revised estimates” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 75, 331-336. 
- Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2009) “This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly” 
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 
- Saha, D. and J. von Weisacker (2009) “Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages 
for 2009: An update” Bruegel Policy Contribution 2009/02, 1-18. 
- Verick, S. and I. Islam (2010) “The Great Recession of 2008-2009: Causes, Consequences 
and Policy Responses” IZA Discussion Paper no. 4934. 
- Zhang, Y., Thelen, N. and A. Rao (2010) “Social Protection in Fiscal Stimulus Packages: 
Some Evidence” UNDS/ODS Working paper. 
 
 
  
Bibliography 
200 
Bibliography Chapter 1. 
 
- Adanu, K. (2005) “A cross-province comparison of Okun’s coefficient for Canada” Applied 
Economics 37, 561-570. 
- Apergis, N. and A. Rezitis (2003) “An examination of Okun’s law: Evidence from regional 
areas in Greece” Applied Economics 35, 1147-1151. 
- Apergis, N. (2005) “An estimation of the natural rate of unemployment in Greece” Journal of 
Policy Modeling 27, 91-99. 
- Attfield, C. and B. Silverstone (1997) “Okun’s Coefficient: A Comment” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 79, 326-329. 
- Attfield, C. and B. Silverstone (1998) “Okun’s Law, Cointegration and Gap Variables” 
Journal of Macroeconomics 20, 625-637. 
- Ball, L., Leigh, D. and P. Loungani (2013) “Okun’s Law: Fit at 50?” NBER working paper 
18668. 
- Baxter, M. and R. King (1999) “Measuring Business Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass Filters 
for Economic Time Series” Review of Economics and Statistics 81, 575-593. 
- Beaton, K. (2010) “Time Variation in Okun’s Law: A Canada and US Comparison” Bank of 
Canada working paper 2010-07. 
- Binet, M.-E. and F. Facchini (2013) “Okun’s law in the French regions: a cross-regional 
comparison” Economics Bulletin 33, 420-433. 
- Blackley, P. (1991) “The Measurement and Determination of Okun’s Law: Evidence from 
State Economies” Journal of Macroeconomics 43, 641-656. 
- Canova, F. (1998) “Detrending and business cycle facts” Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 
475-512. 
- Carrion-i-Silvestre, J. and A. Sanso (2006) “A Guide to the Computation of Stationarity Tests” 
Empirical Economics 31, 433-448. 
- Christopoulos, D. (2004) “The Relationship between output and unemployment: Evidence 
from Greek regions” Papers in Regional Science 83, 611-620. 
- Coen, R. and B. Hickman (2006) “An econometric model of potential output, productivity 
growth, and resource utilization” Journal of Macroeconomics 28, 645-664. 
- Cuaresma, J. (2003) “Okun’s Law Revisited” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 65, 
439-451. 
- Daly, M., Fernald, J., Jordà, O. and F. Nechio (2014) “Interpreting Deviations from Okun’s 
Law” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2014-12. 
- Daly, M. and B. Hobijn (2010) “Okun’s Law and the unemployment surprise of 2009” Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2010-07. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
201 
- Elliott, G., Rothenberg, T. and J. Stock (1996) “Efficient Tests for an AutoRegressive Unit 
Root” Econometrica 64, 813-836. 
- Evans, G. (1989) “Output and unemployment dynamics in the United States: 1950-1985” 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 4, 213-238. 
- Fouquau, J. (2008) “Threshold effects in Okun’s Law: a panel data analysis” Economics 
Bulletin 5, 1-14. 
- Freeman, D. (2000) “Regional tests of Okun’s Law” International Advances in Economic 
Research 6, 557-570. 
- Freeman, D. (2001) “Panel tests in Okun’s law for ten industrial countries” Economic Inquiry 
39, 511-523 
- Gabrisch, H. and H. Buscher (2006) “The Relationship between Unemployment and Output 
in Post-communist Countries” Post-Communist Economies 18, 261-276. 
- Hadri, K. (2000) “Testing for Stationarity in Heterogeneous Panel Data” Econometrics 
Journal 3, 148-161. 
- Harris, R. and B. Silverstone (2001) “Testing for Asymmetry in Okun’s Law: A Cross-
Country Comparison” Economics Bulletin 5, 1-13. 
- Hodrick, R. and E. Prescott (1997) “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29, 1-16. 
- Holmes, M. and B. Silverstone (2006) “Okun’s Law, asymmetries and jobless recoveries in 
the US: A Markov-switching approach” Economics Letters 92, 293-299. 
- Huang, H.-C. and S.-C. Lin (2008) “Smooth-time-varying Okun’s coefficients” Economic 
Modelling 25, 363-375. 
- Im, K., Pesaran, M. & Y. Shin (2003) “Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels” 
Journal of Econometrics 115, 53-74. 
- Kangasharju, A. and J. Pehkonen (2001) “Employment-Output Link in Finland: Evidence 
from Regional Data” Finnish Economic Papers 14, 41-50. 
- Kangasharju, A., Tavera, C. and P. Nijkamp (2012) “Regional Growth and Unemployment: 
The Validity of Okun’s Law for the Finnish Regions” Spatial Economic Analysis 7, 381-395. 
- Kaufman, R. (1998) “An International Comparison of Okun’s Law” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 12, 182-203. 
- Knotek, E. (2007) “How useful is Okun’s Law?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
Economic Review 4, 73-103. 
- Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P., Schmidt, P. and Y. Shin (1992) “Testing the Null Hypothesis 
of Stationarity against the Alternative of a Unit Root” Journal of Econometrics 54, 159-178. 
- Lee, J. (2000) “The Robustness of Okun’s Law: Evidence from OECD Countries” Journal of 
Macroeconomics 22, 331-356. 
Bibliography 
202 
- Levin, A., Lin, C. and C. Chu (2002) “Unit Root Test in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite 
Sample Properties” Journal of Econometrics 108, 1-24. 
- Malley, J. and H. Molana (2008) “Output, unemployment and Okun’s Law: Some evidence 
from the G7” Economics Letters 101, 113-115. 
- Mayes, D. and M. Virén (2009) “Changes in behaviour under EMU” Economic Modelling 26, 
751-759. 
- Moazzami, B. and B. Dadgostar (2009) “Okun’s Law Revisited: Evidence from OECD 
Countries” International Business & Economics Research Journal 8, 21-24. 
- Moosa, I. (1997) “A cross-country comparison of Okun’s coefficient” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 24, 335-356. 
- Moosa, I. (1999) “Cyclical output, cyclical unemployment, and Okun’s coefficient: A 
Structural time series approach” International Review of Economics and Finance 8, 293-304. 
- Mussard, S. and B. Philippe (2009) “Okun’s law, creation of money and the decomposition of 
the rate of unemployment” Economics Letters 102, 7-9. 
- Neely, C. (2010) “Okun’s Law: Output and Unemployment” Federal Reserve Bank of Saint 
Louis Economic SYNOPSES 4, 1-2. 
- Okun, A. (1962) “Potential GNP: Its measurement and significance” American Statistical 
Association, Proceedings of the Business and Economics Section, 98-104. 
- Owyang, M. and T. Sekhposyan (2012) “Okun’s Law over the Business Cycle: Was the Great 
Recession all that different?” Federal Reserve of Saint Louis Review 94, 399-418. 
- Prachowny, M. (1993) “Okun’s law: Theoretical foundations and revised estimates” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 75, 331-336. 
- Ravn, M. and H. Uhlig (2002) “On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of 
observations” Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 371-375. 
- Schwert, G. (1989) “Tests for unit roots: A Monte Carlo investigation” Journal of Business 
and Economics Statistics 7, 147-159. 
- Sogner, L. and A. Stiassny (2002) “An analysis of the structural stability of Okun’s Law – a 
cross-country study” Applied Economics 14, 1775-1787. 
- Sul, D., Phillips, P. and C. Choi (2005) “Prewhitening Bias in HAC Estimation” Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 67, 517-546. 
- Villaverde, J. and A. Maza (2007) “Okun’s Law in the Spanish regions” Economics Bulletin 
18, 1-11. 
- Villaverde, J. and A. Maza (2009) “The robustness of Okun’s Law in Spain, 1980-2004: 
Regional evidence” Journal of Policy Modeling 31, 289-297. 
- Virén, M. (2001) “The Okun curve is non-linear” Economics Letters 70, 253-257. 
- Weber, C. (1995) “Cyclical Output, Cyclical Unemployment, and Okun’s Coefficient: A New 
Approach” Journal of Applied Econometrics 10, 433-445.  
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
203 
Bibliography Chapter 2. 
 
- Adanu, K. (2005) “A cross-province comparison of Okun’s coefficient for Canada” Applied 
Economics 37, 561-570. 
- Albu, L., Caraiani, P. and M. Iordan (2011) “Perspectivele pietei muncii din Romania in 
contextul strategiei Europa 2020” study for the National Commission of Forecasting, 201-247.  
- Apergis, N. and A. Rezitis (2003) “An examination of Okun’s law: Evidence from regional 
areas in Greece” Applied Economics 35, 1147-1151. 
- Attfield, C. and B. Silverstone (1997) “Okun’s Coefficient: A Comment” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 79, 326-329. 
- Ball, L., Leigh, D. and P. Loungani (2013) “Okun’s Law: Fit at 50?” NBER working paper 
18668. 
- Beaton, K. (2010) “Time Variation in Okun’s Law: A Canada and US Comparison” Bank of 
Canada wp 2010-07. 
- Binand, M.-E. and F. Facchini (2013) “Okun’s law in the French regions: a cross-regional 
comparison” Economics Bulletin 33, 420-433. 
- Canova, F. (1998) “Detrending and business cycle facts” Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 
475-512. 
- Christopoulos, D. (2004) “The Relationship between output and unemployment: Evidence 
from Greek regions” Papers in Regional Science 83, 611-620. 
- Coen, R. and B. Hickman (2006) “An econometric model of potential output, productivity 
growth, and resource utilization” Journal of Macroeconomics 28, 645-664. 
- Cuaresma, J. (2003) “Okun’s Law Revisited” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 65, 
439-451. 
- Daly, M. and B. Hobijn (2010) “Okun’s Law and the unemployment surprise of 2009” Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2010-07. 
- Durech, R., Minea, A., Mustea, L. and L. Slusna (2014) “Regional Evidence on Okun’s Law 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia” Economic Modelling 42, 57-65. 
- Freeman, D. (2000) “Regional tests of Okun’s Law” International Advances in Economic 
Research 6, 557-570. 
- Freeman, D. (2001) “Panel tests in Okun’s law for ten industrial countries” Economic Inquiry 
39, 511-523 
- Gabrisch, H and H. Buscher (2006) “The Relationship between Unemployment and Output in 
Post-communist Countries” Post-Communist Economies 18, 261-276. 
- Hanusch, M. (2012) “Jobless Growth? Okun’s Law in East Asia” World Bank Policy Research 
working paper no. 6156. 
Bibliography 
204 
- Harris, R. and B. Silverstone (2001) “Testing for Asymmetry in Okun’s Law: A Cross-
Country Comparison” Economics Bulletin 5, 1-13. 
- Hodrick, R. and E. Prescott (1997) “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29, 1-16. 
- Holmes, M. and B. Silverstone (2006) “Okun’s Law, asymmetries and jobless recoveries in 
the US: A Markov-switching approach” Economics Letters 92, 293-299. 
- Huang, H.-C. and S.-C. Lin (2008) “Smooth-time-varying Okun’s coefficients” Economic 
Modelling 25, 363-375. 
- Huang, H.-C. and C.-C. Yeh (2013) “Okun’s law in panels of countries and states ” Applied 
Economics 25, 191-199. 
- Hutengs, O. and G. Stadtmann (2013) “Don’t trust anybody over 30: Youth unemployment 
and Okun’s law in CEE countries” European University Viadrina Frankfurt Discussion Paper 
no. 333. 
- Izyumov, A. and J. Vahaly (2002) “The Unemployment-Output Tradeoff in Transition 
Economies: Does Okun’s Law Apply?” Economics of Planning 35, 317-331. 
- Kangasharju, A. and J. Pehkonen (2001) “Employment-Output Link in Finland: Evidence 
from Regional Data” Finnish Economic Papers 14, 41-50. 
- Kangasharju, A., Tavera, C. and P. Nijkamp (2012) “Regional Growth and Unemployment: 
The Validity of Okun’s Law for the Finnish Regions” Spatial Economic Analysis 7, 381-395. 
- Knotek, E. (2007) “How useful is Okun’s Law?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
Economic Review 4, 73-103. 
- Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P., Schmidt, P. and Y. Shin (1992) “Testing the Null Hypothesis 
of Stationarity against the Alternative of a Unit Root” Journal of Econometrics 54, 159-178. 
- Lal, I., Muhammad, S., Anwer Jalil, M. and A. Hussain (2010) “Test of Okun’s Law in Some 
Asian Countries Co-Integration Approach” European Journal of Scientific Research 40, 73-80. 
- Lee, J. (2000) “The Robustness of Okun’s Law: Evidence from OECD Countries” Journal of 
Macroeconomics 22, 331-356. 
- Malley, J. and H. Molana (2008) “Output, unemployment and Okun’s Law: Some evidence 
from the G7” Economics Letters 101, 113-115. 
- Mayes, D. and M. Virén (2009) “Changes in behavior under EMU” Economic Modelling 26, 
751-759. 
- Moosa, I. (1997) “A cross-country comparison of Okun’s coefficient” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 24, 335-356. 
- Moosa, I. (1999) “Cyclical output, cyclical unemployment, and Okun’s coefficient: A 
Structural time series approach” International Review of Economics and Finance 8, 293-304. 
- Mussard, S. and B. Philippe (2009) “Okun’s law, creation of money and the decomposition of 
the rate of unemployment” Economics Letters 102, 7-9. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
205 
- Okun, A. (1962) “Potential GNP: Its measurement and significance” American Statistical 
Association, Proceedings of the Business and Economics Section, 98-104. 
- Owyang, M. and T. Sekhposyan (2012) “Okun’s Law over the Business Cycle: Was the Great 
Recession all that different?” Federal Reserve of Saint Louis Review 94, 399-418. 
- Perman, R. and C. Tavera (2005) “A cross-country analysis of the Okun’s Law coefficient 
convergence in Europe”, Applied Economics 37, 2501-2513 
- Prachowny, M. (1993) “Okun’s law: Theoretical foundations and revised estimates” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 75, 331-336. 
- Ravn, M. and H. Uhlig (2002) “On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of 
observations” Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 371-375. 
- Schwert, G. (1989) “Tests for unit roots: A Monte Carlo investigation” Journal of Business 
and Economics Statistics 7, 147-159. 
- Sogner, L. and A. Stiassny (2002) “An analysis of the structural stability of Okun’s Law – a 
cross-country study” Applied Economics 14, 1775-1787. 
- Villaverde, J. and A. Maza (2009) “The robustness of Okun’s Law in Spain, 1980-2004: 
Regional evidence” Journal of Policy Modeling 31, 289-297. 
- Virén, M. (2001) “The Okun curve is non-linear” Economics Letters 70, 253-257. 
 
 
 
  
Bibliography 
206 
Bibliography Chapter 3. 
 
- Afonso, A., Agnello, L. and D. Furceri (2010) “Fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence and 
discretion” Public Choice 145, 503-530. 
- Agnello, L., Furceri, D. and R. Sousa (2013) “How best to measure discretionary fiscal policy? 
Assessing its impact on private spending” Economic Modelling 34, 15-24. 
- An, S. and F. Schorfheide (2007) “Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models” Econometric Reviews 
26, 113-172. 
- Ary Tanimoune, N., Combes, J.-L. and P. Plane (2008) “Les effets non linéaires de la politique 
budgétaire : le cas de l'Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine” Économie et Previson 
5, 145-162. 
- Auerbach, A. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2012a) “Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal 
Policy” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4, 1-27. 
- Auerbach, A. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2012b) “Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion” 
in A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi (dir.) Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, University of 
Chicago Press, 704 p.  
- Barro, R. (1974) “Are government bonds net wealth?” Journal of Political Economy 82, 1095-
1117.  
- Batini, N., Callegari, G. and G. Melina (2012) “Successful Austerity in the United States, 
Europe and Japan” IMF Working Paper no. 12/190, 62 p. 
- Baum, A. and G. Koester (2011) “The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Economic Activity over the 
Business Cycle –Evidence from a Threshold VAR Analysis” Bundesbank Discussion Paper no. 
03/2011, 60 p.  
- Baum, A., Poplawski-Ribeiro, M. and A. Weber (2012) “Fiscal multipliers and the state of the 
economy” IMF Working Paper no. 12/286, 31 p.  
- Baxter, M. and K. King (1993) “Fiscal policy in general equilibrium” American Economic 
Review 83, 315-334.  
- Beetsma, R., Giuliodori, M. and F. Klaassen (2008) “The effects of public spending shocks 
on trade balances and budget deficits in the European Union” Journal of the European 
Economic Association 6, 414-423.  
- Bénassy, J. (2007) “Ricardian equivalence and the intertemporal Keynesian multiplier” 
Economics Letters 94, 118-123.  
- Bilbiie, F., Meier, A. and G. Muller (2008) “What accounts for the changes in U.S. fiscal 
policy transmission?” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 40, 1439-1469.  
- Blanchard, O. (1990) “Comment” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 5, 111-116.  
- Blanchard, O. (1981) “Output, the Stock Market, and Interest Rates” American Economic 
Review 71, 132-143. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
207 
- Blanchard, O. and D. Leigh (2013) “Growth forecast errors and fiscal multipliers” American 
Economic Review 103, 117-120. 
- Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002) “An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects 
of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
117, 1329-1368.  
- Born, B., Juessen, F. and G. Muller (2013) “Exchange rate regimes and fiscal multipliers” 
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37, 446-465.  
- Briotti, G. (2005) “Economic Reactions to Public Finance Consolidation: A survey of the 
Literature” ECB Occasional Paper no. 38, 31 p. 
- Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M. and J. Fisher (2004) “Fiscal shocks and their consequences” 
Journal of Economic Theory 117, 115-189.  
- Candelon, B. and L. Lieb (2013) “Fiscal policy in good and bad times” Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control 37, 2679-2694.  
- Canova, F. and C. Cicarelli (2013) “Panel vector autoregressive models: A survey” ECB 
Working Paper 1507, 55 p.  
- Chinn, M. (2013) “Fiscal Multipliers” New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 25 November 2013 http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/ 
article?id=pde2013_F000329  
- Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M. and S. Rebelo (2011) “When Is the Government Spending 
Multiplier Large?” Journal of Political Economy 119, 78-121.  
- Cimadomo, J. and A. Benassy-Quere (2012) “Changing patterns of fiscal policy multipliers 
in Germany, the UK and the US” Journal of Macroeconomics 34, 845-873.  
- Coenen, G., Erceg, C., Freedman, C., Furceri, D., Kumhof, M., Lalonde, R., Laxton, D., Linde, 
J., Mourougane, A., Muir, D., Mursula, S., De Resende, C., Roberts, J., Roeger, W., Snudden, 
S., Trabandt, M. and J. In’t Veld (2012) “Effects of fiscal stimulus in structural models” 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4, 22-68.  
- Cogan, J., Cwik, T., Taylor, J. and V. Wieland (2009) “New Keynesian versus Old Keynesian 
Government Spending Multipliers” Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34, 281-295.  
- Corsetti, G., Meier, A., Müller, G. and M. Devereux (2012) “What determines government 
spending multipliers?” Economic Policy 27, 521-565.  
- Craft, N. and T. Mills (2012) “Rearmament to the Rescue? New Estimates of the Impact of 
Keynesian’ Policies in 1930s’ Britain” CAGE Online Working Paper Series no. 103, 26 p.  
- Cwik, T. and V. Wieland (2011) “Keynesian government spending multipliers and spillovers 
in the euro area” Economic Policy 26, 493-549.  
- Dalsgaard, T., André, C. and P. Richardson (2001) “Standard Shocks in the OECD Interlink 
Model” OECD Economics Departments Working Paper no. 306, 39 p.  
Bibliography 
208 
- Davig, T. and E. Leeper (2011) “Monetary-fiscal interactions and fiscal stimulus” European 
Economic Review 55, 211-227.  
- Edelberg, W., Eichenbaum, M. and J. Fisher (1999) “Understanding the Effects of a Shock to 
Government Purchases” Review of Economic Dynamics 2, 166-206.   
- Eggertsson, G. (2009) “What Fiscal Policy Is Effective at Zero Interest Rates?” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 402, 39 p.  
- Eichenbaum, M. and J. Fisher (2004) “Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11” NBER Working 
Paper no 10430, 37 p.  
- Fair, R. (1993) “Testing macroeconometric models” American Economic Review 83, 287-293. 
- Fatas, A. and I. Mihov (2003) “The case for restricting discretionary fiscal policy” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 118, 1419-1447.  
- Fatas, A. and I. Mihov (2001) “The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Consumption and Employment: 
Theory and Evidence” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 2760, 32 p.  
- Favero, C. (2002) “How do European monetary and fiscal authorities behave?” CEPR 
Discussion Paper no. 3426, 35p.  
- Feldstein, M. (1982) “Government Deficits and Aggregate Demand” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 9, 1-20.  
- Freedman, C., Kumhof, M., Laxton, D., Muir, D. and S. Mursula (2010) “Global effects of 
fiscal stimulus during the crisis” Journal of Monetary Economics 57, 506-526.  
- Friedman, M. and A. Schwartz (1963) “A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960” 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 860 p.  
- Gali, J., Lopez-Salido, J. and J. Valles (2007) “Understanding the effects of government 
spending on consumption” Journal of the European Economic Association 5, 227-270.  
- Gechert, S. and H. Will (2012) “Fiscal multipliers: A meta regression analysis” IMK Working 
Paper no. 97, 36 p.  
- Ghosh, A., Chamon, M, Crowe, C., Kim, J. and J. Ostry (2009) “Coping with the Crisis: Policy 
Options for Emerging Market Countries” IMF staff position note 09/08, 30 p.  
- Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano (1990) “Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales 
of Two Small European Countries” NBER Macroeconomic Annual 5, 75-111. 
- Hall, R. (2009) “By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Government Buys More Output?” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2009, 183-231.  
- Hegeland, H. (1954) “The Multiplier Theory” reprinted New York, A.M. Kelley, 261 p.  
- Hicks, J. (1937) “Mr. Keynes and the 'Classics', A Suggested Interpretation” Econometrica 5, 
147-159.  
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
209 
- Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E. and C. Vegh (2013) “How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 239-254.  
- Ilzetzki, E., Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2010) “The Country Chronologies and Background 
Material to Exchange Rate Arrangements into the 21st Century: Will the Anchor Currency 
Hold?” unpublished manuscript.  
- Ilzetzki, E. and C. Vegh (2008) “Procyclical Fiscal Policy In Developing Countries: Truth Or 
Fiction?” NBER Working Paper no. 14191, 61 p.  
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012) World Economic Outlook, October.  
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008) World Economic Outlook, October.  
- Kahn, R. (1931) “The Relation of Home Investment to Unemployment” The Economic 
Journal 41, 173-198.  
- Keynes, J. (1936) “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” Palgrave 
Macmillan, 472 p.  
- Klein, L. and R. Young (1980) “An introduction to econometric forecasting and forecasting 
models” Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 155 p.  
- Linnemann, L. (2006) “The effects of government spending on private consumption: a 
puzzle?” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 38, 1715-1735.  
- Lucas, R. (1976) “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 1, 19-46.  
- Mertens, K. and M. Ravn (2013) “Reconciliation of SVAR and narrative estimates of tax 
multipliers” Journal of Monetary Economics, article in press.  
- Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2012) “Persistent Deficit, Growth, And Indeterminacy” 
Macroeconomic Dynamics 16, 267-283.  
- Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2009) “Investissement public et effets non linéaires des déficits 
budgétaires” Recherches économiques de Louvain 75, 281-311.  
- Mittnik, S. and W. Semmler (2012) “Regime dependence of the fiscal multiplier” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 83, 502-522.  
- Modigliani, F. (1971) “Monetary policy and consumption: Linkages via interest rate and 
wealth effects in the FMP model” Consumer spending and monetary policy Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, 9-84.  
- Monacelli, T. and R. Perotti (2010) “Fiscal policy, the real exchange rate and traded goods” 
Economic Journal 120, 437-461.  
- Mountford, A. and H. Uhlig (2009) “What Are the Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks?” Journal 
of Applied Econometrics 24, 960-992.  
Bibliography 
210 
- Mountford, A. and H. Uhlig (2005) “What Are the Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks?” SFB 649 
Discussion Paper no. 2005-039, 53 p.  
- Owyang, M., Ramey, V. and S. Zubairy (2013) “Are Government Spending Multipliers 
Greater during Periods of Slack? Evidence from Twentieth-Century Historical Data” American 
Economic Association 103, 129-34.  
- Perotti, R. (2006) “Public Investment and the Golden Rule: Another (Different) Look” IGIER 
Working Paper no. 277, 49 p.  
- Perotti, R. (2005) “Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries” CEPR 
Discussion Paper no. 4842, 60 p.  
- Perotti, R. (1999) “Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
114, 1399-1436.  
- Quesnay, F. (1758) “Tableau économique” in 3d ed. Reprint, Edited by M. Kuczynski and R. 
Meek, London, Macmillan, 1972.  
- Ramey, V. (2011) “Identifying government spending shocks: it’s all in the timing” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 126, 1-50.  
- Ramey, V. and M. Shapiro (1998) “Costly Capital Reallocation and the Effects of Government 
Spending” Carnegie Rochester Conference on Public Policy 48, 145-194.  
- Ravn, M., Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2012) “Consumption, government spending, and 
the real exchange rate” Journal of Monetary Economics 59, 215-234.  
- Romer, C. and D. Romer (2010) “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates 
Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks” American Economic Review 100, 763-801.  
- Romer, C. and D. Romer (1989) “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of 
Friedman and Schwartz” NBER Working Paper no. 2966, 59 p.  
- Sims, C. (1980) “Macroeconomics and Reality” Econometrica 48, 1-48.  
- Snowdon, B. and H. Vane (2005) “Modern macroeconomics: its origins, development and 
current state” Nothampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 826 p.  
- Spilimbergo, A., Symansky, S. and M. Schindler (2009) “Fiscal Multipliers” IMF Staff 
Position Note 09/11, 15 p.  
- Stein, S. and F. Song (2002) “Vector autoregression and the dynamic multiplier: a historical 
review” Journal of Policy Modeling 24, 283-300.  
- Stock, J. and M. Watson (2001) “Vector Autoregression” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
15, 101-115.  
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
211 
- Tenhofen, J. and G. Wolff (2007) “Does Anticipation of Government Spending Matter? 
Evidence from an Expectation Augmented VAR” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper no. 
14/2007, 40 p.  
- Woodford, M. (2011) “Simple analytics of the government expenditure multiplier” American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3, 1-35. 
 
 
  
Bibliography 
212 
 
Bibliography Chapter 4. 
 
- Afonso, A. (2001) “Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Policy in the EU-15” ISEG-UTL Working 
Paper no. 7/2001/DE/CISEP. 
- Al-Eyd, A. and R. Barrell (2005) “Estimating tax and benefit multipliers in Europe” Economic 
Modelling 22, 759-776.  
- Alesina, A., Ardagna, S., Perotti, R. and F. Schiantarelli (2002) “Fiscal Policy, Profits, and 
Investment” American Economic Review 92, 571-589. 
- Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1995) “Fiscal Expansions and Fiscal Adjustments in OECD 
Countries” NBER Working Paper 5214, 38p. 
- Auerbach, A. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2012) “Measuring the output responses to fiscal policy” 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4, 1-27.  
- Auerbach, A., and Y. Gorodnichenko (2013) “Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion” 
in Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, 63-98, eds. Alesina A., Giavazzi, F., University of 
Chicago Press.  
- Batini, N., Callegari, G. and G. Melina (2012) “Successful Austerity in the United States, 
Europe and Japan” IMF Working Paper no. 12/190, 62p. 
- Baum, A., Poplawski-Ribeiro, M. and A. Weber (2012) “Fiscal multipliers and the state of the 
economy” IMF Working Paper no. 12/286, 31p. 
- Beetsma, R. and M. Giuliodori (2011) “The effects of government purchases shocks: review 
and estimates for the EU” Economic Journal 121, 4-32. 
- Blanchard, O. and C. Cottarelli (2010) “Ten commandments for fiscal adjustment in advanced 
economies” iMFdirect.  
- Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002) “An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects 
of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
117, 1329-1368.  
- Canova, F. and C. Cicarelli (2013) “Panel vector autoregressive models: A survey” ECB 
Working Paper no. 1507, 55p. 
- Choi, I. (2001) “Unit root tests for panel data” Journal of International Money and Finance 
20, 249-272. 
- Cléau, G., Lemoine, M. and P-A. Pionnier (2013) “Which Size and Evolution of the 
Government Expenditure Multiplier in France (1980-2010)?” Document de Travail de la 
Banque de France 469, 63p. 
- Corsetti, G., Kuester, K., Meier, A. and G. Müller (2012) “Sovereign risk, fiscal policy and 
macroeconomic stability” IMF Working Paper no. 12/33, 55p. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
213 
- Dalsgaard, T., André, C. and P. Richardson (2001) “Standard Shocks in the OECD Interlink 
Model” OECD Economics Departments Working Paper no. 306, 39p. 
- Denes, M., Eggertsson, G. and S. Gilbukh (2013) “Deficits, public debt dynamics, and tax and 
spending multipliers” Economic Journal 123, 133-163. 
- Fatas, A. and I. Mihov (2001) “The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Consumption and Employment: 
Theory and Evidence” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 2760, 32p. 
- Fazzari, S., Morley, J. and I. Panovska (2012) “State-dependent effects of fiscal policy” UNSW 
Australian School of Business Research Paper 2012-27B. 
- Fishback, P (2014) “Out of the Crisis: New Insights from the 1930s and 1940s” Conférence 
Plénière au 31e Journées d’Economie Monétaire, Bancaire et Financière du GDRE « Monnaie, 
Banque, Finance », Lyon.  
- Gechert, S. (2013) “What fiscal policy is most effective? A meta regression analysis” IMK 
Working Paper 117, 50p.  
- Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano (1990) “Can Severe Fiscal Contractions be Expansionary? Tales 
of Two Small European Countries” NBER Macroeconomic Annual 5, 75-111. 
- Guajardo, J., Leigh, D. and A. Pescatori (2011) “Expansionary Austerity: New International 
Evidence” IMF Working Paper no. 11/58, 40p. 
- Hebous, S. (2011) “The Effects of Discretionary Fiscal Policy on Macroeconomic Aggregates: 
A Reappraisal” Journal of Economic Surveys 25, 674-707. 
- HM Treasury (2003) “Fiscal stabilization and EMU” Discussion paper, 114p. 
- Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E. and C. Vegh (2013) “How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 239-254. 
- Im, K., Pesaran, M. and Y.Shin (2003) “Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels” 
Journal of Econometrics 115, 53-74. 
- International Institute for Labour Studies (2011) “A review of global fiscal stimulus” EC-IILS 
Joint Discussion Paper Series 5, 41p.  
- Keynes, J. (1936) “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
- Lucas, R. (1976) “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 1, 19-46. 
- Lütkepohl, H. (2005) “New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis” Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin.  
- Maddala, G. and S. Wu (1999) “A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data and 
new simple tests” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61, 631-652.  
- Mertens, K. and M. Ravn (2013) “Reconciliation of SVAR and narrative estimates of tax 
multipliers” Journal of Monetary Economics, article in press.  
Bibliography 
214 
- Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2009a) “Impôt, déficit et croissance économique: un réexamen de 
la courbe de Laffer” Revue d’Economie Politique 119, 653-675.  
- Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2009b) “Investissement public et effets non linéaires des déficits 
budgétaires” Recherches Economiques de Louvain 75, 281-311.  
- Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2012) “Persistent Deficit, Growth, and Indeterminacy” 
Macroeconomic Dynamics 16, 267-283.  
- Mountford, A. and H. Uhlih (2005) “What Are the Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks?” SFB 649 
Discussion Paper 2005-039, 53p. - Perotti, R. (1999) “Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1399-1436. 
- Perotti, R. (2005) “Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries” CEPR 
Discussion Paper no. 4842, 60p. 
- Ramey, V. and M. Shapiro (1998) “Costly capital reallocation and the effects of government 
spending” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48, 145-149.  
- Romer, C. and D. Romer (2010) “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates 
Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks” American Economic Review 100, 763-801.  
- Sims, C. (1980) “Macroeconomics and Reality” Econometrica 48, 1-48.  
- Spilimbergo, A., Symansky, S. and M. Schindler (2009) “Fiscal Multipliers” IMF Staff 
Position Note 09/11, 15p. 
- Tenhofen, J. and G. Wolf (2007) “Does Anticipation of Government Spending Matter? 
Evidence from an Expectation Augmented VAR” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper no. 
14/2007, 40p. 
- Towbin, P. and S. Weber (2013) “Limits of floating exchange rates: The role of foreign 
currency debt and import structure” Journal of Development Economics 101, 179-194. 
 
 
  
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
215 
Bibliography Chapter 5. 
 
- Afonso, A. and R. Sousa (2012) “The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy” Applied 
Economics 44, 4439-54. 
- Agnello, L., Furceri, D. and R. Sousa (2013) “How best to measure discretionary fiscal policy? 
Assessing its impact on private spending” Economic Modelling 34, 15-24.  
- Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1997) “Fiscal adjustments in OECD countries: composition and 
macroeconomic effects” Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund 44, 210-48.  
- Auerbach, A. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2013) “Fiscal multipliers in recession and expansion”, 
in Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, Alesina, A. and Giavazzi, F. (Eds), University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 63-98. 
- Barro, R. (1974) “Are government bonds net wealth?” Journal of Political Economy 82, 1095-
117. 
- Barro, R. (1990) “Government spending in a simple model of endogeneous growth” Journal 
of Political Economy 98, 103-125. 
- Beetsma, R., Giuliodori, M. and F. Klaassen (2008) “The effects of public spending shocks 
on trade balances and budget deficits in the European union” Journal of the European Economic 
Association 6, 414-23. 
- Blanchard, O. (1981) “Output, the stock market, and interest rates” American Economic 
Review 71, 132-43. 
- Blanchard, O. and D. Leigh (2013) “Growth forecast errors and fiscal multipliers” American 
Economic Review 103, 117-20. 
- Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002) “An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of 
changes in government spending and taxes on output” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
117, 1329-68. 
- Canova, F. and C. Cicarelli (2013) “Panel vector autoregressive models: a survey” European 
Central Bank, Working Paper No. 1507, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main. 
- Chinn, M. (2013) “Fiscal multipliers” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Steven 
N. D. and Lawrence E. B. (Eds), Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
- Choi, I. (2001) “Unit root tests for panel data” Journal of International Money and Finance 
20, 249-72. 
- Corsetti, G., Meier, A., Müller, G. et al. (2012) “What determines government spending 
multipliers?” Economic Policy 27, 521-65. 
- ElSayed Kandil, M. (2013) “Variation in the fiscal multiplier with the method of financing: 
evidence across industrial countries” Applied Economics 45, 4894-927. 
- Fatas, A. and I. Mihov (2001) “The effects of fiscal policy on consumption and employment: 
theory and evidence” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 2760, CEPR, London. 
Bibliography 
216 
- Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership-Forum Euroméditerranéen des 
Instituts de Sciences Économiques (2010) “The crisis and ways out of it in the Mediterranean 
countries”, European Investment Bank Summary Report. 
- Gechert, S. and H. Will (2012) “Fiscal multipliers: a meta regression analysis” IMK Working 
Paper no. 97. 
- Hebous, S. (2011) “The effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates: 
a reappraisal” Journal of Economic Surveys 25, 674-707. 
- Hicks, J. (1937) “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’: a suggested interpretation” Econometrica 5, 
147-59. 
- Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E. and C. Végh (2013) “How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 239-54.  
- Ilzetzki, E. and C. Végh (2008) “Procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries: truth or 
fiction?” NBER Working Paper no. 14191. 
- Im, K., Pesaran, M. and Y. Shin (2003) “Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels” 
Journal of Econometrics 115, 53-74. 
- International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) (2011) “A review of global fiscal stimulus” 
EC-IILS Joint Discussion Paper Series 5, IILS, Geneva. 
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008) World Economic Outlook, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC. 
- Levin, A., Lin, C.-F. and C.-S. Chu (2002) “Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-
sample properties” Journal of Econometrics 108, 1-24.  
- Lucas, R. (1976) “Econometric policy evaluation: a critique” Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy 1, 19-46. 
- Maddala, G. and S. Wu (1999) “A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data and a 
new simple test” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61, 631-52. 
- Marglin, A. and P. Spiegler (2013) “Unpacking the multiplier: making sense of recent 
assessments of fiscal stimulus policy” Social Research 3, 819-54. 
- Mertens, K. and M. Ravn (2014) “A reconciliation of SVAR and narrative estimates of tax 
multipliers” Journal of Monetary Economics 68, 1-19. 
- Mountford, A. and H. Uhlig (2009) “What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks?” Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 24, 960-92. 
- Musgrave, R. (1939) “The nature of budgetary balance and the case for the capital budget” 
American Economic Review 29, 260-71. 
- Oxley, H. and J. Martin (1991) “Controlling government spending and deficits: trends in the 
1980s and prospects for the 1990s” OECD Economic Studies 17, 145-89. 
- Perotti, R. (2005) “Estimating the effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries” CEPR 
Discussion Paper no. 4842. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
217 
- Ravn, M. and H. Uhlig (2002) “On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of 
observations” Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 371-6. 
- Romer, C. and D. Romer (2010) “The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: estimates based 
on a new measure of fiscal shocks” American Economic Review 100, 763-801. 
- Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2007) “Shocks and frictions in us business cycles: a Bayesian 
DSGE approach” The American Economic Review 97, 586-606. 
- Spilimbergo, A., Symansky, S. and M. Schindler (2009) “Fiscal multipliers” IMF Staff 
Position Note 09/11, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
- Tenhofen, J. and G. Wolf (2007) “Does anticipation of government spending matter? Evidence 
from an expectation augmented VAR” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper 14/2007, 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main. 
- Woodford, M. (2011) “Simple analytics of the government expenditure multiplier” American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3, 1-35.  
 
 
  
Bibliography 
218 
Bibliography Chapter 6. 
 
- Afonso, A., Agnello, L. and D. Furceri (2010) “Fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence and 
Discretion” Public Choice 145, 503-530. 
- Agnello, L., Furceri, D. and R.M. Sousa (2013) “How Best Measure Discretionary Fiscal 
Policy? Assessing its impact on private spending” Economic Modelling 34, 15-24. 
- Almunia, M., Benetrix, A., Eichengreen, B., O’Rourke, K.H. and G. Rua (2010) “From Great 
Depression to Great Credit Crisis: similarities, differences and lessons” Economic Policy 62, 
219-265. 
- Banerjee, A., Dolado, J.J. and R. Mestre (1998) “Error-correction mechanism tests for 
cointegration in a single-equation framework” Journal of Time Series Analysis 19, 267-283. 
- Barro, R. (1974) “Are government bonds net wealth?” Journal of Political Economy 82, 1095-
1117. 
- Barro, R. and C.J. Redlick (2009) “Macroeconomic Effects from Government Purchases and 
Taxes” NBER Working Papers no. 15369. 
- Blanchard, O. (1981) “Output, the Stock Market, and Interest Rates” American Economic 
Review, 71, 132-143. 
- Blanchard, O. (1993) “Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators,” in H. A. A. Verbon 
and F. A. A. M. van Winden, eds., The New Political Economy of Government Debt, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers. 
- Blanchard, O. and D. Leigh (2013) “Growth forecast errors and fiscal multipliers” American 
Economic Review 103, 117-120. 
- Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002) “An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of 
changes in government spending and taxes on output” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 
1329-1368. 
- Born, B., Juessen, F. and G. Muller (2013) “Exchange rate regimes and fiscal multipliers” 
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37, 446-465. 
- Chahrour, R., Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe (2012) “A Model-Based Evaluation of the 
Debate on the Size of the Tax Multiplier” AEJ: Economic Policy 4, 28-45. 
- Choi, I. (2001) “Unit root tests for panel data” Journal of International Money and Finance 
20, 249-272. 
- Corsetti, G., Meier, A. and G. Müller (2012) “What determines government spending 
multipliers?” Economic Policy 27, 521-565. 
- Dalic, M. (2013) “Cyclical properties of fiscal policy in new member states of the EU” Post-
Communist Economies 25, 289-308. 
- Eberhardt, M. and A. Presbitero (2013) “This Time They Are Different: Heterogeneity and 
Nonlinearity in the Relationship Between Debt and Growth” IMF Working Paper no. 13/248. 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
219 
- Egert, B. (2015) “Public debt, economic growth and nonlinear effects: Myth or reality?” 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 43, 226-238. 
- Fatas, A. and I. Mihov (2006) “The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Rules in US States” 
Journal of Public Economics 90, 101-117. 
- Fatas, A. and I. Mihov (2003) “The case for restricting fiscal policy discretion” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 118, 1419-1447. 
- Gechert, S. and H. Will (2012) “Fiscal multipliers: A meta regression analysis” IMK Working 
Paper no. 97. 
- Hicks, J. (1937) “Mr. Keynes and the 'Classics', A Suggested Interpretation” Econometrica 5, 
147-159. 
- Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E.G. and C.A. Végh (2013) “How Big (Small?) are Fiscal Multipliers” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 239-254. 
- Ilzetzki, E, Reinhart, C.M. and K.S. Rogoff (2010) “Exchange Rate Arrangements Entering 
the 21st Centuring: Which Anchor Will Hold?” manuscript. 
- Ilzetzki, E. and C. Végh (2008) “Procyclical Fiscal Policy In Developing Countries: Truth Or 
Fiction?” NBER Working Paper no. 14191. 
- Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H. and Y. Shin (2003) “Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels” 
Journal of Econometrics 115, 53-74. 
- International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) (2011) “A review of global fiscal stimulus” 
EC-IILS Joint Discussion Paper Series no. 5. 
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008) World Economic Outlook, October. 
- Josifidis, K, Allegret, J.-P. and E. Beker Pucar (2013) “Adjustment mechanisms and exchange 
rate regimes in 2004 new EU members during the financial crisis” Post-Communist Economies 
25, 1-17. 
- Keynes, J. (1936) “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
- Kourtellos, A., Stengos, T. and C. Ming Tan (2014) “The effect of public debt on growth in 
multiple regimes” Journal of Macroeconomics 38, 35-43. 
- Kraay, A. (2012) “How Large Is the Government Spending Multiplier? Evidence from World 
Bank Lending” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, 829-887. 
- Kraay, A. (2014) “Government Spending Multipliers in Developing Countries. Evidence from 
Lending by Official Creditors” AEJ: Macroeconomics 6, 170-208. 
- Levin, A., Lin, C.-F. and C.-S. J. Chu (2002) “Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and 
finite-sample properties” Journal of Econometrics 108, 1-24. 
- Long, J. and C. Plosser (1983) “Real business cycle” Journal of Political Economy 91, 39-69. 
- Marglin, A. and P. Spiegler. (2013) “Unpacking the Multiplier: Making Sense of Recent 
Assessments of Fiscal Stimulus Policy” Social Research 3, 819-854. 
Bibliography 
220 
- Minea, A. and L. Mustea (2015) “A fresh look at fiscal multipliers: one size fits it all? Evidence 
from the Mediterranean area” Applied Economics 47, 2728-2744. 
- Minea, A. and A. Parent (2012) “Is High Public Debt always Harmful to Economic Growth? 
Reinhart and Rogoff and Some Complex Nonlinearities” AFC Working Paper no. 2012-8. 
- Monacelli, T. and R. Perotti (2010) “Fiscal policy, the real exchange rate and traded goods” 
Economic Journal 120, 437-461. 
- Mooney, C.Z. and R.D. Duval (1993) “Bootstrapping: A Nonparametric Approach to 
Statistical Inference” Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
- Nakamura, E. and J. Steinsson (2014) “Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence from 
US Regions” American Economic Review 104, 753-745. 
- Nenovsky, N. and P. Villieu (2011) “EU enlargement and monetary regimes from the 
insurance model perspective” Post-Communist Economies 23, 433-447. 
- Pedroni, P. (2004) “Panel cointegration: asymptotic and finite sample properties of pooled 
time series tests with an application to the PPP hypothesis” Econometric Theory 3, 579-625. 
- Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y. and R.P. Smith (1999) “Pooled mean group estimation of dynamic 
heterogeneous panels” Journal of the American Statistical Association 94, 621-634. 
- Pesaran, M.H. and R.P. Smith (1995) “Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic 
heterogeneous panels” Journal of Econometrics 68, 79-113. 
- Ramey, V. (2011) “Identifying government spending shocks: it’s all in the timing” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 126, 1-50. 
- Romer, C. and D. Romer (2010) “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates 
Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks” American Economic Review 100, 763-801 
- Westerlund, J. (2007) “Testing for Error Correction in Panel Data” Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics 69, 709-748. 
  
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
221 
Bibliography Concluding remarks. 
 
- Barro, R. (1974) “Are government bonds net wealth?” Journal of Political Economy 82, 1095-
1117. 
- Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002) “An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of 
changes in government spending and taxes on output” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 
1329-1368. 
- Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E.G. and C.A. Végh (2013) “How Big (Small?) are Fiscal Multipliers” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 239-254. 
- Keynes, J. (1936) “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
- Okun, A. (1962) “Potential GNP: Its measurement and significance” American Statistical 
Association, Proceedings of the Business and Economics Section, 98-104. 
 
 
Bibliography 
222 
 
 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
223 
 
List of Tables 
 
General introduction 
Table 1. Researchers that anticipated the crisis.  5 
Table 2. Announced stimulus packages 10 
Table 3. Recent studies assessing fiscal multipliers in developed and developing 
countries 
12 
Appendix - Table 1. Fiscal multipliers in recent literature  18 
 
Chapter 1 
Table 1. Stationarity tests for output and unemployment gap 50 
Table 2. Okun’s Law in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: regional evidence 52 
 
Chapter 2 
Table 1. Stationarity tests by region for the cyclical components of income and 
unemployment 
74 
Table 2. The Okun's Law in the Romanian regions 76 
 
Chapter 4 
Table 1. Panel unit root tests for macroeconomic series (the benchmark model) 107 
Table 2. Lag selection in all PVAR models 109 
Appendix A - Table A1. Stationarity tests for macroeconomic series (EU non-
Eurozone countries) 
119 
Appendix A - Table A2. Stationarity tests for macroeconomic series (Recent EU non-
Eurozone countries) 
119 
Appendix A - Table A3. Stationarity tests for macroeconomic series (Eurozone crisis 
countries) 
119 
Appendix D - Table D1. An overview of fiscal multipliers across groups 123 
 
Chapter 5 
Table 1a. Short-run and peak fiscal multipliers 142 
Table 1b. Cumulative and long-run fiscal multipliers 144 
Table 2a. Short-run and peak fiscal multipliers (alternative ordering of fiscal 
variables) 
147 
Table 2b. Cumulative and long-run fiscal multipliers (alternative ordering of fiscal 
variables) 
147 
Table 3a. Short-run and peak fiscal multipliers (control variables included) 148 
Table 3b. Cumulative and long-run fiscal multipliers (control variables included) 149 
Table 4a. Short-run and peak fiscal multipliers (HP-detrended variables) 150 
Table 4b. Cumulative and long-run fiscal multipliers (HP-detrended variables) 150 
Appendix A - Table A0. Unit root tests (benchmark – all countries) 153 
List of tables 
 
224 
Appendix A - Table A1. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 1 – France, 
Greece, Italy, Spain) 
153 
Appendix A - Table A2. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 2 – Cyprus, 
Malta) 
154 
Appendix A - Table A3. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 3 – Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia) 
154 
Appendix A - Table A4. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 4 –Israel, 
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey) 
155 
Appendix A - Table A5. Unit root tests for macroeconomic series (Group 5 – Croatia, 
Slovenia) 
155 
Appendix D. Mediterranean countries and data sources 160 
Appendix E. Control variables 160 
 
Chapter 6 
Table 1: Unit root tests 170 
Table 2: Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests 171 
Table 3: Estimates of the discretionary component of the fiscal policy 172 
Table 4: Output’s response to fiscal policy 174 
Table 5: Impact and cumulative fiscal multipliers for the full sample 176 
Table 6: Pooling Mean Group (PMG) country-estimates of the effect of public 
spending on output 
177 
Table 7a: Fiscal multipliers by country (PMG estimator) 178 
Table 7b: Fiscal multipliers by country (MG estimator) 179 
Table 8: List of groups of countries based on CEEC’ structural characteristics 180 
Table 9: PMG estimates of the effect of unexpected government spending on output 
when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics 
181 
Table 10: Fiscal multipliers when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics 
(PMG) 
182 
Appendix - Table A.1a: List of countries 185 
Appendix - Table A.2a: Summary statistics of government expenditure in % of GDP 
(by country) 
185 
Appendix - Table A.2b: Summary statistics of government expenditure in % of GDP 
(by category) 
185 
Appendix - Table A.3: CEEC’ ERR classification based on Ilzetzki, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) 
186 
Appendix - Table A.4: PMG estimates of the effect of unexpected government 
spending on output when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics (full Table 
9) 
187 
Appendix - Table A.5: MG country-estimates of the effect of public spending on output 189 
 
 
Essays on: Management of fiscal resources in developing and emerging countries 
225 
 
List of Figures 
 
General introduction 
Figure 1. The probability of recession and deflation forecasts 2 
Figure 2. The distribution of joblessness 3 
Figure 3. Future trend in global unemployment 3 
Figure 4. Potential output growth and its components 6 
Figure 5. GDP growth 2010-2016 7 
Figure 6. Global overview of fiscal stimulus as % of 2008 GDP 10 
 
Chapter 1 
Figure 1. Regional output and unemployment cycles in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia 
51 
Figure 2. The network of highways in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2005 58 
Figure 3.a. The magnitude of regional Okun coefficients: the role of unemployment 59 
Figure 3.b. The magnitude of regional Okun coefficients: the role of economic 
growth 
60 
Figure 3.c. The magnitude of regional Okun coefficients: the role of the GFCF 61 
 
Chapter 2 
Figure 1. Unemployment and GDP cycles in Romanian regions 74 
 
Chapter 4 
Figure 1. Response of output to fiscal shocks (the benchmark model) 109 
Figure 2a. Response of output to fiscal shocks (EU non-Eurozone members) 112 
Figure 2b. Response of output to fiscal shocks (Recent EU non-Eurozone members) 113 
Figure 3a. Response of output to fiscal shocks (Eurozone crisis countries) 115 
Figure 3b. Response of output to fiscal shocks during the crisis (Eurozone crisis 
countries) 
116 
Appendix B. Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 120 
Appendix C - Figure C1. Cumulative multipliers for the Benchmark (Eurozone) PVAR 120 
Appendix C - Figure C2a. Cumulative multipliers for the group of EU non-Eurozone 
countries 
121 
Appendix C - Figure C2b. Cumulative multipliers for the group of Recent EU non-
Eurozone countries 
121 
Appendix C - Figure C3a. Cumulative multipliers for the group of Eurozone crisis 
countries 
122 
Appendix C - Figure C3b. Cumulative multipliers for the group of Eurozone crisis 
countries (2008Q1-2012Q4 period) 
122 
 
List of figures 
226 
Chapter 5 
Figure 1. Output response to fiscal shocks (benchmark) 137 
Figure 2. Output response to fiscal shocks in Group 1 (EMU-large) 139 
Figure 3. Output response to fiscal shocks in Group 2 (EMU-small) 140 
Figure 4. Output response to fiscal shocks in Group 3 (Africa) 140 
Figure 5. Output response to fiscal shocks in Group 4 (Asia) 141 
Appendix B. Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomials 156 
Appendix C - Figure C0. Cumulative multipliers for the Benchmark PVAR (all 
countries) 
158 
Appendix C - Figure C1. Cumulative multipliers for the Group 1 (France, Greece, Italy, 
Spain) 
158 
Appendix C - Figure C2. Cumulative multipliers for Group 2 (Cyprus, Malta) 158 
Appendix C - Figure C3. Cumulative multipliers for the Group 3 (Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia) 
159 
Appendix C - Figure C4. Cumulative multipliers for the Group 4 (Israel, Lebanon, 
Syria, Turkey) 
159 
Appendix C - Figure C5. Output response to a consumption shock and cumulative 
multipliers for the Group 5 (Croatia, Slovenia) 
159 
 
